

BROWNSON'S

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1852.

ART. I. — *The Soul, her Sorrows and her Aspirations : an Essay towards the Natural History of the Soul, as the true Basis of Theology.* By WILLIAM FRANCIS NEWMAN. Second Edition. London : Chapman. 1849. 12mo. pp. 264.

WE have, as our readers will recollect, frequently asserted that the uncatholic world, Protestants as well as avowed unbelievers, have fallen into such depths of skepticism that they no longer recognize the first principles of science, and have ceased to hold any principles with that firmness which is necessary to bind them by the conclusions which logically follow therefrom. No doubt there are large numbers in the Protestant sects who fully believe themselves to be Christian believers, and who would hold us unpardonable for calling them unbelievers ; but even these, with a very few individual exceptions, are prepared to give up the Christian name itself rather than concede the identity of Christianity and Catholicity.

We take no pleasure in stating this fact. It would much abridge our arguments with Protestants, if we could address them as in some respects Christian believers, who hold in common with us the great primary principles of religion, and differ from us only on certain specific points of doctrine ; but this, if it was ever proper, is now out of the question. Those among them who believe themselves Christian believers, and who are determined to be Christians, for the most part so believe and are so determined only on condition that Christianity does not

prove to be Catholicity. They are resolved to be Christians only on condition that they can be Christians without being Catholics. With few exceptions, they hate Catholicity more than they love the Gospel, and sooner than submit to the Church they would reject the whole Christian religion, and deny the very existence of God. Neither we nor they themselves can rely on any concessions in favor of religion they may appear to make, for they make no concessions, however honestly they may make them, which they will not revoke the moment they perceive that they cannot adhere to them without furnishing premises from which the Catholic Church is logically concludable. Were we to take them at their profession, and from their avowed principles conclude the Church, they would not accept her, but would abandon their own professed principles, and seek to escape the conclusion by alleging that we have deduced it from premises that it is necessary to establish. The reason of this is, that they have settled it in their minds, that, let what will be true, the Church is false, and therefore that the fact that any principles imply her truth is a sufficient proof of their falsity.

We are forced, in our arguments with Protestants, to proceed on the supposition that they are Protestants, and Protestants before every thing else, and therefore that they will follow out the principle on which they vindicate their protest against Catholicity, if necessary, to its last logical consequences. That principle, as every body knows, is the unrestricted right of private judgment, which is simply the denial of all authority, and the assertion of the absolute moral independence of the individual. This principle, if principle it can be called, we hardly need add, is purely atheistical; for if there is a God he must be supreme, sovereign lord, and man must be morally as well as physically dependent on him, subject to him, and bound to obey him in all things whatsoever,—in thought, word, and deed. The characteristic principle of Protestantism, in that it is Protestantism, is therefore atheistical, and although all Protestants may not be distinctly conscious that such is the fact, it is really atheism and nothing else that they oppose to the Church. Nothing is more natural, then, than that they should push their denials to the denial of God, to atheism, in case they find that it is only by so doing that they can

maintain their protest against the Church. We cannot, then, construct an argument sufficiently ultimate for the final refutation of Protestantism, unless we make it sufficiently ultimate for the refutation of atheism.

No doubt many of our Protestant readers will object to this statement, and regard it as in a high degree unjust to them. But they must bear in mind that, in our judgment at least, they were never consistent with themselves. They adopt the fundamental principles of two essentially hostile and eternally irreconcilable systems. They are Protestants, and they for the most part profess to be Christians. Understanding by a *Christian*, not merely a baptized person, but one who professes and believes the Christian doctrine, a *Protestant* Christian, or a *Christian* Protestant, is to the Catholic mind simply a contradiction in terms. The distinctive principles of Protestants, in that they are Protestants, if logically carried out, would render them atheists; the principles they profess, in that they profess to be Christians, if logically carried out, would require them to be Catholics. They do not ordinarily carry out either set of principles to their last logical conclusions, and they are far from perceiving the innate hostility of the one set to the other. They usually take it for granted, that, since they hold both sets of principles, the two must be reconcilable one with the other, and both alike Protestant. They consider them both to be elements, under diverse aspects, of one and the same homogeneous system, and that one may, consistently with the assertion of both, be limited and modified by the other. Hence, when we tell them that the principle of their Protestantism is atheistical, and that to be consistent they must deny God, they deny the charge, and bring forward against it the principles and doctrines which they profess to hold in common with us, and on the strength of which they claim to be Christians; and when we tell them that, if they hold these principles and doctrines, to be logical they must be Catholics, they reply by bringing forward their distinctly Protestant principles and doctrines; thus repelling the charge of atheism by alleging certain Catholic principles and doctrines, and evading Catholicity by alleging atheistical principles and doctrines, apparently unconscious that in so doing they act inconsistently, and imply that of contradictories *both* may be true. They alternate between atheism and Catho-

licity, assume atheistical ground to escape Catholic conclusions, and Catholic ground to escape atheistical conclusions. It is in vain that we attempt to bind them by conclusions drawn from either set of principles. They suppose they may reasonably hold both, and will be held to neither, when taken exclusively.

Certain it is that Protestants profess to be Christians only by virtue of what they hold in common with the Catholic Church; for all else in their system is negative, and Christianity, whatever else it be, is something positive, affirmative, resting on its own basis, and intelligible by itself, not merely in that it is the denial of something else. Strip Protestants of what they hold in common with the Church, of what they originally learned and retained from her, and they would have nothing with which to cover their nakedness, or which even they could or would call Christianity. They are even in their own estimation Christians only in so far as they agree with the Church, and do not protest against her. Now they cannot be Protestants in the respect in which they agree with the Church, for it is only in dissenting from her and protesting against her that they are Protestants. Hence their Protestantism is not and cannot be in the Christian principles and doctrines they profess, and in treating them as Protestants these are not to be taken into the account. Their Protestantism is to be distinguished from these, and to be judged without reference to the fact that they who hold it do or do not hold these along with it; that is, their Protestantism is to be distinguished from all Christian principles and doctrines, and to be judged unchristian, precisely as it should be judged in case that Protestants did not, inconsistently with it, profess to hold some portions of Christian truth. It is what they deny in opposition to the Church, not what they hold in common with her, that constitutes their Protestantism, as what they hold in common with her, not what they deny in opposition to her, that constitutes their sole claim to be regarded as Christians. It follows, therefore, that we cannot treat Protestantism in any respect as Christian, nor Protestants in that they are Protestants as Christians. As it is not the Christianity they profess, but the Protestantism which they hold, that it is necessary to refute, and as the principle of this is atheism, we must, in all our arguments intended to be a final refu-

tation of Protestantism in its principle, begin with a refutation of atheism, on which the majority of Protestants will unhesitatingly fall back, if they find it necessary to do so in order to avoid Catholic conclusions.

Undoubtedly Protestants generally recognize the existence of the Supreme Being, but we apprehend that, although many of their ministers have written much to prove that God is, comparatively few of them have that clear conviction or that firm persuasion that he is, which is necessary to warrant us in assuming their belief in his existence as the basis of an argument against them for doctrines repugnant to their passions or their prejudices. There are with most of them things more subjectively certain than that God is, and consequently, if hard pressed, they would sooner deny his existence than surrender them. Hence they need to have the existence of God established anew to their minds, and to be shown that it is absolutely certain, so certain that there is nothing else that we believe or can believe that it would not be more reasonable to deny than to deny it.

We propose, consequently, to offer a few suggestions in refutation of atheism, but our readers must not suppose that we are about to inflict on them a long chapter of metaphysics. There are popular errors which admit of no popular refutation. The mass of the people can understand, and profit by, the results of the profoundest thought and reasoning, but only a limited number can understand the processes by which those results are obtained. There is no truth above the reach of the common mind, but the arguments which demonstrate the truth, or the reasoning necessary to vindicate it from the errors often mixed up with it in the popular mind, can in general be appreciated only by those who have received a preparatory discipline. Hence the Divine wisdom in all matters of primary importance and essential or useful to our salvation teaches us not through philosophy and metaphysics, but by revelation communicated to us by a living and ever-present authority. But the refutation of atheism is possible without any very long or intricate process of metaphysical reasoning. The question involved is by no means so difficult as it has sometimes been made to appear, and the question needs but to be clearly and distinctly stated to be within the reach of the ordinary understanding.

There are, doubtless, real atheists in the world, both speculative and practical, but no man can be consistently an atheist. Not indeed, as some tell us, because every man in every act of intelligence asserts principles from which that God is can be logically inferred, but because, as a matter of fact, every man in every act of intelligence, in every exercise of understanding, in every thought, apprehends and asserts that which is God, although he may not be distinctly conscious that such is the fact. The refutation of atheism does not lie in demonstrating from principles distinct from God that God is; it lies in showing that the human intellect has in its operations immediate intuition of that which is God, and could not operate or know any thing at all if it had not. The question has been obscured and rendered difficult to ordinary minds by our modern philosophers, who have proceeded on the supposition that, in order to know that God is, we must be able by our natural light to originate the belief in his existence, and to demonstrate it from certain principles or premises more immediately known to the mind than is God himself. They have supposed it necessary to begin, with Descartes, in doubt, to assume, at least for the purposes of the argument, that man began in total ignorance of God, with no conception of his being or his attributes, and then proceed to show how by the operations of his own mind he might attain to the conception of God, and demonstrate his real existence. But this is an error, and one attended with many fatal consequences.

The belief that God is, inasmuch as it is a matter of supernatural revelation, pertains to faith, but as the preamble to faith, as St. Thomas calls it, it must be a matter of science. It is necessary, in order that it may be a matter of science, that we should not merely believe, but also know, that God is; and we must know that he is, because faith, though transcending reason, must be reasonable, have some relation to science, which could not be the case if we had no knowledge properly so called of the existence of God. Motives of credibility must have a scientific basis, but unless we know independently of the revelation that God is, and is the Creator of all things, they can have no such basis. But to the reality of science or knowledge as distinguished from faith it is not necessary that its matter or the object known should be originally

discoverable by the mind's own operations; all that is necessary is that, when clearly and distinctly presented to the mind, it be intuitively evident. The distinction between faith and knowledge does not necessarily consist in the fact that the objects of the one are supernaturally revealed to the mind, and the objects of the other are discovered by it, but in the fact that in the former the assent is given on the authority of the Revelator, and in the latter by the intuitive apprehension of the truth. In point of fact there is very little of what we know that has been originally discovered by us, or presented to the mind otherwise than by the teacher who originally knew or had already learned it. It is not, therefore, at all necessary to the scientific validity of the belief in God, that it should have been originated by the mind's own operations, or that it should be a belief which the mind without assistance from abroad could have generated.

The belief, moreover, is one that the mind not furnished with it could not originate. If we could suppose a people at any time entirely destitute of the belief, in total ignorance of God, with no conception of his being, we should be obliged to suppose them remaining for ever without it, unless supernaturally taught it by God himself, or by teachers from some other people who had already been taught it. The reason of this is, that there is no conceivable process by which the mind can originate it, which does not presuppose that the mind is already in possession of it. "Fear made their gods," sang old Lucretius, and whole hosts of philosopherlings have labored to prove that the passions have generated the belief in God, and that therefore it has no validity. The passions have, no doubt, obscured the intellect, and influenced the notions which men left to themselves have formed of the attributes of God, and of the worship which he exacts of them, but they could not have originated the belief itself, for the belief is an act of the intellect, which precedes all motion of the passions, and without which neither passion nor its object is conceivable. I must intellectually apprehend an object before I can desire it, fear it, or love it; and I must conceive it to be God before I can tremble or love, be filled with fear or awe, thrill with terror or delight in its presence as in the presence of the Divine. All the passions in themselves are blind, and no one of them is capa-

ble of presenting any object to the mind, and they have and can have no object save as presented by the intellect. Men must have had the belief that there is the Divine, that God is, before they could have supposed that what moves their passions is God or Divine, or be led to infer from the fact that their passions are moved that there is a Divinity that moves them; they must also have held his existence before they could have dreamed of saying this or that is God, or of identifying him with wood or stone, heroes or animals, the elements, the mysterious, the terrible, or the beneficent forces of nature, the wind or the rain, the storm or the tempest, the sun, the moon, or the stars of heaven; and consequently the belief that God is must have preceded the rude forms of African fetichism, as well as the poetical and polished mythology of Greece and Rome. The belief must necessarily precede its applications or its corruptions, and consequently all those have grossly erred who have labored in the interests of atheism to prove that man has generated in his own mind the belief in God.

They, again, have erred no less grossly, but from more commendable motives, who have alleged in the interests of the belief that the human mind is able to generate it. This to some extent is the case with the author of the work before us. We say *to some extent*, for he does not precisely allege that the individual has originated the belief for himself, since he assumes that the well-instructed child has before forming the belief *heard say* from his father that there is a God. Nevertheless, his whole argument proceeds on the supposition that the individual is able to originate the belief, and he undertakes to show the process by which it may be done. Like all philosophers of his class, he begins with the child,—forgetting that the adult is before the child, and that the human race must have begun in the adult man, not in the infant,—and attempts to show the gradual formation of the belief through the development of what he calls the sense of awe, the sense of wonder, the sense of admiration, the sense of order, the sense of design, the sense of goodness, the sense of wisdom, and reverence. In what sense the author here uses the word *sense* is not very clear, and we suspect it would be difficult even for him to inform us. He writes with great looseness of expression and indeterminateness of thought. The

word *sense* in our language has more than one meaning. It means the faculty of perceiving through external organs, as the eye, the ear, &c.; sometimes it means the organ itself; sometimes, again, the exercise of the perceptive faculty, sometimes its object, and, finally, sometimes simple feeling, or affection of the sensitive soul, in modern language, of the sensibility. When we say *sense of* a thing, we use the term to denote a feeble or obscure perception. Thus a sense of awe would mean a feeble and obscure perception of awe, which, if not nonsense, means that we are conscious of a slight degree of awe. This of course is not the meaning of the author, and by sense of awe he would have us understand most likely either the feeling of awe or the faculty or capacity of feeling awe, or of being affected by the emotion termed awe. So of the sense of wonder, and of admiration. Thus far we presume the author understands by *sense* the power or capacity of the soul to feel awed, to wonder, and to admire. But when he speaks of *sense* of order, of design, of wisdom, and of goodness, he cannot use the word in the same sense, because order, design, wisdom, goodness, are not feelings or emotions of our soul, but objects intellectually apprehensible by it, and he must here use the word to denote either the intellect itself or an exercise of intellect, either the power to apprehend order, design, wisdom, and goodness, or the actual apprehension of them. Reverence, again, is an affection of the rational soul, and demands as its condition the intellectual apprehension of its object, and follows instead of preceding such apprehension.

But passing over the unphilosophical use of language, a common fault of our author, let us inquire if it be possible either to obtain the conception of God or to establish the belief in his existence in the way Mr. Newman indicates. Awe, wonder, admiration, order, design, wisdom, goodness, are all considered by him as properties or affections of the soul, and as affections of the soul they lead us gradually, as they are developed, to the belief in God. We demand how this is done. By way of deduction or induction? Not by way of induction, for there is no induction in the case. Induction is concluding from a number of particulars a general law or principle common to them all, and the law or principle is not applicable beyond the particulars enumerated. In the present case, regarding

the particulars enumerated as subjective affections, the principle or law obtainable by induction from them would be subjective also, and pertain solely to the human soul, or be the human soul itself. Not by deduction, for deduction is simply analysis, and analysis can give you only what is in the subject analyzed. But these affections are subjective, human, and therefore do not contain God, and therefore God cannot by analysis be obtained from them. This is sufficient for the refutation of Mr. Newman's theorizing.

But omitting the awe, wonder, and admiration, and confining ourselves to the sense of order, design, wisdom, and goodness, as a feeble and obscure perception of them, we are still unable from it alone, as assumed to be developed in the child, to obtain either immediately or by way of inference the belief in God. Men must hold the principle of causality, must believe in a first cause and a final cause, and in the necessary relation of cause and effect, before they can either intellectually apprehend order, design, wisdom, or goodness, in nature, or dream of inferring the existence of God from them, and therefore must really believe in necessary and eternal being, cause and end of all things, that is to say, in God himself. This fact alone condemns the whole physico-theology of your Bridgewater Treatises, and the ordinary argument *a posteriori*, so much insisted upon by the pretended natural theologians of modern times.

The argument *a priori*, or from cause to effect, as it is usually defined, is no more conclusive. It proceeds on the supposition that there are certain principles, at least in the order of our knowledge, more ultimate than God, from which his existence may be logically concluded. But either God is contained in those principles, or he is not. If he is not, he cannot be concluded from them, for nothing can be in the conclusion not contained in the premises. If he is, he can be said to be contained in them only in the sense that he is identical with them, or identically those principles themselves, and then he is not concluded from them, but is immediately apprehended in the immediate apprehension of them. In the order of reality there can be no principles more ultimate than God, for he is himself prior to all not himself. If at all, he is himself ultimate, the first principle conceivable or possible, and therefore there can be no principle from which his existence is con-

cludable. There can be none in the order of our knowledge. In what we know, God is either apprehended or he is not. If not, he cannot be concluded; if he is, then he is apprehended prior to the logical process, and not obtained by it, and all it can do is to clear up and establish the fact that what we do really apprehend is God.

Let us understand this. Reasoning consists in deducing conclusions from given premises. It can neither operate without premises, nor furnish its own premises, and therefore it does and must always proceed from premises furnished it, and, in the last analysis, from premises furnished or given to the mind prior to all reasoning or logical process. The mind cannot by reasoning obtain its first principles, because, without first principles it cannot reason at all. Hence the first principles of all reasoning are *given*, not obtained; therefore are called *data*. As there can be nothing in the conclusion not contained in the *data* or premises, so nothing can be assented to in the conclusion which had not really been assented to in them. Reasoning is not an operation by which knowledge is extended to new matter, a process by which we go from the known to the unknown and make new conquests to the domain of our knowledge. All it does is to distinguish, clear up, and establish what we already know in its premises, or is given us in the *data* from which we reason. It changes the state or the form of our knowledge, but does not give us knowledge of any new matter. In the order of knowledge, distinguished on the one hand from faith and on the other from opinion, the principles, premises, or *data* are intuitively evident, and consequently nothing not intuitively evident can be concluded. It is therefore impossible to conclude God by any logical process, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*,—for the principle of both arguments is the same,—unless he is intuitively evident in the premises, and therefore apprehended prior to the commencement of the reasoning. Hence the belief in God has not been and cannot be generated by any simply logical process whatever.

Reasoning is an exercise of the reflective, as distinguished from the intuitive understanding, and its premises must be distinctly apprehended as the condition of its operation. But in the intelligible order, as distinguished from the sensible order, reflection cannot take its premises immediately

from intuition, as modern Transcendentalists and exaggerated spiritualists maintain, because we are not pure intelligences, but intelligences united to body, and, unless by a miracle, can act in this life only in conjunction with the body. Hence we are capable, in the reflective order, the order in which we properly act, of no pure intellection, or intellectual operation. We are incapable of performing any intellectual process in which the senses do not take part. We must act as we are, soul and body, intellect and sense united, and consequently cannot reflect or reason on any object which is not either sensibly presented or sensibly represented. This is the great fact on which Aristotle insists against Plato, and St. Thomas against the Platonists, and is the fact intended in the famous maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu*. Neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas ever intended to teach that nothing is apprehensible by us which is not an object of sense, or to deny that we may have, and have, intuition of the intelligible; for Aristotle makes philosophy properly so called consist in the knowledge of principles and causes, which he holds to be supersensible, and St. Thomas concedes that we have in our desire for good at least an obscure apprehension or intuition of God, who is our sovereign Good. What they mean is, that nothing can be in or present to the mind as an object of the reflective understanding which is not either a sensible object or an intelligible object sensibly represented. Neither held the modern doctrine of Sensism, any more than the modern doctrine of Transcendentalism. All they meant is the well-known fact, that the intuition of the intelligible, though real and the basis of all science, as of all demonstration, is not, and cannot be, immediately an object of reflection. To be such, the object of the intuition must be sensibly represented to the mind.

But the intelligible has no sensible representative in the order of nature, for by its own nature it is always supersensible. The pretence of some, that the sensible world is the image and representative of the intelligible world, is unworthy of any serious consideration. The material is, and can be, no image of the spiritual; and all theologians agree, that the image and likeness of God to which man was created pertain to man's soul, not to his body. Analogies may be detected between the forces operating

in the sensible world and those of the spiritual, and on the exhibition of these much of the charm and vivacity of poetry depends; but these forces are not themselves sensible; they are invisible and immaterial, save in their effects. The correspondences of the Swedenborgians are too fanciful to be entertained. Intuition of the intelligible must, in order to be an object of reflection, be sensibly represented; and as it has no natural representative, it must be represented to us through the medium of artificial signs, or words, which are the sensible signs of ideas, or intelligible objects. Sensible objects may be objects of reflection without the aid of words or language. I can reflect, for instance, on a tree, a blade of grass, or a flower, although ignorant of its name, because I am able to seize the object itself and hold it up before my mind's eye, and speculate on its form, its properties, or its uses. But in the intelligible order this is not possible. Mathematics is a mixed science, and pertains only in part to the pure ideal or intelligible, and yet no mathematician can carry on his processes without the aid of sensible signs or symbols. If we could, as our Boston Transcendentalists contend, take our premises immediately from intuition, we should be pure intelligences, and independent, intellectually considered, of the body while in it, which certainly is not the fact. We must take them from the sensible signs which signify them, and therefore from language. The real office of intelligible intuition is not to originate belief or to propound its object to reflection, but to evidence or confirm it when sensibly represented.

Now God, if he be at all, must be in the intelligible order, or rather that order itself, as distinguished from the sensible. He certainly is no object of our senses, as is conceded on all hands; the distinct or reflective belief that he is, is not and cannot be taken immediately from intuition, even assuming that he is intuitively apprehended by us, because in intuition nothing is reflective or distinct. It would by intuition alone be impossible to assert either to ourselves or to others that God exists. Before we can distinctly conceive that he is, we must have the truth that he is, sensibly represented to us, that is, expressed to us by sensible signs, in words, or language. Hence we could not attain to the belief that God is, could have no distinct belief that he is, unless taught it through the medium of words by some one other than ourselves.

But if the human mind is unable to generate the belief, the very fact of the existence of the belief becomes a proof, and a conclusive proof, of its validity. We do not, of course, contend, that the simple fact that a belief is entertained is in all cases a proof that it is well founded, for we are far from believing in the infallibility of the human race; we only say, that the fact that *a* belief which man could not of himself originate, and which he can have present to his mind only as taught it by another, is in the world, and generally held, is full proof that it is true. For if we can have it only as we are taught it, we must either assume that God himself has first taught us, or else suppose an infinite series of teachers. My father may have taught me, but who taught him? His father? But who taught his father? These questions may be continued to infinity, and we must either assert an infinite series of teachers, which is an infinite absurdity, or we must stop with the first man, the commencement of the series of generations, and then arises the question, Who taught the first man? God himself, is the only answer conceivable, and then God really is; for if he were not, he could not teach his existence, since what is not cannot act. This is historically the way in which the belief has actually originated. God taught the first man his own existence, and the belief has been perpetuated to us by the unbroken chain of tradition. This of itself sufficiently refutes the atheist.

The tradition of the human race in this respect is uniform and unbroken. History traces the belief from the first man down to us, and the testimony of the human race to the existence of the tradition in every age and in every nation is itself sufficient to warrant belief in its reality, if human testimony is sufficient to establish any fact whatever. There may have been atheists in every age who have denied the existence of God, but even these are so many unexceptionable witnesses to the fact of the tradition, for these all assailed it, and they could not have assailed it if it had not existed; they all arraigned the belief in God, but in so doing they only proved that the belief survived, since men do not arraign what is not, or deny what is not affirmed. The mythologies and idolatries of the heathen all vouch in like manner for the fact of the primitive tradition, for they are all manifest corruptions or perversions of it, — of the belief and worship of God

which preceded them, subsisted with the patriarchs and the Jews contemporaneously with them, and in the Catholic Church have survived them. Even if man could have originated the belief itself, still the universal tradition would be full evidence that he first learned the existence of God from God himself.

But we will not stop here, lest we be supposed to hold one of the errors of Lamennais. This would establish the validity of the belief in God, it is true, but it would not make his existence a matter of science. Here was the error of Lamennais. He made the belief traditional, assumed the original revelation by God himself, but made the belief rest for its evidence, not on intuition, but on the testimony of the race, and therefore left it a matter of faith, of mere human faith too, and not a matter of science. The belief is proved to be true by the tradition, but to be a matter of science it must be evident not merely from testimony, but from intuition, or, in other words, it must be intuitively evident, and that it is intuitively evident we proceed now to show.

We allow the atheist to doubt all things if he wishes, till he comes to the point where doubt denies itself. Doubt is an act of intelligence; only an intelligent agent can doubt. It as much demands intellect to doubt as it does to believe, — to deny as it does to affirm. Universal doubt is, therefore, simply an impossibility, for doubt cannot, if it would, doubt the intelligence that doubts, since to doubt that would be to doubt itself. You cannot doubt that you doubt, and then, if you doubt, you know that you doubt, and there is one thing, at least, you do not doubt, namely, that you doubt. To doubt the intelligence that doubts would be to doubt that you doubt, for without intelligence there can no more be doubt than belief. Intelligence, then, you must assert, for without intelligence you cannot even deny intelligence, and the denial of intelligence by intelligence contradicts itself, and affirms intelligence in the very act of denying it. Doubt, then, as much as you will, you must still affirm intelligence as the condition of doubting, or of asserting the possibility of doubt, for what is not cannot act.

This much, then, is certain, that however far the atheist may be disposed to carry his denials, he cannot carry them so far as to deny intelligence, because that would be denial

of denial itself. Then he must concede intelligence, and then whatever is essential to the reality of intelligence. In conceding any thing, you concede necessarily all that by which it is what it is, and without which it could not be what it is. Intelligence is inconceivable without the intelligible, or some object capable of being known. There is no intelligence where there is no knowledge; there is no knowledge where nothing is known; and there can be nothing known where there is nothing to be known. So, in conceding intelligence, the atheist necessarily concedes the intelligible. He who asserts intelligence asserts the intelligible, for without the intelligible intelligence is impossible. But as what is not cannot act, so what is not cannot be intelligible. The intelligible therefore is something which is, is being, real being too, not merely abstract or possible being, for without the real there is and can be no possible, or abstract. The abstract in that it is abstract is nothing, and therefore unintelligible, that is to say, no object of knowledge or of the intellect. The possible, as possible, is nothing but the power or ability of the real, and is apprehensible only in the apprehension of that power or ability. In itself, abstracted from the real, it is a pure nullity, has no being, no existence, is not, and therefore is unintelligible, no object of intelligence or of intellect, on the principle that what is not is not intelligible. Consequently, to the reality of intelligence a real intelligible is necessary, and since the reality of intelligence is undeniable, the intelligible must be asserted, and asserted as real, not as abstract or merely possible being. The atheist is obliged to assert intelligence, but he cannot assert intelligence without asserting the intelligible, and he cannot assert the intelligible without asserting something really is, that is, without asserting real being. The real being thus asserted is either necessary and eternal being, being in itself, subsisting by and from itself, or it is contingent and therefore created being. One or the other we must say, for being which is neither necessary nor contingent, or which is both at once, is inconceivable, and cannot be asserted or supposed. Whatever is, in any sense, is either necessary and eternal or contingent and created, — is either being in itself, Absolute Being, as the Germans say, or existence dependent on another for its being, and therefore is not without the necessary and eternal, on which it depends. If you

say it is necessary and eternal being, you say it is God; if you say it is contingent being, you still assert the necessary and eternal, therefore God, because the contingent is neither possible nor intelligible without the necessary and eternal. The contingent, since it is or has its being only in the necessary and eternal, and since what is not is not intelligible, is intelligible, as the contingent, only in necessary and eternal being, and therefore can be known only in knowing necessary and eternal being, the intelligible in itself, in which it has its being, and therefore its intelligibility. So in either case you cannot assert the intelligible without asserting necessary and eternal being, and therefore, since necessary and eternal being is God, without asserting God, or that God is; and since you must assert the intelligible in order to assert intelligence, and since you must assert intelligence even to deny it, it follows that in every act of intelligence God is asserted, and that it is impossible without self-contradiction to deny his existence.

The conclusion here is evident, but if we analyze it we shall find that it is not that God is, but that what is really apprehended in every act of intelligence as the intelligible, without which the act were impossible, is God. The whole argument proceeds on the assumption that the mind has immediate and direct intuition of being. We find that in every act of intelligence there is apprehension of real being, and it is only in virtue of such apprehension that there is any actual intelligence at all. But this apprehension is immediate, intuitive, not discursive, by virtue of a prior act of intelligence, or a previous apprehension, because without it there is no apprehension, and no intellectual act at all. As certain, then, as it is that there is intelligence at all, so certain is it that in the first, as in the last, act of intelligence there is intuition of being, and of real being. It is equally certain that this real being is necessary and eternal being, and therefore God; for only that which is necessary and eternal, which is being in itself, subsisting by and from itself, absolute, perfect, independent being, is intelligible in and by itself alone. Nothing but being is intelligible, and consequently that which has being only in another is not intelligible in and by itself alone, and can be known only in the being in which it has its being. Hence Malebranche rightly maintained, after St. Augustine, that we see all things in God, in whom we live,

and move, and are. If nothing but being is intelligible *per se*, it follows that the being which is the intelligible, and without which there could be no intelligible, is independent being, being that has its being in and from itself; for otherwise it would not be intelligible *per se*, and could be known only in knowing another being on which it depends or in which it has its being. But being which is independent, that has its being in itself and not in another, is necessarily necessary and eternal being, therefore God. Consequently that of which we have immediate intuition in every act of intelligence as the intelligible is God, which is what was to be proved.

It may help us to understand this if we bear in mind that there are no abstractions in nature, and that whatever is is real. We may say this or that which does not exist is *possible*, but we cannot say the possible is, for in that it is possible its characteristic is that it is not, but may be. Abstracted from the real, from the power or ability of the real, as we have said, it is a mere nullity, and is unintelligible, the subject of no predicate whatever. Between that which really is in itself or in another, that is, between real being or real existence, and nothing, there is no medium. A thing is or it is not, exists or does not exist. Existence as distinguished from being is that which is not in itself, but in another, and has being only by virtue of the creative act of him in whom it is. The word itself, from *ex-stare*, says as much. It is never necessary and eternal, but contingent, with a beginning in time, and therefore is inconceivable without the independent, necessary, and eternal being that has created it, and on which it depends. All conceivable, all possible reality is that which is and exists, that is to say, creator and creature. Hence, between God or Creator and existence or creature, and nothing, there is no *tertium quid*, no medium, and consequently whatever is intelligible to us, or essential to intelligence, which is not existence or creature, is God.

Now it is certain that in reasoning, for instance, we have immediate intuition of cause and effect, and of the necessary relation of the one to the other, and we could not perform a single act of reasoning if we had not. In the syllogism we hold there is necessary *nexus* between the premises and the conclusion, and in all languages the conclusion is said to follow *necessarily* from the premises.

Here is evidently apprehension of the necessary. This apprehension is necessarily intuitive, and not the result of reasoning, because it precedes all reasoning, and is the basis of every discursive process. But the necessary, as the eternal, wherever we encounter it, must have a real entity, — is, in the language of the schools, *ens necessarium*, necessary entity, and therefore God. Consequently, that of which we have immediate intuition in every process of reasoning, and without which no such process would be possible or conceivable, is God the Creator.

In all the operations of the mind concerning numbers, for instance, there is always intuition of unity; for all numbers, as says Thomassin,*

“are only unity more or fewer times repeated, and since it is seen as unchangeable and eternal, God himself is seen. The truth of unity and of numbers, and of their innumerable and ineffably wonderful properties, and the necessity of this truth which could not not be, its immutability whence it cannot be otherwise than it is, and its eternity whence it cannot not always be, are most evidently perceived and most clearly seen, and since it has so many of the Divine attributes, it can be no other than God himself. As to figures also, there are in the universe no circles, no spheres, no figures which exactly agree with the laws and definitions, which the understanding alone perceives to be prescribed to them. In God, therefore, as in the supreme principle of numbers, as in the very citadel of unity and equality, as in the art of arts and law of arts, all these things are seen, and are clearly seen, with the fullest light and evidence. Finally, the truth of these figures and of their properties, and the necessity, immutability, and eternity of this truth, surpass all created nature, and yet are plainly and most certainly seen with the eye of the mind; and therefore God himself is seen [or intuitively apprehended].”

We may add to the same purport the following passages from St. Augustine, with Thomassin's commentary on them, as cited by Gerdil.

“*Aug.* By these and many similar arguments are those reasoners, to whom God has granted understanding, and who are not led by pertinacity into error, compelled to acknowledge that the truth and reason of numbers do not belong to the external senses, and that this truth and reason are sincere and unchangeable, and com-

* Lib. VI. cap. 10, art. 2, *et seq.*, apud Gerdil, Tom. IV. p. 24. Romæ, 1806.

mon to all who reason.* *Thom.* Therefore this truth, since it is intelligible, unchangeable, and eternal, is God."

"*Aug.* There is † a thing worthy of being known, which is, how from corporeal and spiritual, but mutable numbers, we can come to the immutable numbers which are in that immutable truth : and thus the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. *Thom.* You see the numbers, which are so plainly evident, appear incommutable, and are seen in God, who is the incommutable truth. *Aug.* The incommutable truth of numbers is as the chamber, the *penetrable*, the region, habitation, or seat of numbers."‡ And again : "A sort of light in a wonderful manner, both secret and public, is present and illumines all those who perceive immutable truths." And further on : "Pass, then, beyond the mind of the artificer, that you may behold the eternal number, then will wisdom shine upon you from its inner recess and from the dwelling-place of truth. *Thom.* He therefore most constantly asserts that God, the eternal and immutable truth of numbers, is seen [intellectually apprehended]."

As to figures, St. Augustine says : § —

"Since agreement, by which alone all things are beautiful, pleases in all arts, and this agreement requires equality and unity, either in the similitude of equal, or in the gradation of unequal parts, who is there that can find supreme equality or similitude in bodies, and would dare to say that any body is truly and simply one, if carefully considering that all bodies are changed either by passing from species to species, or from place to place, and that they are composed of parts occupying their places, by which they are divided into different spaces? Moreover, the true equality and likeness, the true and first unity, are apprehended not by the eyes of the flesh, nor any external sense, but by the intellect. For how should any equality be desired in bodies, or how should the most of them be known to be imperfect, if that which is perfect were not apprehended by the mind, — if indeed that may be called *perfect* which is not made and which is neither extended in place nor changeable in time? *Thom.* He argues, then, that the transcendental equality is seen neither by the senses nor the imagination, but by the intellect alone, and that works are judged by it as by the law of all arts. But since this equality is immutable and immense, having no relation to place or time; since it is perfect, though not made; since it is the law which may not be judged, but according to which, as being supreme and above them, all created

* Lib. II. de Lib. Arbit., cap. 8.

† Retract. agens de Lib. VI., De Music.

‡ Lib. II. de Lib. Arbit., cap. 11.

§ De Ver. Relig., cap. 30.

minds judge,—it must necessarily be God himself, the law of all arts and the art of the Almighty Artificer, as the same St. Augustine immediately adds : But since this law of all arts is in all respects immutable, and the human mind to which it is granted to apprehend this law is liable to the mutability of error ; it is evident that there is a law above the mind of man, which is called truth.”

And again :—

“*Aug.* This is that immutable truth which is rightly called the law of all arts, and the art of the Almighty Artificer. *Thom.* Hence it is evident that God is seen [or intuitively apprehended], since this law or truth of equality and unity is apprehended by the intellect alone. *Aug.* Is it easy for the soul to love these things, in which it seeks only equality and likeness, and of which, after the most careful consideration, it hardly detects the least trace or shadow ? Is it difficult for the soul to love God, in whom, as far as is possible for it, still thinking of earth, it sees nothing unequal, nothing unlike, nothing extended in place, nothing varied in time ? If it pleases us to build edifices, and to be busied in such works, what is it that pleases, if it be not numbers ? For I find nothing else which may be said to be similar or equal in them which discipline may not deride. If this be so, why do we descend to these things from that citadel of most true equality, and build on its ruins ? *Thom.* You perceive that the equality itself is God, and is seen by our understanding, and seen so clearly and surely as to be more evident than bodies.

“*Aug.* It belongs to the higher intellect to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons, which, if they were not above human understanding, would not be immutable ; and if nothing of ours were added to them [that is, if we were not in relation with them, or could not apprehend them], we could not by them judge of sensible things, &c. But that of ours which is employed in treating of sensible and temporal things, and is not common to us with brutes, is indeed rational, but proceeds from that rational substance of our minds by which we adhere to the intelligible and immutable truth [that is, intuitively seize or apprehend it], and is given us for treating and governing inferiors.”* And Chapter VII.: “As we have said of the nature of the mind, if it contemplates the whole truth, it is the image of God, and from it is in a certain manner distributed and directed to the action of temporals ; nevertheless, though inasmuch as it consults the truth perceived it is the image of God, yet inasmuch as it operates in inferior actions it is not his image.”

We come to the same conclusion from the notion of justice. St. Augustine must speak for us :—

* *De Trinit.*, Lib. XII. cap. 2.

"What the mind is, we know from ourselves, for the mind is within us. But how shall we know the just, since we are not yet just? If we know it without us [in space], we know it in some body. But this is not a thing belonging to bodies. In ourselves, then, we know the just; for I do not find it anywhere when I seek it, if I may say so, but with myself." And if I interrogate another what is the just, he asks himself what he shall answer. Is that which he sees the interior truth present to the mind which is able to see it? Nor are all able to see this: and those who are able are not all of them that which they see within themselves, that is, they are not just minds because they can see and tell what is a just mind. Whence could they be just minds, unless by adhering to that form which they behold within them, and, being informed by it, made just minds? The man, then, who is believed to be just, is loved by that form and truth which he who loves him sees and understands with himself; but which form and truth he is not, as otherwise he would himself be loved."*

The soul, as Gerdil remarks, knows itself, in the manner in which it knows itself in this life, by its interior sentiment of itself, but it knows justice only in beholding the very form of justice. Now this form and this truth is God himself; for, as St. Augustine says, it is loved for itself, and, besides, justice can be represented to us by no idea of it distinguished from itself, as St. Augustine says again in express terms:—

"For we find nothing such except itself that, when it is unknown, by believing we love it because we already know something similar. For whatever you see like it is it, since it alone is such as it is."

And again:†—

"Hence, even the wicked think of eternity, and rightly blame and praise many things in human actions. By what rules, then, do they judge, unless by those in which they see how each one should live, although they themselves do not live according to them? Where do they see them? Not in their own nature, since they are certainly seen by the mind, and it is evident that their minds are changeable, and whoever sees these rules sees they are unchangeable. Nor do they see them in the habit of their mind, since they are the rules of justice, but their minds are evidently unjust. Where are these rules written? where do the wicked see what is just and what is unjust? whence do they know they should have that which they have not? Where are these

* *De Trinit.*, Lib. VIII. cap. 6.

† *Ibid.*, Lib. XIV. cap. 15.

rules written, if not in the book of that light which is called truth? Hence, every just law is written in and transferred to the heart of the man that works justice, not by migration, but as it were by impression, as an image passes from a ring to the wax, *yet does not leave the ring*. But he that does not do that which he sees should be done, is turned from that light by which, notwithstanding, he is enlightened."

"Behold, you blame God," he says (Enarr. in Ps. lxi.), "as if for injustice. You could not blame him for injustice if you did see justice, for how could you know that this is unjust, unless you know what is just? You see this to be unjust from some rule of justice, and comparing with it the evil that you see, and finding that it does not agree with the rectitude of your rule, you blame it as an artificer distinguishing the just from the unjust. I ask you, then, whence do you see that this is just? Whence that I know not what with which your soul is sprinkled, — for it remains in many respects in darkness, — that which flashes upon your mind? Whence is this *just*? Has it no origin? Is it from you, and can you give justice to yourself? No man gives himself what he has not. Therefore, since you are unjust, you can be just only in turning to some permanent justice, which you cannot depart from without being unjust, nor come to without being just: when you go from it, it is not wanting, when you approach it, it does not increase. Where then is this? Go where God has once spoken, and you will find the fountain of justice where you find the fountain of life."

These extracts, which are only a specimen of what we might make from St. Augustine, and which we introduce both for their merit as arguments, and as authority for our Catholic readers, fully sustain our position. They prove that in all our intellectual operations, as their necessary condition, we have intuition of real being, of the unchangeable, the necessary, and the eternal, and real, necessary, unchangeable, and eternal Being is God, and therefore they prove that we have intuition of God. This intuition is like all intuition, indistinct, indefinite, and we do not from it alone ever know or become able to affirm that its object is God. To know this, it is necessary to reflect on the object of the intuition as re-presented to us in language, or sensible signs. Here is the place for the various arguments ordinarily adopted by theologians. They do not prove to the mind that has no intuition of God that God is, for God is the first principle of all proof, of all demonstration, of all science; but they do prove to the

mind that the object of its intuitions, by virtue of which it knows or reasons, is God. These arguments, whether from effect to cause or from cause to effect, whether from the order and design of nature, the necessity of a prime Mover or of a universal Governor, do not prove from principles distinct from God that God is, but that principles which we did not know to be God are God, and nothing else, which is still better.

Another branch of the subject, namely, the evidence that God not only is, but is the creator of all things, or has created the world, and which contains the refutation of pantheism, remains to be considered; but as it would make this article quite too long to take it up now, we reserve it for a future occasion. Pantheism is the form which atheism now assumes, and the great point to be proved to complete the refutation of atheism is not to establish the fact that we have intuition of God as being, but of him as creative being, for it is the creative Deity that is now generally denied. We live in an age marked by the revival and prevalence of heathenism, and the grand error of heathenism originated in the loss of the conception of God as creator. Heathen philosophy forgot the first verse of Genesis: "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." It lost sight of the creative act of the Divinity, and hence it was never able to attain to sound theology even in the natural order. The philosophers of our age lose sight of the same fact, and hence their errors. We will endeavor hereafter to recall the fact to their minds, and establish it. But we have said enough for the present. We have shown that God is, and that he is the very principle of all our intelligence, the fountain of all truth, and the source of all light. As such, we are in immediate relation with him, are in our own minds intimately united to him. Let it be our study to be as intimately united to him in our hearts by a never-failing charity, which loves him above all things for his own sake.

- ART. II. — 1. *Encyclical Letter of His Holiness, Pope Pius the Ninth, to the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops throughout the World.* Rome, at St. John of Lateran. 1850.
2. *Letter of the Count de Montalembert to the Catholics of France, on the Presidential Election.* Paris. 1851.
3. *Acts of the Synod of Thurles.* 1851.
4. *Speech of His Grace, the Most Rev. Paul Cullen, Archbishop of Armagh, Primate of all Ireland, at the Opening of the Catholic Defence Association.* Dublin. 1851.
5. *Speech of the Most Rev. John Hughes, Archbishop of New York, at the Astor House Banquet.* 1851.
6. *Letter of the Rt. Rev. Michael O'Connor, Bishop of Pittsburg, on the Claims of Kossuth.* Pittsburg. 1852.
7. *The Catholic Press.* 1852.
8. *Letter from Europe.* By REV. DR. BAIRD. New York.
9. *Speeches of Kossuth.* 1851-52.
10. *The Protestant Press, passim.* 1852.

It has been said by some who look over our Review, that we are not remarkable for saying new things. Some of our friends have hinted that a little more variety might not be unsuited to our pages, and that it would be likely to secure a class of readers who seldom do us the honor to read our essays. They look at our table of contents, and they find that the Church, in some one of her aspects, is the centre around which every word and sentence is made to revolve. Our doubting friends ask whether this be politic or necessary. Would it not be well, at times, to suppose, were it but for the sake of argument, that Catholics and Protestants can meet on common, or, at worst, debatable ground? What principle would be sacrificed, if an article now and then should appear, in which the Protestant might find some recreation, and some instruction even, without being compelled to stumble over sentences which remind him that his soul is in danger, that he is an inhabitant of a lost world, and that the incomprehensible distance which separates starry bodies most remote from one another is as nothing compared to the abyss which divides the Church, the Catholic world, the Star of Bethlehem, from the world without, the Protestant world, the star that

fell, once upon a time, and dragged after it a third of the lights of heaven? Grant that the Protestant be a fly, cannot you try, at least, to catch him with honey?

Meanwhile, the flies who are to be caught with honey buzz the same complaint in our ears. They cannot open our Review without finding something therein which shocks their sensibilities. Eternal damnation, with all its attendant and unnamable horrors, is forced upon their unwilling attention, as a thing which may be predicated of them, *in sensu composito*, with the same certainty which enables the by-stander to say of a man who has swallowed deadly poison, and who will not eject it, that he will surely die. Such a course cannot be maintained without innumerable sins against common charity. And why cannot you imitate the policy of our Protestant Reviewers, even of the graver sort, who, if they judge it necessary or expedient to adopt, as their ordinary tone, a heavy, solemn, and religious style of writing, nevertheless interweave flowers and pretty ornaments with their solid matter, and not unfrequently emulate, with no small degree of success, and certainly to the satisfaction of their readers, the light tone and playful manner of the magazine? Why always harp on the same string?

We do not mean to institute a comparison, *servatis servandis*, between ourselves and a Paganini, yet we venture to observe that good music *can* be drawn from one string. We have frequently answered the objection, that our language involves a breach of common charity, and we will not here repeat our answer. We grant that the objection, as it is here stated, has some color of truth. We do not think much of *common* charity, inasmuch as it is a counterfeit presentment of an abused name. A little observation is enough to satisfy one that it is the charity of the world, and that in ethics it is called philanthropy; in theology, indifference. True charity, or simply charity, should not be uncommon; but it is, inasmuch as faith is also uncommon. We do not prize the common charity which is rejected by the Church, anathematized by the Apostles, and declared by Christ to be a mere human sentiment, incapable, in any case, of unlocking the gates of heaven. We submit that every word proceeding from the mouth of Christ is honey, and none the less when his words, which were full of sweetness to the penitent, sound-

ed very like a sentence of final reprobation to the proud and obstinate sinner. If our flies mistake the nature of honey, we cannot see that the fault is ours.

But we present nothing new! The Church, and nothing but the Church, inspires our matins, lauds, and even-song. To these people who ask for a new story we might reply, "Story! God bless you, we have none to tell." The things urged by us have been said before. The Catholic, as often as he has occasion to speak of the world without, finds himself chanting an antiphon that has been familiar, in some form, to every Christian, who must testify against the world, if not in his blood, at least in his tears. The wisdom of Paganism ended with the conclusion that man can know nothing. The wisdom of the Gospel taught Solomon and St. Thomas that man can know only one thing, — that God is alpha and omega, the beginning and the end. There is nothing new under the sun, and that which is hath been; that which hath been will be. The saints of every age know that the soul is better than the body; heaven, above the earth; God, the omnipotent master of Satan; and knowing this thing, they not only know all things worth knowing, but the only thing which can be known at all.

Yet no objection brought against the Christian is more likely to provoke a smile of pity than this which we are now considering, inasmuch as it implies the utter abandonment of right reason on the part of those who make it. We might retort that the world sings but one song, that it knows and can know no other; it is the song sung to it by the Devil in Paradise, which it caught up and has repeated ever since, with a persistence not to be shaken by the discovery, continually made, that it is a lying song. No degree of suffering, no amount of experience, could or can teach ancient or modern heathens that the world is not a thing to be sought or loved for its own sake. The apple of Sodom never ceases to look inviting to the eye, but the bitter ashes which fill it, and choke the eaters who pass along, furnish no warning or example to the crowds that press from behind, eager to taste and see how bitter Satan is. Were it not a thing of common experience, it would be incredible that the masses of mankind rush blindly to the gulf whence they, as well as Christians, can hear the never-ceasing cry of departed rebels against God, and

dupes of the world. "Therefore we have erred! The harvest is over, the summer is ended, and we are not saved." Then, if we are reproached with the sameness of our speech, the answer is prompt. The unity of speech which confesses God includes all truth, and it is the key of heaven. The unity of speech which confesses Satan includes all error, and it is the key of hell.

But, aside from all this, our objector maltreats his own understanding when he complains that Catholic language is one. He acknowledges the intrinsic worthlessness of his own cause. Unity of language implies unity of principle. The gentile, by which term we mean the ancient and modern heathen, the infidel, and the Protestant, finds in the world one language and one speech, proceeding from one principle, which is, — In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth? No, say the gentiles, in the beginning the earth created the heavens, and God. Let us build a tower whose top shall pierce the skies. So they set aside the old, God-given unity of language, and found Babylon, the city of the world, the Babel of tongues; and the object of their ambition, the motive of their rebellion, the tower whose top was to reach to heaven, turns out to be a sightless, ruined monument of the folly of its builders, and to reach, not heaven, but hell. The variety of tongues, the diversity of language, for which our gentile asks, may and should be clearly recognized by him as a confusion of speech, utterly wanting unity of principle, referrible to the same causes, and pregnant with the same effects, as the variety of tongues brought upon the dwellers of Babel by their foolish imitation of their master, — of the master of all gentiles, — of Satan, — who before them said, "I will plant my throne above the stars; I will be like unto the Most High"; and who, like them, — like his eldest earthly son, their father according to the flesh, — like Cain, — bore upon his brow the sign of damnation, wandered from the face of the Lord, and staggered under a weight of punishment greater than he could bear.

Catholic unity of language implies one principle, one motive, one first and final cause of speech, and as the various parts of any instrument whatever reflect the purpose of the maker, and are intelligible or valuable only as they serve that purpose, so in every sentence of the Catholic speech there appears the principle which informs or vivifies

the whole. This principle may be called the glory of God, or his justice, or his kingdom, but it is always God, the Lord of science, who directs thoughts, and puts words into the mouth of his servants. In this sense, the Word of God becomes flesh in the word of man, because the *words* of men, naturally presenting the senseless, soulless, unprincipled confusion of Babel, become a *word* taught by God, repeated by regenerated man after the pattern shown him in the *mountain*, conserved by, for, and in the Church of Christ through all ages, and declaring, in every word that proceeds from the Christian tongue, that the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth, absolute, universal Master in heaven, on earth, and in hell. It is not denied that this *word* may be enunciated by the Church, and by her sons, in varied measure, but the burden is still the same, and under all its accidental forms the Christian can readily hear the great word, so often spoken, so little understood, that the soul is more precious than the body; heaven, than the earth; and that in every thought, word, and action we must seek first the kingdom of God, in which search is found the true, though viewless kingdom of this world, and it is seen to be, not an abiding-place for man, not the beginning or the end of his being, but a land of exile whose natural productions are apples of Sodom, and whose only use is to furnish a causeway to the gates of heaven.

We have the authority of poets and of discontented men for saying that variety is charming. It is true, inasmuch as the human heart is objectively *immense*, nothing can fill it that is not God. The good things of this life may arrest its attention for a moment, but they are not God, and it turns to seek something new, feeling the while a sense of disappointment that grows more keen as the heart grows old, and old without having found God. Aged gentiles are hence miserable, inasmuch as they have never sought God, the true good of their heart, in himself, but they have sought him in his creatures, in which he is never found. They are found in him. Variety ceases to bring pleasure to the old age of a heathen. But it never need bring any thing but contentment to the Christian, who seeks every thing in God, and finds him in every creature. The world, which is such an unfathomable mystery to the unconverted, from the ancient dualists to the modern humanitarians, is to him a book illuminated by

the rays of God's countenance; the heavens declare to him the Divine glory, the firmament displays the infinite creative act; he can understand and repeat the hymns of benediction and praise wherein the royal prophet calls upon even inanimate creatures, from the sun, moon, and stars to lightning, rain, and hail, to bless the Lord, and magnify his name for ever. That summons of the Psalmist king was the best possible answer to the dualist, who pretended that of inanimate beings some were intrinsically evil, eternally turned from good, and incapable of bearing any other than a blaspheming testimony to the Fountain of benediction. It was the best possible answer to the pantheist, inasmuch as it placed the inanimate being in the relation of the creature to its Creator, by imposing upon it the duty of sacrifice. It was the best possible answer to the gentile. He placed the end of his being in creatures. They pointed to God as the sole end of his being, and of theirs, and invited him to seek them in God.

If what is called variety pleases the Christian, his pleasure has nothing in common with that of the heathen. If variety be charming to the gentile, it is so for its own sake; it is so because the possession of a new object brings present weariness, whereupon he seeks in rapidly successive novelty some remedy for the sting which his idols leave behind, as an intimation that, in seeking them as his chief good, he totally mistakes the end of his creation and of theirs, and that every step in their direction removes him eternal ages from God. Multiplicity without unity is chaos, and chaos is the world of the gentile. Not so rolls the Christian world. In it the problem of multiplicity in unity is fully solved. The Christian does not possess the things of this world, he uses them. He finds them in God, and God, the only object which can fill his heart, is found in them. Hence their use brings contentment, their loss imports no sorrow, for God remains when they disappear. And new objects are not sought to stifle disappointment, or to banish satiety, but to find in every creature the means of drawing nearer and yet more near to God. Talk of the lack of variety in Christian life! Why, only in it is variety to be found. Confusion is not variety, yet the world of the gentile is confusion itself, because it is a world of means without an end, effects without a cause, the many without the one. *Felix qui potuit*

rerum cognoscere causas, exclaimed a genuine heathen, from the depths of his gentile misery. The heathen may well complain of the sameness of objects in his world, but his weariness cannot be shared by the Christian, whose world is properly a *universe*, replete with multiplicity, variety, in a supreme and infinite unity. And the Christian language, — who but a foolish gentile would discover in it sameness? It is the only living speech, for it is vivified by the Infinite Word by whom all things were made, and in whom all things live; it is the happy tongue *quæ rerum potuit cognoscere causas*. Monotony, indeed! Read the writings of the saints, listen to their words, note their ecstasies in the Divine presence, and confess that in the language of the world without you lack words to express things, and lack ideas even to your beggarly words. Let the gentile whose world is barren, who has not even energy to “whistle for want of thought,” study men like a holy solitary who began to meditate upon the petitions of the Lord’s prayer, but found the words “Our Father” so suggestive, that he never got beyond them. What does that torrent of ideas mean? Let him study the interior life of the saints, who find in the contemplation of God a fulness of delight which causes them to exclaim, “O Beauty, ever ancient and ever new! Too late have we known thee; too late have we loved thee!” Why have saints found material for the study of a lifetime in the name of Jesus? Hear St. Bernard:—

“Nec lingua valet dicere,
Nec litera exprimere,
Expertus potest dicere
Quid sit Jesum diligere!”

What is seen in these saints may be seen in every Catholic, regard being always had to the degree of goodness by which his Catholic life is measured. Every Catholic has some knowledge of the things about which we have been speaking; good Catholics know more, the saints know most. Through the mercy of God, and without any merits of our own, we find ourselves in the Church, and as the Catholic *universe*, whose Lord and Master is God, is eternally distinct from the gentile *world*, whose Lord is also God, but whose master is Satan, we are constrained to admit that the worst Catholic enjoys advantages which are unknown, although not unsuspected, by the most

praiseworthy heathen. It is not very strange that the gentile, whose ideas are centreless, and whose language is confounded, should see little variety in Catholic speech. Degrees of holiness are degrees of union with God, wherefore the language of the Catholic will bear the more testimony to God, in proportion as he draws nearer to the Divine presence. The oftener he approaches the sacraments, the more frequently will the words, God, Christ, and the Church, fall from his lips. It is natural that the subject of his thoughts should habitually employ his tongue. God has filled his heart with an abundance, and out of that abundance his mouth speaketh. Moreover, the knowledge of divine things enables him to understand the multiplicity of the universe, to apprehend its cause, and to discourse intelligently thereon. But that cause is God in Christ, through the Church. *Scientia*, said the Roman orator, *est cognitio per causas*; and as he was a pagan, he had no science. The Catholic, who is taught to refer things to their causes, and to do it constantly, cannot, if he be a Catholic, lose sight of God in Christ, through the Church. But to the darkened understanding of the gentile, the Church is a mere human fact, or at least he treats it as if it were, and hence he does not know the endless variety in simplicity, — multiplicity in unity, — of which only the Church possesses the key. Standing upon the earth at noonday, one can see the sun in the heavens, but nothing else. Let the observer stand near the sun, and he will see all the objects illuminated by that orb. So the gentile, from his opaque world, can see the sun of Catholicity shining in the heavens, but he has no conception of the light in which his earth and other objects appear from the centre of illumination. Hence the Church, a word which is pregnant, for Christians, with a world of ideas, does not give him literally the ghost of a notion. A lifetime of meditation on the words "Our Father," or on the Holy Name of Jesus, is to him an unfathomable mystery. To his mind, our infinitely suggestive Catholic names and words convey little or no meaning. They do not inspire an idea. Poor fool! Like most gentiles, he loves to talk about the fine arts. Did he ever ask himself what it means that the highest efforts of oratory, historical composition, painting, sculpture, architecture, and other arts which he prizes, as the complement of the only civilization he understands,

were inspired by the Church, by a prayer, by some influence from a world of which he knows nothing? Does he ever ask himself why artists who warm themselves in the blaze of the nineteenth century are content to copy the excellences of men who lived in the Catholic world, and who prayed, without the faintest hope of ever reaching the excellence of those models? Or why it is that no deception, in this age of deceptions, is more successful, more highly prized, than a successful imitation of the works of the men who prayed? It would seem as if one fact, which is constantly recurring in Protestant experience, would lead him to understand the necessity of getting into the Catholic world with all speed. He finds that he can comprehend all forms of heresy, of gentile delusion; he can comfortably associate with all or any of the votaries of error, and few if any vagaries of theirs seem to him wonderful or strange. Men may deny the Trinity, or affirm it; believe in the innate depravity of man, or in his essential goodness; maintain the existence of hell, or reject it; admit the existence of God, or doubt whether there be such a Being. He sees no word in the language of any of these, which is not written in his vocabulary, and whose meaning is not satisfactorily ascertained. But when he is thrown into the society of Catholics, he sees something in them passing strange and incomprehensible. He instantly knows that they do not belong to the world which is familiar to him. It is not that he disbelieves their doctrine, because he disbelieves the doctrines of many persons familiar to him in his own world. It is not that he despises them, because he despises many of his own associates. It is not because he thinks them to be ignorant and superstitious, for the place whence he came abounds with ignorant and superstitious people. Then why can he not comprehend the men and things of the Catholic world? Why is its language to him strange and unintelligible? Is it because Catholicity is nonsensical, beneath his understanding? No, for he would then see through it, as he does through any thing absurd and foolish which he meets in some men and things of his own world. Moreover, he knows that the genius and learning of ages was inspired and fostered by this incomprehensible religion. He every day sees men of exalted natural attainments leaving his world in disgust, and embracing Catholicity. Works of

art, which he knows cannot be equalled in his world, were thrown off in the Catholic universe with an ease and rapidity which make him almost think that Catholic artists made a pastime of what costs him a lifetime of toil.

And he is conscious of another mystery. The men of his gentile world, with whom he lives, are not to him special objects of love or of hatred, apart from any good or evil they may have done to his person. Friendship to few, good-will, or at least indifference, towards all others, is a rule which he seldom finds it difficult to observe in his world, unless where his real or supposed enemies are concerned. But the presence of a Catholic, certainly of a Catholic priest, causes in him a feeling of distrust, of antipathy, of incipient, and not unfrequently of burning hatred. He knows that these feelings are shared by all true gentiles of every age; he has a secret notion that they must be, and he feels himself urged, and sometimes quite prepared, to do Catholics an injury. If he can persecute, he will. If he cannot by law, he contents himself with urging its necessity, and in the mean time with annoying them in all ways within the law. Now why do these feelings towards men who have never offended him, and who would serve him, arise in the heart of a true gentile. That they do arise is certain; and the halls of legislation, the courts, the schools, the workshops, the kitchens, even here in Boston, bear witness that they do. He cannot tell. His distrust, uneasiness, or hatred is to him as incomprehensible, when he tries to account for it, as is his utter failure to comprehend Catholic language and ways. He sometimes endeavors to justify himself by saying that, in other countries, Catholics, long since dead, worked some evil to Protestantism, and he also imputes to Catholics doctrines and practices which they anathematize and abhor. Yet he knows in his secret soul that these accusations are false, or at least of doubtful truth, and he is also aware that, even if they were true, his contented toleration of worse evils in his own world takes from him his excuse for persecuting Catholics.

Then what is the secret of his utter inability to comprehend any thing appertaining to Catholicity, and his hatred to its name? He cannot tell. If he would plead ignorance, and put himself in the category of those who take *omne ignotum pro magnifico*, there would be a hope for him, because his pride, the chief if not the only

obstacle to conversion, to a translation to the Catholic universe, would receive a smart blow from that confession. But such a course would be inadmissible, for the men of his world are enlightened in their generation; they have harnessed the lightning, they have annihilated space; there is no power in nature which they have not chained, or do not hope to chain; there is no secret in nature which they do not understand, or think that they understand, or at least expect to master. Then this Catholicity at which they so hopelessly stare is not within the range of natural things. Then it is above nature, it belongs to a higher world, and the things peculiar to it are of course, and naturally, above the comprehensions of men who live in a lower world, in the gentile chaos. And this is the reason why Catholicity is and must be eternally incomprehensible to the natural man. It is scarcely worth while to notice the objection made by bigoted Protestants, who fancy that they are religious persons. They share the feelings just described; the Church is to them unintelligible and hateful in a supreme degree. Their anger and wonder are especially aroused by the fact, that no conspiracy against the Church, organized these eighteen centuries, has produced any other result than the ruin of her enemies, an unexpected and effective display of her own resources, and the occupation by her of a position higher, firmer, than that which she apparently held when they began the attack. No vessel ever encountered surer destruction in running upon rocks, than have the kings and kingdoms that sought to crush her. The spiritual children of Pius the Ninth have heard, as Christians of every age have heard, the voice of an angel coming to them in their Egyptian banishment, and saying, "Arise, and return, for they are dead that sought the life of the child." How many times have they rolled stones to the door of her sepulchre, sealed it, placed soldiers to watch it, and then went their way to make merry over the fallen Church, at the very moment when she was putting aside the stones, paralyzing the soldiers, and showing herself to the people as the Bride of Christ, beautiful as the moon, royal as the sun, terrible as an army in battle array! Let her visit, as she has visited, the valley of dry bones, the remnants of fallen empires, the ghosts of a ruined civilization, and presently the ghosts vanish, the dry bones live, new kingdoms appear.

Now the bigoted gentile, who fancies that he is religious, not seldom admits that the things of the Catholic world are incomprehensible to him and his fellows, and that they are not the results of natural causes. Therefore he argues that the Catholic Church is a device of Satan, and sometimes he tries to believe that it is. Catholics need not be disturbed at the accusation; it was also preferred by the bigoted gentiles against our Lord Jesus Christ:—"He casteth out devils through Beelzebub, the prince of devils." "He is a Samaritan, and he hath a devil." The answer of our Lord will serve as an answer to the modern Pharisee: "A house divided against itself cannot stand." The Church of Christ stands yet. She continually wars against devils,—casts them out; then she has no league with them. Her works are those which the Devil cannot endure, neither can his servants of the gentile world. What he hates, she loves, and what he seeks, she spurns. Moreover, our bigoted Protestant, who fancies that the Church is a device of Satan, has two or three awkward difficulties awaiting solution. In all ages, the great mass of the men who actively sought the destruction of the Church were confessedly servants of the Devil, inasmuch as they were atheists, enemies of all religion, and therefore, in the eyes even of Protestants, limbs of Satan. The horde of European revolutionists is an instance in point. Then the gentile admits that the Church is incomprehensible, and, somehow, invincible. Now the Devil is a shallow creature, easily seen through, readily detected in even the most astute of his wiles, as the Holy Scriptures abundantly testify. And he is a coward; he flies from the man who resists him. Moreover, when our gentile, admitting that Catholicity is supernatural, surmises that the Devil fashioned it, he commits a serious blunder. The Devil is not a being in the supernatural world; he is ordinarily invisible, it is true, but only gentile philosophers confound the invisible with the supernatural. The Devil is a fallen being, and he is in the order of ungraced nature. Hence our gentile, in admitting that the Church does not belong to the natural world, grants also that the Devil has no part in founding it. And only a little of the intelligence which is said to illuminate this age would suffice to show the gentile that his very world is the theatre especially taken by the Devil, under Divine permission, for the scene of his

infernal labors, and that his very world is characterized by the mass of Protestant preachers as the Devil's especial ground. Therein they are right.

The discovery, or perhaps we should say the revival, of the application of algebra to mathematical and other kindred calculations, was received by the learned as a great addition to the instruments of science, and with reason, since the terms of an equation are universal, — embrace any possible number of particular quantities. The formula represents all and each, and solves any quantitative problem connected with any of them, while it is indifferent to their non-quantitative specialities, and stands to them severally as the universal does to the particular. The Catholic dogma stands in a similar relation to all and each of the things of the universe. It is generative, moreover, which is an attribute only of the Living Universal. Herein is a peg whereon to hang a remark apposite to our subject. The algebraic formula, the generic statement, is useful as a proposition to which any number of particulars may be reduced. It may stand for any of them, and solve any question about them connected with any predicate which is common to all of them. It can do no more. Propositions, particular statements, may be reduced to it, not one can be educed from it. It is not fecund. The Catholic dogma is living, living in the Church, living in Christ; and it is generative, because it has life. Its life is the grace of Christ. So there is no question, no problem of the universe, which may not be reduced to it. It solves all and each. And there is no conclusion or proposition affecting the life of man which may not be educed from it. The Church tells you what is and what is not, what must or must not be done. Through her, strength is given to believe and to do; to make the conclusion educed from her *live* in the moral world, live in human acts. God is the Living Universal, and only he can be; but the grace of Christ is the life of the Church, and that grace, inasmuch as it is Light and Love, is the Holy Ghost; wherefore it is said, *Ecclesia est Spiritus Sanctus*; and this grace, this life of the Church, makes her creatrix of the moral, the Catholic world, wherefore she is a living universal. And so every human act, to be meritorious of eternal life, to have a place in the moral, supernatural, Catholic world, must be informed through her, and live her life. A man must

have her for his Mother, or he cannot have God for his Father. And as there is no object which may not be affected by human acts, or which may not affect them, and as none of these have a place in the Catholic, supernatural world unless they are informed, directed, vivified, by the Church, it is clear that there is nothing in the universe which is not subject to Catholic dogma. Every thing that exists may be made an occasion of sin or of well-doing, of damnation or of salvation. The Church, in which alone damnation is avoided and salvation obtained, and which directs with infallible certainty, and strengthens with certain, though unmerited grace, every human act in the supernatural world, gives us the means of avoiding the one and of obtaining the other. Wherefore the dominion of the Church is imperial and universal. Every thing that exists in the world stands in a relation either conducive or adverse to salvation. The Church knows and tells us with infallible certainty what that relation is, and our thoughts and acts with reference to the things of the universe are shaped accordingly. Inasmuch as God is better than the world, heaven than hell, the soul than the body, the supernatural than the gentile world, so, when an object is adverse to God, to heaven, and to the soul, while favorable to the other alternatives, that object is bad, and it is to be eschewed; otherwise it is good, and to be sought and referred to God.

From all this follows a conclusion easily drawn. Every thing that exists in the world stands in one aspect to the Catholic, and in a contrary aspect to the Protestant or gentile. The Catholic — we mean, of course, the true Catholic — refers every thing to God, nothing to himself or to the world. Concerning every thing, he asks, Is it good for God, for heaven, and for the soul? If so, it is to be prized; if not, it is worse than worthless. It is possible, nay, it is quite probable, that some Protestants may assent, in theory, to this view, and that it may even be inculcated from pulpits; but the Protestant world denies it in theory and in practice, which is a sufficient reason why Protestant sermons are disregarded, in addition to the fact that Protestant ministers were not sent to preach. The sermons, when they happen to be partially orthodox, are disregarded because they are unintelligible. They are unintelligible because they are in opposition to

the principles of the Protestant world, and are therefore propositions drawn from no principle and asserted on no authority. Drawn from no principle, because they can and do flow only from the Catholic dogma, of which the Protestant world knows nothing. Asserted on no authority, for the minister has none of his own; he knows not the Church, and he is not sent to preach. That some scattered propositions deduced from Catholic dogma are admitted in theory by some Protestants, and inculcated from pulpits, is not wonderful. Human nature is not essentially corrupt. The understanding was darkened by the Fall, but it was not destroyed. The will was weakened, but it was not spent. Some of the truths of what is sometimes called natural theology and ethics, but which we prefer to call a portion of the primitive revelation given with language to the first man, can be discerned by us, even in a fallen state. Some of the more facile duties of the moral law can be done by fallen man. *Pure* error or evil in a proposition, or in a human act, is intrinsically impossible. The gentile world, although it is destitute of faith, hope, and charity, is not wholly destitute of grace. It knows nothing of habitual, sanctifying grace, which some theologians call the grace of Christ in a more especial sense, inasmuch as it crowns in the living man the work of redemption; but the gentile need not be a stranger to that grace which is sometimes called the grace of God, by way of intimation, we suppose, that the grace bestowed upon him may be said to be, to a certain extent, the grace of God the Creator rather than that of God the Redeemer. He can discover some truths, do some naturally good works, coöperate with Divine grace from step to step, until he pass into the Church, into the supernatural world, and become the subject of the grace of Christ, in its full acceptation. God is willing, God denies no necessary graces, and Christ, in dying, offered him the means. As there are degrees of sanctity among Christians, so there are degrees of unbelief and of wickedness among gentiles. It is true that they are all equally removed, *in sensu composito*, from heaven, because all are shut out. But in any other sense it is not true that they are in the same predicament. They who perish farthest from the shore sink in the deepest water. It is not surprising, then, that some gentiles assent to more conclusions drawn from the Cath-

olic dogma, and live more regular lives, than others do. Nature, although it cannot do every thing, — cannot gain heaven, — yet is not absolutely good for nothing. Finally, the assent of some Protestants to certain detached Catholic conclusions indicates that they have preserved a remnant, or at least a reminiscence, of Catholicity from the wreck of the sixteenth century. Besides, the Church *is*; every man may see her; she sits upon a mountain, and her light is not hid. And Protestantism is not a negative, but a privative. Every privative presupposes a positive, and cannot be without it.

Now these things show that Catholics and gentiles live in two eternally distinct worlds, and they indicate how and why. The Catholic refers every thing to God, and regards nothing as good which does not come from God, and end in him. The gentile refers every thing to this world or to himself, and regards nothing as good which does not end in himself. The gentile never thinks it necessary to subordinate and refer his own being to God as his final end. Even when he admits that there is an hereafter and a heaven, he thinks that he will go to heaven, as a thing of course, inasmuch as a destiny which will bring permanent misery upon himself is a case quite out of the course of events in his world. And when he says that he will go to heaven, he does not mean that he will go to render glory to God, but to bring happiness to himself. God and heaven are only for his sake. So even heaven, the centre of God's presence, he subordinates to himself.

It is difficult to conceive two worlds more opposed, more irreconcilable, than these. One is the causeway to heaven, the other the antechamber of hell, and heaven and hell each casts its light or its shadow upon its own world, and colors it accordingly. If the opposition between the Catholic and the gentile were visible only on Sundays, outside the walls of the church, or on stated occasions, it would not be so singular. But there is not a moment in which it may not become evident. There is not an action in which it may not appear. There is not a thing, however indifferent in itself, which may not be an occasion for its manifestation. Say that a man eats. If he be a gentile, he will eat simply to satisfy his appetite. If he be a Christian, with a sign of the cross he refers his eating to the glory of God. The two men have placed the action

in two distinct worlds. How? The gentile eats simply for the sake of eating; more accurately, to gratify himself. The action is not done for God, and God has no part in it. It is then an act done in the world in which God is not master. The final end of the action is the satisfaction of the eater. God is defrauded of the glory due to him. Glory, from the mere act of eating? Yes, glory. He has willed that every thing we do must be done for him. And before him there are no such things as great and little. The universe is as a grain of sand. Alexander eating is as Alexander conquering the world. We make the distinction between great and little because we are little. They are alike before God, because he is great. Are not the actions of what we call little men alike to the men whom we call great? Therefore glory is not given to God; a sin has been committed, and it will be remembered and punished at the last day. The Christian, on the contrary, places the action in the world in which God is master. Two worlds, one its own end, the other a simple means; one with Satan for its master, the other with God for its master; one in which God has no part, the other in which Satan has no portion; one in which every thing glorifies God, the other in which every thing glorifies man,—are two sufficiently distinct worlds. The soul was made for God, the body for the soul, eating for the body; therefore eating is an act to be necessarily subordinated to God, and when it is not, it loses its signification, its end, its place in the universe. Logicians say that the sorites is the most difficult to manage of all forms of reasoning. Yet the Catholic makes a sorites like the above every day, every hour, and with infallible accuracy, for his argument begins and ends with God. This habit of close reasoning, based upon the science of final causes, the most recondite of all sciences to the gentile, the most easy to the Catholic, indicates that the Christian must be an excellent logician, and so he is. It proves more. All science is based upon the science of final causes; more accurately, of the Final Cause. The gentile knows nothing of this science. Then he knows no science. Science *est cognitio rerum per causas*. *Causam*, Cicero should have said, as in effect he did in his last moments, when he exclaimed, *Causa causarum, miserere mei!* So the gentile is a very unscientific person, while the knowledge he lacks is obtained from the

Catechism, and is known even to Catholic children. This is the demonstration of a proposition of ours which has seemed strange to some, in which we said that the Catholic child who knows his Catechism knows more than the most learned Protestant.

The man who knows the final cause of things knows the first cause, and he is, in despite of himself, an ontologist. Every Catholic is an ontologist,— he cannot help it; and if he chance to affect psychology, it is owing to accidental circumstances, such as a wrong direction given to his early studies, the choice of a text-book, the influence of a favorite professor, or an analytical turn of mind. But he forgets his psychology in grave matters. All Catholics untainted by secular education are ontologists. It cannot be otherwise; for ontology is the science of beings, therefore of forces, therefore of causes. The Catholic learns this from his Catechism, and applies it to his life. Ontology deals with the creation of secondary causes, in the first cycle, and their return to God the Creator, in the second cycle; the Catechism deals with the same thing, and so does the Catholic, continually. The sign of the cross, made by him over his meat, is a sign of his ontology, and a summing up, *eminenter*, of the science itself. A Protestant cannot be an ontologist, therefore. And hence it is matter of history that no Protestant ever was an ontologist. Certain chapters of history *can* be written *a priori*. Protestant metaphysics, being destitute of principles, because barren of all knowledge concerning final causes, sink into materialism. Hence the Protestant predilection for what are miscalled natural sciences. That predilection is instinctive. Those so-called sciences utterly ignore the science of causes, the first and the final; so they are a congeries of effects without causes; therefore they are the science of effects which are not effects. Any manual of natural science, so called, exhibits this result. The science turns out to be an imperfect, and often arbitrary, classification of objects, which is changed to suit the whims of each succeeding professor, so that one need not live a long life to find himself constrained to study half a dozen sciences of the same class of objects, each contradicting the others. And so the Protestant science of logic degrades the syllogism,— a cunning manœuvre, destroying, at a blow, the instruments of reasoning; and it makes of universal ideas

mere names. It was appropriately done, for *ideas* imply causes; *names* indicate things, without any reference to causes. Protestant metaphysics are an excellent hand-maid to Protestant theology; in the former, we have the science of effects without causes; in the latter, the science of a world without a God.

The opposition between the two worlds, gentile and Christian, is necessarily visible or imminent in every thing. We selected eating as an example, but the same thing is universally evident. What can God have to do with my vote? Just as much as with every thing else. God is the author of society. He placed man in it, in order that he might the more readily obtain means whereby to glorify his Creator by saving his soul; government is necessary to society; government should be administered in truth and in justice, and your vote decides whether good men shall so administer it, or whether bad men shall pervert it; your vote decides whether society shall be an instrument for the salvation or the damnation of men, whether it shall glorify God's mercy or his justice. God will be glorified in any case, and the only question is, whether you are to be his mere instrument, to be used and thrown aside in hell, or a co-worker, to be summoned, after a lifetime of faithful coöperation, into the joy of your Lord.

To the gentile, riches are his, poverty is a crime, sickness a curse, misfortune undeserved, enemies hateful, disgrace inexplicable, the world good, the flesh to be indulged, man illimitably progressive, and death a sovereign calamity. To the Christian all these propositions are reversed. Riches belong to God, poverty is a virtue, sickness may be a mercy, misfortune a blessing, enemies are to be loved, disgrace is an occasion of repentance and of merit, the world evil, the flesh to be repressed, man fallen, death a release. In every thing the same antagonism is visible, although its appearance, universal as it is, never fails to make the gentile wonder; another proof that the gentile is essentially unintellectual, and that he is an *inductive* philosopher. An examination of each case of antagonism will furnish the same result, and indicate the root of the evil, the cause of this irreconcilable difference between the two worlds. The Christian seeks God in every thing, the gentile seeks himself. This error of the gentile, by the way, could not fail to produce idolatry; indeed, it is idolatry; and accordingly

the worship of the creature, its substitution for the Creator, is a very old fact, as predicable, however, of the gentile to-day as ever it was. Whoever reflects upon the great apostasy of the world from God to itself, will understand why idolatry made its appearance so early, why it is that our age is eminently idolatrous, and that creature-worship will never pass away.

Not unfrequently this never-ending antagonism between the Catholic and the Protestant view of men and of things excites the most marked attention in every quarter, and it is when the thing in question occupies a large space in the public eye. Kossuth and Louis Napoleon are prominent examples in point. It is pretty generally agreed that Catholics oppose Kossuth and uphold Louis Napoleon, while Protestants uphold Kossuth and oppose the French President. And this fact astonishes many persons as if it were a new thing. It is not new or surprising to Catholics, inasmuch as their judgment concerning these two individuals is a mere application to new cases of principles with which they are familiar, and which they are called upon daily to apply to men and to things. The magnitude of the interests at stake do not, for their own sake, move the Catholic, hasten his judgment, or retard it. It is as easy to judge a great as a small matter, for the Catholic dogma is as applicable to one as it is to the other, and moreover, in its presence, great and small affairs of this world are alike.

With reference to Louis Napoleon, the question before the Catholic is, what bearing the recent events in France have upon the kingdom of God upon earth. Whatever ambitious projects the President may cherish, whatever his motives may have been, whatever may be his personal standing in the sight of God, are questions foreign to the cause which is to be adjudicated before the two worlds. Granting his motives to be good, his enemies will not take them into account, or admit them as an excuse for what he has done. We have nothing to do with them; we have simply to weigh the acts which have been done in the presence of the world, leaving all adjudication of motives to Him who alone can judge them. If the heart of the President be right in the sight of God, it will be well for himself; if not, God will accept what he has done, press it into the accomplishment of his designs, and cause

the President to go the way of mere human instruments of his will. Yet, when the act is good, it is but fair to infer that the motive is also good, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, and we have yet to see proof that Louis Napoleon was not sincere. Meanwhile, the work done by him has been good. He preserved the independence of the Holy See, the centre of Catholic unity. What is called the temporal power of the Pope may not be essential to his office, but the history of the last thousand years gives evidence enough that it is the will of God that the Pope should retain that temporal power. He has lost it several times, and it has always been restored to him in a wonderful way. The last restoration, in 1849, is an event which has to this day exercised the wits of gentiles, who cannot comprehend it because the providence of God is in their world an empty sound. And God has manifested his providence, not only by always restoring the Pope in some strange, out-of-the-way manner, which no one, no gentile certainly, would have anticipated, but also by punishing the enemies of the Holy See. History has yet to say that a Roman republican came to a good end. The enemies of the Papal crown were always the enemies of the Papal mitre. Louis Napoleon, in driving them from Rome, gave the anti-Catholic world a blow which shook it to its centre. He has also served the interests of religion in France by securing to the Church in that country a freedom which it has not known for centuries; by promoting the interests of religious education, and in other ways which it is not necessary to recount. Government is essential to the well-being of society; the President found his country torn by factions, on the eve of a reign of terror, — terror, not to the wicked, but to the good, — and he inaugurated government, a thing almost unknown, hopeless, forgotten, in France. He has silenced the Socialists, the enemies of the Church, and, in an especial manner, of the Christian family. He has preserved, for the present, the peace of Europe, inasmuch as his unexpected and providential act has damped, if not destroyed, the hopes of the revolutionists. Now the question before the Catholic is this. What relation has the work done by Louis Napoleon to the soul, to heaven, to the supernatural world? From the enumeration of his acts, it results that they tend to the defence of the Church, of the family, of government,

and of society. The men protected by him are generally Catholics, persons who regard the world as subordinate to God. The men repressed by him are generally gentiles, persons who subordinate the world to human passions. The things encouraged by him are prized by Christians; the things destroyed by him are not lawful for Christians to love. It is easy to anticipate and to understand the unanimity of the Catholic judgment regarding Louis Napoleon. The work done by him is good for the kingdom of God.

Now the gentile encounters here his usual difficulty in comprehending the Catholic judgment. It is based upon the principle that what is sinful is not good for the state. This is the Gospel which sounds like foolishness to him; for God, heaven, the Church, and the soul have no voice in politics in the world which possesses him. His model statesmen laugh at the notion that they should do or undo any thing for the sake of the soul. A member of Parliament, or of Congress, who might defend or oppose any measure on this ground, would be hissed out of countenance. The gentile denounces Louis Napoleon, because the work done by him is not good for the body, for the world. The President, he says, has trampled upon the freedom and rights of Frenchmen. Men are entitled to the largest liberty of thought, speech, and action. Human nature is perfect or perfectible; its tendencies are innocent, they perfect it, therefore men have the right to follow its tendencies. Any action is just which tends to make man free in every thing. The people are sovereign, therefore they may elect to have any or no government. If they do not like the Church; if they kill or banish priests, and turn the churches into playhouses or stables; if they assassinate in cold blood every man who is likely to embarrass them by his fidelity to God or to the state; if they promote godless education; if they plot against the integrity of the family; if they organize midnight conspiracies against the state, thereby filling peaceable men with alarm; if they circulate licentious writings in all imaginable shapes, — they only exercise the freedom essential to the development of human nature. The people never make mistakes. That government is the best which governs the least, and Louis Napoleon has retarded the time when all government will become unnecessary to a self-

regulating people; he has fastened chains upon human nature; his work is therefore bad.

The two conflicting judgments were to be expected, for the principles of the parties are utterly irreconcilable. This is forbidden by the law of God, says the Catholic, therefore it is not good for the country. This tends to free the people from all law, says the Protestant, therefore it is good for the country. No wonder that the Catholic and the Protestant stare at one another, when they talk of recent political events.

The case of Kossuth presents no special difficulty. The Catholic judgment is unpopular, but that is nothing new. When Kossuth landed in England, he ceased to be the hero of a tale of Eastern crime, and in declaring England to be his book of life, he avowed his ambition to be the hero of the Western world of villany. True to his world, he appeals to our mob against the government; seeks to entangle us in an unjust, as well as foolish, war against nations that have done us no harm; reviles all that is respectable in the counsels and traditions left by the founders of our republic, and adds his influence to the forces which are expedited for the downfall of our national greatness. Considering the immense number of persons who have been led astray by him, who have committed and will commit the most atrocious crimes against Heaven, the Church, and society, in consequence of his evil example,—considering the thousands who have lost and will lose their lives because of him,—it is lawful to conclude that no man of our day has caused more misery, more sin, or has precipitated more souls into hell. We have heretofore shown that his Magyar cause was unworthy the support of an honest man. The atrocious murder of the venerable men, Lambert and Latour; the theft of the property of Hungary; the saddling his country, already ruined by domestic and foreign wars of his creation, with an immense debt, for which he left only notes and promises; the false pretences under which he is now filching more money from silly people, and burdening his country, whose credit he has as little right to pledge as he has to pledge that of America, with a new debt,—are only a tithe of the misdeeds for which he will yet stand adjudged guilty before outraged Europe. He is pledged to destroy the supremacy of the Pope, and to uproot, if possible, the Catholic Church

in Europe. He is the friend and ally of the enemies of religion, government, the family, and society, whom Louis Napoleon has succeeded, for the present, in whipping back to their kennels. Not satisfied with the piles of dead bodies heaped together by his insane lust for power and for revenge, he is even now devising the murder of untold thousands. He is pledged to ruin Austria, and one of his avowed reasons is, that the Catholic governments may fall with her; that the demons of rape, murder, and robbery may be let loose upon Europe; that the Church, and all those holy and useful institutions which depend upon the Church, may be totally swept away. He is the preacher of revolution for its own sake. The modern revolutionary doctrine, of which he is a champion, is condemned by right reason, and anathematized by the Church, which repeats the words of St. Paul, and enforces the law of God, denouncing eternal damnation to those miserable men who, without just and weighty causes, known as such to the world, and declared to be such by competent authority, refuse obedience to their legitimate rulers. No *Catholic* is or can be a Red Republican or Socialist. The revolutionists themselves are a small minority of the people. They are cowards, moreover; they plot and fight only in the dark, and Louis Napoleon has shown that one *man*, with sufficient resolution and willingness to expose his life to the constant peril of assassination, is strong enough to drive them all back to their burrows. When they succeed, the people begin to know what despotism means. And after loading the people with untold miseries; after laying waste the country with fire and sword; after destroying, in a year, the fruits of the piety and the industry of ages; after the commission of crimes which recall the memory of barbarous times; after filling their purses with gold stolen from the altar and the poor, — they run to a hiding-place, to some nest for swarming vipers, like England, and plot in the dark for fresh horrors to Europe, already thrown by them, and by such as they, into the barbarism of pagan ages. These are the works of Kossuth, and Catholics, trying his conduct by the law of God, cannot see in him any other than the enemy of souls.

But how the gentile laughs at that accusation! He admits that Kossuth and his friends have done these things, but in his world these things go under other

names. War against the Church is war against unmanly superstition; godless education is freedom to the mind; the damnable license of writers is the freedom of the press; midnight conspiracies are patriotic councils; assassination is the immolation of a tyrant or of a slave upon the altar of liberty; theft is a loan for the public welfare; wholesale murder is the just retribution awaiting the tools of despotism; Kossuth is the apostle at whose voice tyrants quake, and chains fall from the limbs of oppressed nations. He is the hero of the divine fury which arouses humanity; he is the champion of universal liberty; he is the high-priest of the PEOPLE-GOD.

The Catholic dogma, the formula of endless variety in supreme unity, contains the solution of every question, the particular formula for every action, the meaning of every thing which exists, and the right name for every object in the universe. It is the generative formula of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful in the moral world. It is therefore easy to conceive that there never was a time when it was not invoked by Christians for their guidance, and that its appearance in history is a constantly recurring fact. Theologians say that there are four marks by which the Church may be known. There are four marks by which the gentile may be known. These are ignorance, unbelief, hatred, and scorn. The gentile cannot understand Catholic doctrine; he will not believe it; he hates it, he scorns it. Our Lord Jesus Christ, who taught us every lesson worth knowing, taught us this lesson also: "He came unto his own, and his own received him not." The people could not or would not understand his language, or the principles of his Gospel. Seek first only the world, said they. Seek first only God, he answered. This was as incomprehensible to them as it is to the gentile now. No amount of experience can teach the gentile; his heart is hardened, and, like Pharaoh, he suffers great calamities without any profit to his soul, inasmuch as he attributes these calamities to the Fates, to chance, to the air, to magicians, to any hand but that of God. Whom he chastiseth he loveth. But the Pharaohs of every age lose the benefit of chastisement; their hearts are hardened, they return with hatred the love of God. Our Lord spoke of this matter frequently with his disciples, and it happened more than once that when he preached to the peo-

ple his disciples did not understand him, for they, like some worldly Catholics of our own day, were not enlightened by the Holy Ghost. Our Lord told his disciples he knew that the people did not understand his words. "To you," he said, "it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God; to the rest I speak in parables, that seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not hear." He told the people that he was a king. They raised the cry of treason. What people now say of the Pope was then said of Christ; — his spiritual authority would lead him to grasp temporal honors, and to teach the people disloyalty to the kings and presidents of that day. His Apostles encountered the same treatment; they were looked upon as men belonging to another world, and speaking another language; they were adjudged public enemies, and as such they were doomed to die. For three hundred years, and more, the Christians' road to heaven was red with their own blood. Their pure lives, their submission to the authorities, their loyalty, brought them no mitigation of their sufferings; for they obeyed man only for the love of God, and no breach of the commandments of the world is less readily forgiven by it than the violation of that which calls upon men to love the world first, last, and alone. The early Christians, like Christ and the Apostles, were accused of plotting to upset the state. It seemed to the people impossible that men united in a compact body, having one law, one doctrine, one God, one visible chief, one method of talking and of acting, and who had been treated so cruelly by government and people, could possibly be loyal citizens. The words of the prophet, quoted by Christ as applicable to the people who stood near him, wondering what he meant, are just as applicable to the gentile world of every age: "For the heart of this people has grown gross, and with their ears they have been dull of hearing, and their eyes they have shut, lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and be converted, and I should heal them." St. Paul, when he preached to the Jews, at Rome and elsewhere, and when he saw how blind, deaf, and dumb they were, could not refrain from marvelling at them. Learning made no difference in the hearers, or rather, as happens in our own day, a thorough secular education seemed to make the hearers more stupid

and more incapable of understanding the Gospel. Such men employ their learning to invent obstacles and reasons why they should not believe in the Church. In the time of St. Paul, the philosophers of Athens were the most accomplished gentlemen in the world. Yet he found them an uncommonly stupid set of men, more incapable than the unlettered crowd of comprehending the Christian doctrine. He, like his Master, like all Catholics, had to meet the never-failing accusation of disloyalty to the state, a circumstance which proves, if proof were wanting, that good Christians were always good Papists, inasmuch as the Roman centre of unity was and is the main cause of that accusation. When St. Paul was at Philippi, he was imprisoned and whipped for a cause which is always recited in the acts of indictment against the Christian, — for teaching fashions which it was not lawful for the Romans to observe. So, when the struggle between the Church and the emperors of Germany, concerning investitures, was going on, the misunderstanding was as great as ever. The Holy Ghost sends bishops to rule the Church of God, the bishops send priests to preach, and to administer the Sacraments. But this doctrine, which centres all in God, was incomprehensible to men who made every thing centre in the world, that is, in themselves. The emperors could see in a bishop only an efficient police marshal, and in a priest an active constable. So the emperors insisted that it was their right to give the ring and crozier, the emblems of authority, to the bishops. This was a subordination of the soul to the body, heaven to earth, God to man, and the Church could not, of course, permit such a practice to be enforced. So in France, when the Church insisted upon her own independence, or upon the abandonment, on the part of a married king, of some woman whom he had taken to the place of his wife, the gentile kings and people accused the Pope of interference in temporal affairs. So in England, when the Church resisted the absurd pretensions of Henry the Second, the tyranny of John, and the licentiousness of Henry the Eighth, all of whom strove to make the Church in England an Anglican sect, the gentile kings and people were enraged, and, not heeding that the Lord who sitteth in the heavens laughed them to scorn, imagined a vain thing; and no subsequent lesson has induced them to abandon their contest with God, and

with his Christ. Pretending that Catholics were disloyal to the state, they have ever since persecuted them, and the very last year saw Queen, Lords, and Commons persisting to imagine a vain thing. The silly law concerning titles is precisely the same in principle with hundreds of laws passed in different countries, during the last eighteen hundred years, by gentiles who have eyes and see not, and they serve to prove that no amount of human knowledge will enable a man to comprehend the first principles of the Catechism, or to understand a sentence uttered by a Catholic concerning religious things. This omnipresent fact is within the experience of every Catholic. It is seen as often as a Catholic becomes a candidate for the humblest office, enters a common school, opens a store, labors in a kitchen, or in any way comes into contact with Protestants. Misunderstanding of the most radical stamp, of the most hopeless character, awaits the Catholic in every quarter, and the burden of the Protestant or gentile complaint, however diverse in form, is always found to be the same in substance; — the *Catholic* is disloyal to the world; he seeks first the kingdom of God, and his everlasting justice. The gentile accusation is true. Catholics glory in their disloyalty to *his* world, inasmuch as loyalty to it is disloyalty to God.

See what profane history has to say of your saints. What nice instinct selected that word, *profane*, and *secular*! It is always blasphemous, for its material includes only those things which are outside the temple, — the Church; which are unconsecrated, and which belong, accordingly, to the secular world, which is a world of mere facts, effects without causes, — causes, that is, known to itself. See what this history has to say of wicked men. Their actions fill every page. Whereas saints like Francis, Dominic, Ignatius, Gregory the Seventh, Innocent the Third, Pius the Fifth, Thomas à Becket, Catherine, Theresa, and others, are dismissed with an indignant or sneering paragraph, in which the world is informed that these saints, in whose honor the Church erects temples to Almighty God, were fanatical, arrogant, haughty, superstitious men and women. The history which writes down Christ as a malefactor, spares no abuse of his saints.

Before we close this article, we wish to call attention to two facts connected with our subject. We may return

to each hereafter ; we dismiss them here with a paragraph. The instrument used against its nature is spoiled, and the work on which it is used is ruined. The world is compelled, as the Devil was before Christ, to testify against itself, and accordingly in every age the ruin of gentile handiwork teaches every one, excepting the blind and deaf worker, that the world is an instrument whose only use is to furnish a causeway to heaven. The personal enemies of Christ were doomed, even during their lives, and the holy city became a ruin, — not one stone remained upon another. The cities which rejected the Apostles have followed Jerusalem, at no great distance, to the valley of death. The Roman empire, drunk with the blood of the saints, became the sport of naked barbarians. The German Cæsars, who sought to make a tool of the Church, saw their house become extinct, and their sceptre pass into other hands. Roman republicans have seldom failed to pay a bitter penalty for their temerity in laying hands on an ark watched over in an especial manner by God. The house of Bourbon, which has been guilty of innumerable attempts against the independence of the Church, is now a beggar for its lost hereditary crown. The house of Hapsburg sinned in like manner, and it required Austerlitz and 1848 to teach it the things good for its peace. England, with her Crystal Palace, and her Titles Bill, looked like a very great nation, in 1851 ; let the Times newspaper say what she is in 1852. She invited all the nations of the earth to come and see her before the angel would begin to cry, *Cecidit magna Babylon!* The world must be used as an instrument, or woe to the world and its worshippers.

The other fact, to which we can only briefly allude, is this. When worldlings discover their mistakes in judgment, when they find that the Catholic was right, after all, they quietly amend their opinions, and partially adopt the Catholic view, without, however, conceding the Catholic principle, which no mistake of theirs can lead them to comprehend, and without giving due credit to their Catholic teachers. Let the recent case of Kossuth be cited for a thousand others which might be adduced in point. At present, by far the greater portion of the respectable papers denounce him as an impostor, and his cause as a bad cause, and the people quietly listen and many believe. It is likely that, long before the time named by the Most Rev.

Archbishop Hughes, the country will recognize Kossuth as a humbug. Yet, six months ago, the Catholics were almost alone in this just appreciation of the man and of his cause. One year previously, there were several unthinking Catholics who were disposed to defend the mischievous agitator. Two years ago, the editor of this Review, who was the first to call the attention of the American people to the cloud which menaced the country from Hungary, and which has now burst upon us, was heard with ill-concealed impatience on the part of some, when he called the whole Magyar agitation by its right name. The truth slowly, but surely, overtakes the lie. It has required the experience of three hundred years to make the world begin to surmise that the Protestant rebellion of the sixteenth century was an outrage upon civilized Europe. Three hundred years passed before the Roman imperial court reversed the sentence pronounced by its representative, Pontius Pilate, upon our Lord.

Plain talking, then, and plain dealing with Protestants. They cannot understand your principles, unless they be illuminated by the Holy Ghost. Controversies with them are not of much avail, and any concealment of the Catholic dogma, or any thing like an apology for it, is worse than useless. If you wish to be instrumental in the conversion of any of them, pray for them, exhibit the beauty and holiness of the Catholic dogma in the sanctity of your lives, and in that way it is possible that they may begin to suspect that it is for their peace to embrace it. "Let your light so shine before men that they, seeing your good works, may glorify your Father in heaven."

ART. III. — *Les Saints Lieux. Pèlerinage à Jérusalem, en passant par l'Autriche, la Hongrie, la Slavonie, les Provinces Danubiennes, Constantinople, l'Archipel, le Liban, la Syrie, Alexandrie, Malte, la Sicile, et Marseille.* Par MGR. MISLIN, Abbé Mitré de Sainte-Marie de Deg en Hongrie, Camérier Secret de S. S. Pie IX., Chevalier du Saint-Sépulchre, Commandeur de l'Ordre Constantinien de Saint-Georges de Parme, Membre de plusieurs Académies de la Suisse, de Rome, et de la Toscane. A Paris : Guyot Frères. 1851. 8vo. 2 tomes.

THESE are two interesting and in various respects highly instructive volumes. The author is a native of Switzerland, and was formerly tutor to the young Archdukes of Austria, and, we believe, to the present Emperor Francis Joseph. He is a man of learning and talents, of firm faith and sincere and tender piety. He travels as a Catholic and as an ecclesiastic, but as one who well knows the world, as a shrewd observer, and as an able and impartial commentator on what he sees and hears. A more pleasant, instructive, and trustworthy traveller it has rarely been our good fortune to meet, or one whose accounts of the countries through which he has passed are more interesting or more important. We see and learn more of them in his pages than we could by visiting them ourselves, for he always seizes the right point of view, and shows you the precise things a Catholic traveller ought to see and become acquainted with. His account of the Holy Places in the East we must reluctantly leave to a future article, as well as his observations on Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire, in order to confine ourselves to some remarks he offers in passing on the late revolutions in Austria and Hungary.

The Abbé Mislin set out from Vienna on his pilgrimage to the Holy Places on the 24th of June, 1848, after the first Red Republican revolution in that city, and just before the open revolt of Kossuth and the Magyars. His position at the court of Austria gave him a good opportunity of understanding the character and purposes of each, and his candor, independence, and obvious good faith render his statements worthy of all confidence. He loves Austria, indeed, and is strongly attached to the imperial family, but he is no blind idolater of Austrian policy, and though

far from sympathizing with the false liberalism of the age, he comments with great freedom on the acts of the imperial government. We cannot better prove what we say, than by letting him speak at some length for himself.

"It was from Vienna in Austria that I set out on my pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Having returned in the early part of 1848 to that capital, where I had resided many years, it was not long before I became a witness to the events which followed the revolution of February and the unexpected fall of Louis Philippe. The proclamation of the republic in France was hailed in Austria with shouts of joy, not merely by the anarchists, but also by men in power. These feared constitutional ideas much more than republicanism, and believed that the overthrow of constitutional thrones would consolidate the absolute monarchies. The anarchists foresaw all the advantages which might be derived from this thunder-clap which was reverberating on the banks of the Seine, and which must shake all the old monarchies of Europe.

"Some attempts at insurrection had been made in several provinces of the Empire, but they had been easily suppressed, in part by the people, and in part by the army, which for the most part at all times remained faithful to its sovereign. Then the Polish, Italian, and Hungarian revolutionists, directed by the clubs of France and Germany, comprehended very well that it was neither at Milan, nor at Presburg, nor at Cracow, that they could overturn the Austrian monarchy, but that it was necessary to strike it in its heart, — and they appointed their rendezvous at Vienna. The 13th of March, while the members of the Estates, professors, and lawyers bore their *respectful* petitions to the foot of the throne, believing that only some reforms were demanded, the real reformers, aided by the students of the University and the populace, made a revolution in the streets. Assuredly, if in such a case the goodness and loyalty of the sovereign could save a state, Austria would have escaped the scourge of a revolution; but for those who wished the ruin of the Empire, the announcement of the concessions made by the Emperor became merely a signal of revolt.

"The revolutionists at first turned the popular hatred against a man whom they had for a long time designated as the keystone of the arch of the *ancient system*. This man was removed, and the same day the monarchy crumbled to pieces. But the edifice was everywhere undermined, and all the genius of Metternich could no longer have sufficed to uphold it. Besides, however great had been the influence of this statesman, it was not, at least had not been for some years, so preponderating as to render him responsible for the acts of the Austrian government. He had against him the constant opposition of one of his colleagues, sustained by a bureaucracy the most jealous, the most Voltarian, the most nu-

merous, the most indomitable, and the most powerful to be found in the world. For a long time there had been no unity in the government, and it could be neither strong nor durable.

"Having entered upon the affairs of state in the sequel of the old French Revolution, and during the disastrous wars in the early years of the present century, Prince Metternich was able, in the Congress of Vienna, to reconstruct a powerful state from the vast provinces of the ancient monarchy so powerfully shaken by the conquests of Napoleon. It was not in his power to fuse all the heterogeneous elements which composed the Austrian empire, and to form from nationalities so different and so opposed one to another as the German, the Hungarian, the Italian, the Bohemian, &c., perfect national unity. He cemented together the materials which Providence furnished him; the weather or revolution dissolved the cement, and the edifice fell to pieces. But the different races that composed this grand empire too soon forgot that the acts of Prince Metternich had been infinitely more useful to Austria than the conquests of Napoleon to France.

"In Austria harmony was preserved by a skilful balancing of province against province, and of their reciprocal pretensions. Austria has often been blamed for this system, which, however, was for her a necessity, and at the same time an act of good government. France will always be *one*, whether as a monarchy or as a republic. Paris has become France; all is centralized there; centralization in Austria is an impossible evil. In general, the provinces were well administered; nevertheless, if more development, more life, had been given to provincial and municipal institutions, they would, perhaps, in the hour of danger, have been found powerful auxiliaries, instead of emitting from their bosom, as was the case, the first sparks of that fire which is now consuming the monarchy.

"But would it answer any good purpose in these times to attempt by means of concessions to allay the storm which is everywhere raging? It is not when the river overflows its banks, but when it flows peaceably in its channel, that durable dikes can be constructed against its foreseen inundations. Prince Metternich did not lack foresight. He perhaps was not well informed of the nature of the movement that broke out at Vienna, on the 13th of March, but he had for a long time followed the progress of revolution in Europe with all the clear-sightedness of his genius, and he has often been heard to say, 'We are hastening with giant strides towards an abyss.'

"People and kings have rushed onward to the precipice with equal blindness. Revolutions, those eternal scourges of God, succeed each other, as formerly those hordes of barbarians whom God sent against those he would chastise. This chastisement is the most

terrible that can be inflicted on the human race. 'God,' says Bossuet, 'sends them to punish scandals, to awaken the faithful and their pastors, the people and sovereigns; suffers the seducing spirit to deceive haughty souls, and to diffuse everywhere a haughty chagrin, an indocile curiosity, and a spirit of rebellion.'* To strike a death-blow at Austria, the revolutionists hypocritically revived in the provinces a vain spirit of nationality. This the secret societies labored assiduously to effect. Then, on a convenient day, the 13th of March, the delegates of the twenty nations, or rather, twenty clubs, proclaimed the revolution under the windows of Prince Metternich, and in the evening he went into exile. These were the real actors, all the rest were simpletons or dupes. The Austrian *people* were as much surprised by their revolution as were the rest of Europe. The Viennese themselves had no suspicion of what they had done, if we except a fanatical sect which is sure to appear in evil times, like birds of prey on the field of battle, or wherever there is a carcass to devour. The Jews contributed powerfully to the revolution, and *these knew what they were about*.†

"Foreign emissaries had indeed some accomplices in the interior; but at first these were limited to a small number of nobles greedy of popularity, to booksellers who wished to sell publicly unlicensed publications which they had long been selling privately, advocates who aspired to be ministers, medical doctors without patients, desirous of trying on a suffering public the experiments suggested by their rash empiricism, and professors without talent, without conviction, and without faith, who had taught their pupils to rebel against God, waiting for an opportunity to teach them to stir up an insurrection in the streets. These all made use of young persons, rash and inexperienced, whom they might disavow at need; but, placed in advance by men who were less courageous, these young persons remained there. Hence it is that we saw for the first time in the annals of the world one of the most powerful monarchies governed by the students of a university.

"Whilst they conducted the car of state through the rugged roads of insurrection and terrorism, the population of Vienna, proud of the precocious reputation of their young Phaetons, imprudently yoked themselves to it, and ran with them to cast themselves into

* Bossuet, *Oraison funèbre de la Reine d'Angleterre*.

† As much as I am led by character, by principle, and, above all, as a Christian and a priest, to preach forbearance, and to rise against the unjust persecutions of which the Jews are sometimes the victims, I must still brand with infamy the conduct of those among them who use all the means in their power to disturb and ruin the states which afford them hospitality, and who pay with their gold for the publication of the most infamous libels against religion and government.

the abyss. From the very beginning, men of the old nobility, generally esteemed for their character, their talents, and their experience, and who had adopted in good faith the innovations of the month of March, endeavored by devotion to their sovereign and their country to give a regular direction to the progress of affairs, to ally liberty with order and justice, and thus prevent the ruin of the state. Then it was that we saw the Count de Fiquelmont charged with Foreign Affairs, the Count de Latour Minister of War, and the Count de Hoyos at the head of the National Guard. But their very titles were crimes; the people screamed, It is aristocracy, *camarilla*, reaction!

"The populace of Vienna invented then a new constitutional means to rid themselves of the ministers. This was the *charivari*. During the night, some hundreds of workmen, students, and National Guards assembled before the houses of the functionaries marked out for insult, and forced them to resign their offices. One of the ministers, M. von Pillersdorf, was able for a time to sustain himself in office by means of concessions. He had been the representative of the revolution in the Council of State, under the former order of things. He became unexpectedly Minister of the Interior, and charged to form a ministry. Without character, without energy, without any fixed purpose or definite end, his policy was always to give way; a deputation, a few cries in the street, an article in a newspaper, infallibly resulted in obtaining from him a dangerous measure, of which he could not calculate the reach: he appeared to hold, that to flatter the people is to govern.

"All the powers, however, were more and more concentrated in the hands of the students; and the inhabitants of Vienna, now so proud to belong to a constitutional state, submitted with a *bonhomie* which seemed to flow from imbecility to the most arbitrary and despotic government ever known. 'When the multitude are once taken by the bait of liberty, they follow as blind men provided that they only hear its name.'* We can with difficulty conceive the abject state to which the Viennese were sunk before these petty tyrants of twenty-one.

"The students, while they yet suspected the intentions of the National Guard, made an appeal to those upon whom they had fired on the 14th and 15th of March, and joined the populace. The greater part of the National Guard were at first well-intentioned. They desired order, and would have been contented with the liberties obtained on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of March; liberties which they compromised, by believing that it remained for them to defend them, and that by marching at the tail of the University

* Bossuet, *ubi supra*.

and populace they would abdicate their dignity, and sacrifice to fear their liberty, their fortune, their existence, and that of the monarchy.

"The alliance of the National Guard, of the students, and of the populace once completed, there were seen frequently at Vienna what are called *demonstrations*. These scenes were at first hypocritical, then they became threatening, and at length so revolting, that in the night of the 17th of May the Emperor was obliged to leave his capital with all his family. He who had given his people liberty was the only one that was not free, and the Viennese must for ever blush, that on the evening of the 15th of May they turned against the sovereign whom they had surnamed the *Good* those very arms which he himself had given them.

"However, all these demonstrations were the work of a directing club, who from the bowels of the earth, where they were concealed, the same day and hour, by secret means, moved the blinded populations of Paris, Frankfort, Berlin, Vienna, Naples, and Rome. All these people believed themselves free, and yet they obeyed servilely unknown, irresponsible masters, who commanded all their proceedings, all their actions, all their thoughts, and all their assassinations.

"The terrorism which hung over Vienna soon drove from this city all who could live elsewhere. Their departure was said to be a plot of the aristocracy and the rich to ruin the poor people. The resources diminished daily, commerce languished, public credit was gone, the workmen threatened the proprietors, anarchy was complete within, new crises were inevitable. Yet in such a state of things it was necessary to carry on the war in Italy.

"If the revolutionists wished not to preserve to the monarchy its most beautiful province [the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom] they would at least, one would think, interest themselves in the fate of that army under Radetzky, composed of their brothers and sons, who, believing themselves bound by their oath, daily exposed themselves to death with a bravery that commands the admiration of Europe, not excepting even Italy herself. And yet I very much doubt if there was anywhere a city where the victories of the Austrian army were received with more displeasure than at Vienna, where the very flag of that army was proscribed. It mattered little to these false patriots that province after province should be lost to the Empire; for the only empire which existed for them, that which commanded all their sympathies, was not Austria, but the revolutionary empire which embraced all Europe. They disavowed the army of Italy, and Count de Latour was obliged to apologize for sending it reinforcements. The army sustained itself by its valor and its fidelity, and it was the sole support of the state, which its own citizens sought with a blind fury to de-

stroy. Experience has demonstrated, that, if there is a good *constitution* in Austria, it is that of the army.

"The evil was extreme, since the monarchy was attacked at the same time within and without. Foreigners have been much astonished at the revolution in Vienna, for they had supposed no people were less inaccessible to revolutionary ideas than the Austrians. Their ancient fidelity to their sovereigns was proverbial, and it was constantly repeated that the Viennese remained outside of the intellectual and political movement of the age, and had but one want, *that of good living*. But the citizens of Vienna had read this reproach so many times in books and journals, that it contributed not a little during their *glorious days* to inflame the ambition of all those heroes of the shop and the college who wished to ape the *gamins de Paris*, and the pupils of *l'École Polytechnique*. They wished to imitate at Vienna what was done in Paris, and they attempted it with a servility that bordered on buffoonery. There came from France, among others, professors of barricades. One day they invented an imaginary enemy, and in less than no time all the pavements of Vienna were piled up even to the first story of the houses; men, even women, watched all night in the useless intrenchments, and the next day the greater part of the journals exclaimed, with an ecstasy truly German, *Now we can look the great city of Paris proudly in the face; we have nothing any longer to envy her*. It is the servility with which all that is done in France is copied in Germany, that led M. de Humboldt to say to a French gentleman who was taking his leave of him to return to Paris, 'See to it that your country keeps herself well, for when France gets a cold in her head all Europe is obliged to sneeze.' I do not know whether this is a great honor for France or not, but surely it is very little for the rest of Europe.

"If Prince Metternich foresaw the use which the good Viennese would make of *liberty*, he did very wisely in granting them only *good living*; for assuredly nothing has so completely vindicated the old order of things as the new order which they have instituted in its place.

"It has been the same with the liberty of the press. Certainly I am not the man to make an apology for the censorship of the press as it was formerly practised in Vienna. It was in the last degree irreligious, silly, and absurd. But that censorship was perfect liberty in comparison with the frightful tyranny which under the revolutionists weighs upon the manifestation of thought. The most unbridled license propagates each day the most disgusting pamphlets against religion, and against individuals supposed to be hostile to the new order; and I have seen many persons make fruitless efforts to find a journal or a printing-office which would publish some timid rectifications. Not only could they get nothing printed

at Vienna, but the *Committee of Public Safety* (there was a committee of public safety!) had the folly to attempt to strike by its measures even the journals of foreign countries. One fact will serve to show what was the liberty of the press there enjoyed. As there were no Jesuits at Vienna, and as the revolutionists must have a phantom, they took the Liguorians. The Swiss radicals, or rather Swiss societies, affiliated with the secret societies of all countries, had decreed that the Liguorians, the Benedictines, the Sisters of Charity, and many others, must be considered as *affiliated* with the Jesuits. The students and Jews of Vienna ratified this judgment, and shamefully expelled these religious from their houses, stripped of every thing, and reduced to the necessity of begging public charity in the environs of the capital. Four citizens of Vienna, touched by their situation, wrote a *confidential* letter to the Archbishop, praying him to intercede with the minister that some slight succors might be given to these unhappy proscribed, out of the sums of which they had been despoiled, to save them from dying of hunger. This letter was sent to M. Pillersdorf. The students, becoming aware of it, obliged the minister to give up to them this *culpable* letter. They caused it to be printed and placarded on the walls, in order to denounce its signers to the public hatred; they treated these worthy citizens to a *charivari*, and then forced them by threats and injuries to retract the sentiments of humanity which they had expressed in their letter.

"The liberty of writing went even to that. O Galileo, it has been said that the intolerance of the Inquisition condemned you to retract your admirable system of astronomy,* but you were happy that it did not force you to deny your humanity!

"Thus it is, the revolutionists of all times and countries are alike. In Germany, Italy, France, Switzerland, they promise liberty, and give only the most hideous slavery.

"We have just seen how the people of Vienna, maugre their habits of fidelity, order, and peace, suffered themselves to be drawn into revolution by foreign emissaries. But it must be confessed that there were many internal causes which greatly facilitated the efforts of those who sought the ruin of the monarchy. There was no unity, there was no life, in the upper regions of the government. This great empire moved on the old machinery, upheld solely by the affection of the people for their sovereign. Their attachment to the imperial family was not belied for a single moment. In the very worst days of the revolution, the Emperor appeared in the streets, and was always hailed with enthusiasm. If subsequently

* I am far from conceding this stereotyped calumny, due to the bad faith of the anti-religious. Galileo was only obliged to respect the Holy Scriptures.

the people rushed with threats towards his palace to wrest from him some new concession, they never dared avow that their demonstrations were directed against the person of the sovereign. Obligated, in order to obtain freedom of action, to quit Vienna, the Emperor Ferdinand did not quit his states, and there was not a province that would not have been happy to possess him. An indissoluble bond, a bond of reciprocal affection and esteem, binds together this family and the people.

"The Austrian people are kind-hearted, religious, honest, and distinguished for their good sense, and consequently are little accessible to revolutionary ideas. It was not these people that made the revolution. They were the most peaceable, wealthy, and happy people in Europe. But among them was a minority called *intelligent*; that is, reading newspapers, discontented, and irreligious. This minority had been for a great number of years in open conspiracy, and it comprised the entire body of the officials of the government. The bureaucracy was a leprosy which extended from one extremity of the empire to the other, and eat into its very heart. An innumerable army of officials seemed to have no other duty than to impede the progress of affairs, to render the government odious within and without, and to ruin the state. It is commonly believed that the Emperor of Austria was an absolute monarch; but there were by his side, below and above him, councils, cabinets, bureaus, presidents, referendaries, &c., that sanctioned, modified, or annulled his decisions. The signature of the Emperor was often a recommendation very little respected by the officials. This bureaucracy, very unpopular, and necessarily so, sought to obtain pardon of the *intelligent* public for its attachment to the budget by its manifest contempt for the government. The government itself was sustained by nobody. To attack it passed for good taste and breeding in the court, the public offices, the saloons, and even in the antechambers of the Emperor. The Austrian *Moniteur*, that is, *The Vienna Gazette*, published on its first page the ordinances of the government, and opposed them in the other three.

"The bureaucracy inspired an infinity of hatreds against the government. In making a revolution, all thought they were attacking the bureaucracy; what was their astonishment, when, mounting to the assault against the government, they found the bureaucracy by their side, mounting with them!

"The bureaucracy had obtained possession of the Church and of education, the customs, the censorship, and the police. It had enslaved the Church. This was the gangrene of the Austrian monarchy. A jealous, inept, and tyrannical legislation had petrified all the institutions of the Church. The bishops were generally little more than Aulic Councillors, and could seldom attain to the

episcopate, except after having been imbued in the public offices, during many years, with Jansenistic principles, the germ of which they must transplant into the ecclesiastical institutions. Some few prelates, worthy of the ancient times of the Church, were persecuted by the provincial governors, who were always sure to be sustained by the government. Parish priests were the heads of bureaux, sometimes agents of the police. One would believe that this order of things was established expressly for the irrevocable destruction of both Church and State. With very few exceptions, there were no preachers in Austria; the word of God was not free.

"In the choice of professors of theology, what was most feared were men of Catholic convictions. During a long series of years the only authorized text-book on canon law was a work placed on the Index by the Holy See, and it is a curious *pendant* to this condemnation that the Index of books prohibited by the Church was itself proscribed at Vienna, and even the *Roman Breviary* was placed on the index of the Austrian censors. The priest who should use the said Breviary, not corrected by the Austrian censors, was liable to a fine of fifty florins. The law, indeed, was not executed, but it existed. Pious associations, congregations, confraternities approved by the Church, were prohibited by the civil, and often also by episcopal authority.

"Notwithstanding the will of Francis the First, expressed on his death-bed, that regular relations with the Holy See should be re-established, and that the laws contrary to the discipline of the Church should be modified, after a great many years and a thousand fruitless efforts on the part of Rome, not a single step toward this important result had been effected,—a result which would have been even more useful to the State than to the Church. The bishops of Prussia, of England, of Turkey, could correspond freely with the Holy See; the bishops of Catholic Austria could not. Let it not, however, be forgotten that this was the work, the creation, the *fetich* of the *enlightened, intelligent, and liberal* party, whose most constant, and perhaps only, opponent in the government was that same Prince Metternich who has been held responsible for acts which he uniformly fought against. Hence, immediately after the revolution these tendencies became a thousand times more manifest and oppressive than they were before. The first acts which signalized the *era of liberty* were acts of intolerance and proscription so revolting, that it is necessary to go very far back in the history of tyranny to find any thing to equal them. But the actual trammels will break of themselves when the ephemeral terrorism born of the clubs and the University shall have had its day.*

* The present pious Emperor, Francis Joseph, has verified this prediction in abolishing at the commencement of his reign the infamous Josephine laws. — Ed. B. Q. R.

"As in all revolutions, they attacked violently the clergy at Vienna. The insults, calumnies, and menaces were directed principally against the bishops and the rich abbeys which had escaped the vandalism of Joseph the Second. The poor convents and inferior clergy, however, though treated with less envy and severity, did not escape their share in the persecution. But this was not all. Books, pamphlets, journals, caricatures, and those impure works which ignorance and corruption have produced, were circulated, tending to bring religion itself into derision. It would not, therefore, have been just to spare its ministers.

"However, it was especially against the nobility that the wrath of the people was directed. It is true that the nobility enjoyed great privileges, that many of those privileges ought not to exist in the present times; that the charges and rents of the tenantry were sometimes rendered extremely burdensome by the severity and intolerable vanity of the possessors of titles and seigniorial rights; that many of the nobility gave grave scandals; and that many Austrian, Bohemian, and Hungarian counts and barons, in regard to instruction and the opinions they entertained of themselves, seemed to be ghosts of the thirteenth century, — all this was true, and to be expiated. But it is equally true that a large number of great names were nobly borne, and were found at the head of great and useful undertakings; that many of these old families had the purse always open for the unfortunate; that their gardens, museums, picture-galleries, were constantly at the service of the public; that the peasants on their lands were infinitely better treated than the peasants on the lands of rich commoners; that often they founded schools, erected and endowed churches; and that they furnished in all departments distinguished men, whom Austria will always honor.

"Austria, a Catholic power, has always been the most tolerant power in Europe of the other forms of worship embraced by a small minority of its subjects. The government seems to have reserved all its jealousy for the so-called dominant religion. In the sequel it will do better than tolerate it, better even than protect it; it will leave it free. The bishops have a great duty to perform, and a great future opening before them. Their duty is to take the place which God gives them, without fear of the edicts which impiety may launch against them. Every one will be free to speak, to write, to associate for worldly or political purposes, and no one can deny the same right to the Church. The time has passed for expecting the aid, often suspicious, always impotent, of the government. The Church has a life and a strength of her own. Let the bishops reject, if they still retain them, their absurd prejudices against the Holy See, the remains of the Reformation which the enemies of the Church revive, which ignorance propagates, and which the light of truth will dissipate. Let them attach themselves

more closely to the Chair of Peter, — to that impregnable tower against which all the efforts of the wicked break, and fail, — to that Mother-Church, severed from which all other churches are but withered and dead branches.

“Heresy, as a destructive scourge, had torn up the soil of old Germany, and covered it with blood and ruins. The heresies of the last three centuries have sunk into a nihilism the most absolute offered us in the whole history of the aberrations of the human mind. Nothing remains of them but the name, and that hatred of the one only religion which survives all heresies. Catholic sovereigns have shown only too many unjust prejudices against the Church. May the sad experiments of Antichristian legislation which they have made serve as a warning to their successors ! Unhappily, a part of the bishops sustained the laws which oppressed the Church, under the pretext of freeing themselves from the yoke of Rome ; but the tendencies now manifest, especially among the younger clergy, are very different, and we may be sure the Church will be free from the moment that the clergy are worthy that she should be. O, if Austria had known how to take the position in her interior and in the affairs of religion which belongs to her as a great Catholic power, — if she had left to its free development in her states that Catholic element which is the element of order, peace, and justice, — if she had not suffered the consummation of that greatest political crime against a Catholic nation committed since the division of Poland, — a crime so much the greater as it was wholly unmerited, — her government would not have been overthrown on the 13th of March, by a few operatives and students from the University, at the bidding of foreign revolutionists. Catholic France and Austria suffered the radicals under their own eyes to cut the throats of the most Catholic people in Europe, for wishing to defend their liberty and their faith, conquered, centuries ago, at the price of blood ; and not half a year after the destruction of the *Sönderbunde* passed away, before they both fell prostrate under the force of the radical doctrines which annihilated the Swiss Cantons. In the political as in the moral and as in the physical order, we are always punished where we have sinned. Never are we the accomplices of a wrong, without finding that wrong, sooner or later, our chastisement.* The people of Vienna, like those of Milan, of Leghorn, of Rome, applauded the disasters of the Swiss Catholics, and the justice of God was not tardy in weighing upon them as they had weighed upon others. In the Swiss question the Austrian government was guilty only of weakness, while the people of Vienna approved the violences and sacrileges of radicalism. They were therefore ripe for revolution. They had for a long time been

* Montalembert, *la Chambre des Pairs, Affaires de la Suisse.* 1847.

perverted, and yielded in nothing to the population of Leipsic, Berlin, or Frankfort. I speak always of the *lettered* or radical population.

"I have often heard it said that the Viennese conducted themselves so grossly in their revolution only because they had no idea of political life, and that the fault is chargeable upon the previous government, which prohibited foreign journals. But I do not concede that the education of a people is made by journals; and, moreover, the journals were passably numerous in Austria. It is true that those published in the monarchy were strictly gagged by the censorship; and this shows the absurdity of that censorship, since at the same time it permitted foreign journals, however bad they might be, to enter, or at least was unable to prevent them from entering. It was the same, too, with books. The few authors Austria produced were obliged to send their manuscripts to a foreign country for publication, while all the worst books published in Germany and France were sold publicly in Vienna, except those which attacked the government. These last were sold only in secret; yet every one could obtain them. Thus the Austrians, as well as the Prussians, the Saxons, and the people of Baden, could at their ease form their mind and heart in the study of the most revolting productions of France and Germany. Nevertheless, the censorship of the press was one of the principal pretexts of the revolution. It deserved not so much hatred; it deserved only pity and contempt.

"We can easily understand that, with such an order of things, education must have been in a deplorable state. The bureaucracy hated the Church and feared revolution. Between this fear and this hatred, it crushed all the young minds, of which it had taken possession for half a century. It had the shame of being overturned by those it had formed after its own image and likeness. Science, generally little esteemed, and poorly recompensed, was cultivated only by a few individuals who had a passion for it, which infallibly conducted them to the hospital. Many of the professors devoted themselves to teaching only after having failed in other pursuits, and they lived isolated, discontented, and unknown. Never could a poet or a serious author leap the threshold of the saloons of the great, so as to receive some words of recompense and encouragement. In order to gain a momentary admission, he must declaim some frivolous scene, or sing some smutty couplets. In the time when France produced Racine, Bossuet, Corneille, there were Colbert, Turenne, the great Condé, and a whole people, to comprehend and admire them; while the upper and lower society of Vienna understood and admired only farces and ballets, and produced only dancers and buffoons. The government which had so great a fear of the independence of the Church had no fear of the immorality

and irreligion which overflowed in all directions, but even caressed them. It was for works of beneficence that pieces the most immoral were represented in the theatres, so as to attract a greater crowd.

"While the Catholic cause was abandoned in France by the several ministries which issued from the revolution of July, 1830, whilst Spain and Portugal struggled under the pressure of a revolution always breaking out anew, whilst Italy inflamed herself for a future revolution, anti-Catholic and anti-social, while Protestant Switzerland profaned Catholic churches, pillaged convents, and destroyed the institutions of learning, while the Machiavellian governments of Germany demanded laws under the name of liberty for the oppression of Catholics, Austria, if she had had the courage to unfurl anew that ancient banner of Catholicity, which is also that of liberty and civilization, showing by her interior administration and her foreign policy that she respected, and would cause to be respected to the full extent of her power, the rights of Catholics in Prussia, in Russia, in Switzerland, in Syria, she would have found in herself the strength which the protection of Heaven gives, and would have commanded the sympathies of the whole Catholic world." — pp. 1 – 16.

Our readers, we are sure, will thank us for this long extract, which not only reveals the character and the impartiality of the author, but gives us a very full and satisfactory account of the origin and character of the Austrian revolution of March 13, 1848. He is no enemy to Austria, but he is no flatterer of the Austrian government, which, though not censurable under the relations alleged by the revolutionists, had many and great faults, which no lover of freedom and Catholicity can palliate or disguise. The imperial family were pious and well disposed, but the administration was almost wholly in the hands of the enemies of the Church. Happily, however, the government was forced by the rude shocks it received to recognize its errors, and the present Emperor has already done much, and we trust he will do still more, to correct them. Even as a matter of sound policy, he should leave the Church free, for it is only through her freedom and independence of the state that government, or even society, is practicable in any part of Christendom. The attempt to maintain society on atheistical principles, by chaining up the Church, disparaging the clergy, ridiculing religion, and directing attention solely to worldly interests, roast beef and plum-pudding, has signally failed, and we hope it will be long before a new crop of fools will be produced to renew it.

From Vienna the author passed through Hungary. He embarked on the Danube in the steamboat *Ceres*, on the 24th of June, 1848.

"Our boat," he says, "shoots rapidly along among the islands of the Danube, so green, so beautifully shaded by trees of every hue. I have already lost sight of Vienna, all except its admirable Tower of St. Stephen, on the summit of which floats a flag, but not that which has united so many different nations in one empire, and been consecrated by a glorious history of a thousand years. The Austrian flag is now proscribed in Austria, torn and insulted more than if it were the flag of a foreign or a hostile nation. O the unspeakable folly of men! They imagine themselves free because they have a flag of three colors, which is imposed upon them by the clubs of Paris! These nations in revolution have denied all their historical recollections, in order to have, like the French, a tricolored flag, which is not national even in France. If this mania of imitation continues, I shall see on my return the Seine and the Gironde flowing at Vienna and Berlin, and the Column of the Place Vendôme ornamenting the capital of German unity.

"The revolutionary ideas, which are now triumphing in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere, have so little foundation in the actual wants of the people and the demands of the age, that they were very different only a few months ago. But for the French revolution of February, we should have seen constitutional monarchy established some seven or eight times in Italy, and forty times in Germany. The republic of San Marino alone would not have adopted it, for the want of space for a Palais-Bourbon and a Palais du Luxembourg. All Europe would have had seven or eight ministers more or less responsible, presided over by an immutable thought, a House of Peers for life, and a House of Commons chosen for five years. But all at once the mould breaks in the hands of the masters, and more than one constitution which began monarchical has ended in being the most democratic in the world, — *desinit in piscem*. The wants of the people change not with the winds which flap the flag on the old metropolis of St. Stephen, or with the storms that periodically break forth on the banks of the Seine." — pp. 18, 19.

As he visits Presburg, the ancient capital of Hungary, the author makes some reflections and offers some details not without interest. The Hungarian revolution has not yet broken out, but it is on the eve of its explosion. The author sees clearly what is coming, and gives a brief and trustworthy account of the causes and nature of the struggle which was then prepared. He fully confirms the view

which has been uniformly taken in this journal of the Hungarians and of their late rebellion against Austria.

"A few years ago I assisted at one of those turbulent Hungarian Diets which preluded the present tempest. After a stormy session of the Chamber of Deputies, in which I had seen the Austrian government furiously attacked without hearing a single voice raised in its defence, save that of the official and almost indifferent voice of the President, I observed to the President, that it was impossible for an edifice to remain a long time standing which every body conspired to demolish. 'The Hungarians,' [Magyars,] he replied, 'are ardent, vivacious, high-spirited, clamorous, and fond of opposition in — phrases. It is necessary to let them throw off their excess of fire and eloquence. My predecessor, who took every thing literally, died in endeavoring to restrain them, but I, who know them, leave them to act and speak in their own way. Whatever they may do or say, they are sincerely attached to their king, and let there come a real danger for the state, they will be its most courageous defenders.' The President left me very little convinced by his observation.

"I love the Hungarians for their open and chivalric character. They are religious, brave, hospitable, prepossessing to strangers. When I first presented myself in the Chamber of Magnates, I knew nobody; a simple priest, I was at once received as a brother by many prelates and bishops, who came to meet me, and with whom I have remained ever since tenderly united. More lately I have obtained rank among the Hungarian clergy, who had for a long time opened to me both their arms and their hearts. But this year, 1848, the Hungarians have forgotten the recollections of 1741; they have forgotten that chivalric cry of loyalty and enthusiasm, *Moriamur pro rege nostro Maria Theresia*, [Let us die for our king, Mary Theresa,] which had remained as the symbol of their national character. It is true, Joseph the Second but ill repaid the devotedness of this people; but, strange as it may seem, he is the idol of the revolutionary party. If he struck the people, he struck the Church still harder, and the *Brother Sacristan* of Frederic the Great has obtained the pardon of the sovereign who imposed on Hungary the German language, and carried away from Presburg the crown of St. Stephen.

"A violent reaction has manifested itself in the late Diets, not only against the German language, but also against the Latin, which was the language of public affairs; and they have substituted the Hungarian or Magyar language in its stead. In Europe generally this victory is regarded as the triumph of the *liberal* party; but it was in fact only the self-styled victory of a turbulent minority over the Catholic clergy and the Austrian government. This, however, is enough to render it popular with foreigners.

"In Hungary, in a population of twelve millions and a half, there are not less than fifteen or sixteen distinct nationalities, each for the most part with a different language of its own. The Hungarians, or rather the Magyars, form only about one third of the whole population. How embarrassing for a government to make itself understood in this tower of Babel! Usage had introduced the Latin. The Latin of Hungary had long been the subject of the railleries of those who did not know it; but, without being as pure as that of Cicero, it had the advantage of not being the idiom of the Illyrians, the Magyars, the Croats, the Wallachians, or the Saxons, and of being understood by all the nations of the earth. In the United States as in France, in England as in Germany, they can use a passport, or any other document, written in Latin; but if written in Hungarian, it would be as unintelligible as if written in Chinese or Sanscrit.

"In a political point of view, the triumph of the Magyar language has been, therefore, an act of oppression, and the *Liberals* who committed it were so intolerant, as to wish to oblige the Croatian deputies present at the Diet forthwith to speak a language which they did not know. Through the intervention of the Austrian government, the Hungarian Diet granted to Croatia the interval of two Diets to provide herself with a language. Yet this decision did not prevent the Magyar Liberals from hissing her deputies, as often as they attempted to avail themselves of this respite to defend the interests of their country in Latin.

"I insist on this fact, because it has been, not in itself, but in the tendencies it betrayed, the first cause of the misunderstanding between the Croats and the Magyars, and of the war which is on the point of breaking out between them. The triumph of the Magyar language in the parliament was a new irruption of the Magyars into Pannonia, the subjection of fifteen nationalities to one alone, or of eight millions of people of other races to four and a half millions of Magyars.

"The revolution in Vienna, last March, was hardly known at Presburg, before on the one hand the Hungarians attempted their separation from the empire, and on the other sought to incorporate with Hungary proper Croatia, Sclavonia, and Transylvania, so as to have a compact kingdom of fifteen millions of inhabitants. The Diet, the ministry, the Palatine, that is to say, the three constitutional powers, took the road to Pesth, under the direction of Kossuth, who soon absorbed them all, and summoned the Slaves to unite with them. The Croats, with their Ban Jellachich at their head, who had heard it said that the revolution of Vienna was made in favor of all the nationalities of the empire, and therefore in favor of their own, declared that they would be to the Hungarians what the Hungarians wished to be to the Austrians, that is to say, independent, holding immediately from the crown alone.

"The Magyars take up arms to subject the Croats, and the Croats take up arms to defend themselves against the Magyars. Here are the two nations in face of each other, or, I prefer to say, two men, Kossuth and Jellachich, so completely is each identified with the cause he defends. The one, Kossuth, is an eloquent rhetorician, able to stir up the masses as the tempest stirs up the waves of the ocean; the other, Jellachich, a soldier, loyal and intrepid, electrifies an entire people, rude indeed, but brave and devout. The one fascinates by his discourses, the other by his example; the one is nourished by the discourses of the old French Convention, which he admires, the other by the history of his country, which he loves; the one glorifies revolutions, the other glorifies liberty." — pp. 21 — 24.

We commend this parallel between Kossuth and Jellachich to the admirers of the former. No one questions that Kossuth is a distinguished revolutionary orator, and in that sort of eloquence — the lowest in the scale and the easiest to be attained to — which is adapted to rouse up the evil passions, and stimulate the natural insubordination of an unreasoning and unscrupulous multitude, he stands preëminent. But of the lofty character of a true patriot, of a real lover of liberty, or of a wise and prudent statesman, he has as yet given us no indication. His speeches in this country tire by their repetitions, and disgust by their egotism. His credit is every day diminishing, and if he ever leaves this country it will be as a small man in comparison with what he was esteemed when he first set his foot on our shores. He is far inferior, in all the qualities that fit him to be a leader of a revolutionary movement, to Joseph Mazzini, and can fill only a subordinate place under him. Our people have shown their usual bad taste in attempting to make him the object of their hero-worship. They love liberty and delight to honor it in its representative, and for this we honor them. But in Kossuth they have selected a second-rate revolutionist, — a sort of Camille Desmoulin, or rather a Robespierre without Robespierre's incorruptibility in money matters, — not the representative either of liberty or of a noble struggle in behalf of national independence. The Magyars were the oppressors, not the oppressed, and while they were seeking to render themselves independent of the empire, they were fighting to keep eight millions of Hungarians of other races in subjection to themselves. It was

the Croats who were fighting for liberty, and who were the real champions of freedom. He who deserves our sympathies and honors is not Kossuth, but their noble chief, the Ban Jellachich (*Yellashish*, as we have been told to pronounce it). He loved his country and liberty, and knew how to defend both, and he deserves to have his name placed high on the list headed by our own Washington. But we return to our author.

“ But behind this question of language there is a war of nationality to be settled, of which language is the expression. The Magyars have two objects to accomplish, that of consummating their separation from Austria, and that of confirming their independence by rendering themselves powerful enough to defend it. Certainly, if Croatia, Sclavonia, and Transylvania could identify their interests with those of Magyardom, place themselves under the direction of Kossuth, and declare war on Austria while she is engaged in suppressing the revolt in Lombardy, it would be the severest blow that could be struck to the monarchy ; but this blow will not be struck, for they will never submit to the Magyars.

“ Moreover, the opposition of Hungary to Austria is not at all the work of the people, as was that of Galicia in 1846. It is a conspiracy of a part of the nobility, availing itself of all the anarchical elements of the country to obtain its ends. Hungary, enjoying a constitution and privileges of its own, must have fewer grievances from Austria to complain of than other provinces. If that constitution and its privileges are absurd in our times, as in many respects they undoubtedly are, the fault is not in the crown, which has frequently attempted to introduce some modifications, but to this same Magyar nobility, who always resisted them, and now rise in rebellion. The lands of the nobles, for instance, were subject to no tax or impost whatever. How, then, could the Austrian government open its frontier to the productions of Hungary, and thus ruin the proprietaries of the other provinces, which bear all the burdens of the state ? How could it construct roads, protect agriculture, commerce, and manufactures ? The resources of Austria, compared to those of other states much less important, are very inferior, although the taxes in the German, Bohemian, and Italian provinces are very high. If the finances of Austria are in a deplorable state, the fault is chiefly that of Hungary. Thus, many provisions of the Hungarian constitution maintained by the Diet, in spite of the crown, have the disadvantage of keeping this kingdom in a semi-barbarous state, and of also seriously injuring the prosperity of the whole empire.

“ It is curious to see the democratic clubs of Europe make common cause with the aristocratic movements of Hungary, as they

did two years ago with the popular movements of Galicia. Provided revolutions are only made, it is all the same to them whether they are made with or without, for or against, the people. 'In our times,' Chateaubriand says, 'liberty is reason. It is without enthusiasm, and is sought because it is necessary to all, — to kings, whose crowns it secures by restricting power, and to the people that they may no longer rush into revolutions to find what they already possess. Certainly, then, all the revolutions which we have witnessed of late lead very far from their avowed object, independence and liberty.'

"Formerly the revolutionists appealed to the *fraternity of nations*, now they appeal to the distinction of nationalities, that is, to the *isolation* of nations. But here, again, the same contradiction. The same radicalism that seeks to separate the Italian and Germanic races in the broad plains of Lombardy, compresses under the same yoke the people of French, Italian, and German descent in the narrow valleys of Helvetia; the same spirit that tends to detach the Magyars from the Austrians, would compel the Bulgarians, Germans, Slaves, Croats, &c. of Hungary to submit to the domination of the Magyars." — pp. 24–26.

We regret that our limits compel us to take leave of our author, at least for the present, at Presburg; we hope, however, to rejoin him in our next Review, and accompany him on his journey to the Holy Land. We have merely cited here his testimony as to the causes, character, and tendencies of the Austrian and Hungarian revolutions. What we have cited was written in the month of June, 1848, after the revolution in Vienna, and before the outbreak of hostilities between Hungary and Austria, but by one who saw clearly what was to be expected, and fully comprehended the causes which were at work to ruin the Austrian empire. Since then, Austria, who appeared to us at that time utterly prostrate, whose empire we thought must be dissolved, and the German provinces be united to a new German empire embracing all Germany, the Italian be absorbed in an independent federative Italy, and the Slavonic be in part merged in a new and independent kingdom of Poland, and in part incorporated with the Magyars, forming an independent and powerful kingdom of Hungary, — since then, we say, Austria has suppressed the revolt in Italy, put down the revolution in her hereditary states, and reduced the Magyars to submission. This has disappointed and enraged the revolutionists, for Austria was the key-stone of the old European edifice, and it was only by her destruction that it could be demolished.

Threatened with Red Republicanism within, with continued revolt in her provinces, and having to oppose, not only her own rebellious subjects, but the combined power of the whole revolutionary party of the Continent, Great Britain, and the United States, Austria called upon Russia to assist her in putting down the rebellion in Hungary. Russia complied with her request, and the Magyars were finally defeated and reduced by the combined forces of Austria and Russia.

This assistance granted by Russia to Austria has been represented by the defeated revolutionists, Great Britain, and the United States, as an unauthorized and criminal intervention in the domestic affairs of independent nations, and the revolutionary ex-Governor Kossuth, liberated from a Turkish prison through the intervention of Lord Palmerston and Mr. Secretary Webster, calls upon us to give him material aid in reviving the suppressed revolution, and to unite with Great Britain and intervene so far as to prevent Russia from again intervening. He made the same demand of England, and found many of the English people ready to respond to it—in their toasts. This demand is the burden of all his speeches here, and their name is legion. Our government, if we may judge from the President's late message, was at first inclined to favor his revolutionary projects, and even to comply with his demand. Many of our citizens have been quite enthusiastic on the subject, and, having declared Kossuth the champion of liberty, the apostle of humanity, a second Messiah, come to break the power of tyrants, and to redeem the human race from bondage, have been ready to respond to his appeal, and to force their government into a war with both Austria and Russia in his behalf.

Kossuth, in all his speeches that we have read, in all his reasonings, quietly assumes as the basis of his arguments what he knows perfectly well is false, and the mass of his American sympathizers take his statements as true, without having any clear or just conception of the real merits of the question. Four years ago Hungary, to the great body of our people, even our educated people, was as much a *terra incognita* as the interior of Africa. Very few of them had any knowledge of its inhabitants, its domestic institutions, or its relations to the Austrian empire. Italian refugees and French liberals had prejudiced them against

Austria, and prepared them to believe that any party opposed to her must be in the right. When, therefore, they heard Hungary had revolted and taken up arms against her, they took it for granted that the Hungarian cause was a good cause, and deserving the sympathy of every American citizen, and every friend of liberty throughout the world.

But Kossuth knows perfectly well that Hungary had no ground of complaint against the Austrian government. That Hungary had not developed her resources, that she had not kept pace with the industrial progress of the age, that she had to suffer very serious evils, very many things that needed reforming, is most true and undeniable; but all this was due, not to the Austrian government, but to the obstinacy and folly of her own Diet, or local parliament. The imperial government labored constantly to persuade the local parliament to introduce the reforms which in the process of time and change of circumstances had become necessary, but always without success, and there was not a grievance complained of, not a reform needed, that the Hungarian parliament was not competent to redress or to introduce, if it had been so disposed. This fact should never be overlooked or forgotten, for it renders the opposition to Austria wholly unjustifiable.

Moreover, the immediate causes of the war with the imperial government were not the grievances that required redress, but desire for national independence on the one hand, and on the other the determination of the Magyars to subject to Magyar rule the non-Magyar races of Hungary, or rather of Croatia, Slavonia, Transylvania, &c., in a general way reckoned as parts of Hungary, but not within the limits of Hungary proper, civil or geographical. The pretext for hostilities was, that the imperial government would not aid the Magyars in reducing these non-Magyar races, that is, would not aid in stripping the empire of a number of her provinces, and give them to the Magyars, to render the kingdom they proposed to declare independent powerful enough to defend itself. If the imperial government consented to let Hungary separate herself from the empire, and become independent, it could not be expected to add to her proper dominions other provinces, or to refrain from efforts to confine the independent kingdom within the limits of Hungary proper. The demand of the Magyars was itself

unreasonable, and they had no right to feel aggrieved that it was not complied with, or that the imperial government aided Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania to maintain their independence of Hungary, and their loyalty to the empire. Even assuming Hungary, which, however, was not the case, to have been recognized as independent of the empire, this would have been no cause of war on the part of Hungary. A state has a right to defend its loyal provinces, and in fact the war of the Magyars on the Croats, who adhered to the empire, was itself a war on the empire, and of itself justified the imperial government, and would have done so even assuming Hungary to have been independent, in making war on Hungary. The revolt of the Magyars had no justification, and their war upon the empire was aggressive, and in all respects unjustifiable. Under any point of view, then, from which we choose to consider the Magyar cause, it was essentially a bad cause, with which no friend of freedom or of justice could, understanding it, sympathize.*

* We are not sure that this is sufficiently clear to all our readers. Hungary is sometimes spoken of as including Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania, and sometimes as excluding them. Geographically it includes them, politically it in some respects did, and in some respects did not, include them. These states, inhabited chiefly by Slavonians and Roumans, were distinct from the Hungarian state, but were for certain purposes of administration joined to the kingdom of Hungary, and dependent on the Hungarian crown. Yet they had a civil organization of their own, and diets of their own, at least Croatia had a diet, distinct from the Magyar Diet, which is meant whenever mention is made of the Hungarian Diet.

While Magyar Hungary, or Hungary in its restricted political sense, remained united to the empire, those provinces in some sense held from the empire, if we understand it, through the Hungarian crown. In consequence of this fact, when the Magyar kingdom obtained, in March, 1848, from the concessions of the good, but weak and terrified, Emperor Ferdinand, an independent ministry, the Magyar government claimed these provinces as a part of the Hungarian state, and demanded their submission to the new independent ministry. As the concession of that independent ministry was a virtual separation of Hungary from the empire, and threatened to be soon even a formal one, and to render Magyar Hungary in all respects an independent kingdom, the effect of this demand would have been, if complied with, to sever Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania from the Austrian empire, and to make them provinces of the independent Magyar kingdom, and to subject the Slavonians and Roumans to the Magyars, their bitter enemies and hereditary oppressors. The Croats, who were impatient of their *quasi*-dependence on Hungary even while Hungary was united to the empire, could not entertain the thought of being dependent on her as an independent kingdom. They preferred being united to Aus-

But Kossuth and his friends misrepresent the relation which subsisted between Hungary and the empire. Certainly Hungary was distinct from and independent of the Duchy of Austria, but to assert it to have been independent of the Austrian empire or state, and connected with it only by the accidental union of the crown of each in the same person, is to assert a palpable falsehood. Hungary was an integral part of the Austrian state, as much so as the Duchy of Austria itself. Austria aside from Hungary, Bohemia, Galicia, Croatia, Sclavonia, Transylvania, Dalmatia, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, &c., is not an empire, but a dukedom, and these kingdoms and provinces, in forming in union with the Duchy of Austria the Austrian empire, are not regarded in law as subjected to that duchy, and dependent on it. They are, in reference to it, independent states, as the several States of our Union are, in relation to each other, independent states. The empire of Austria is a federative, or, as some term it, a composite state. The members or components, taken separately, are

tria, and holding immediately from the Emperor, to being subjected to the Magyars no longer united to Austria. They consequently, under the lead of their noble chief, the Ban Jellachich, refused to submit to the Magyar ministry. The ministry took up arms to compel them to submit, but were defeated by Jellachich. They then applied to the imperial government to use its authority to compel them to submit, and to put down what Kossuth calls "the Servian insurrection." The imperial government, if its action has not been misrepresented, counting on the loyalty of the Magyars, and trusting that they would still remain united to the Austrian state, appears to have been at first disposed to listen to their request; but as soon as it was clearly manifest that the Magyars were to be satisfied with nothing but absolute independence of the empire, it refused, and approved the Ban Jellachich.

Here we get at once at the immediate causes of the war of the Hungarian ministry under Kossuth against the empire. The Magyar Diet had so alienated the affections of the non-Magyar provinces of the geographical kingdom of Hungary, that they would not consent to belong to the political kingdom of Hungary, if independent of Austria, and governed by the Magyar nobility. The Magyar ministry undertook to force them into submission, and, failing, called upon the empire, from which it was separating and wished to separate them, to assist it. The imperial government, after a brief hesitation, refused its assistance, and even extended its protection to the non-Magyar provinces. Then the Kossuth ministry turned against the Austrian state, fomented the new Red Republican revolution in Vienna of October, 1848, and marched its troops to the aid of the insurgents, with the hope of securing Magyar independence and the subjection of the Croats and non-Magyar races, under the walls of Vienna, by the ruin of the Austrian monarchy. They were defeated, as every body knows, by

mutually independent, and have each their local institutions and administrations; but in their composition, federation, or union, they form one state, just as the States composing our Union are one state in their federative character. The relation of Hungary to the empire was substantially the relation of Massachusetts to the federal government of the American Union; and she had no more right to secede from the empire, and declare herself independent, than Massachusetts has to secede from the Union, and declare herself a complete and independent state. How Hungary came to be thus united to the empire, we have heretofore shown at length, when treating expressly of the Hungarian rebellion. Suffice it to say here, that the union had received the assent of the Hungarian Diet, and therefore of Hungary herself, and she could not dissolve it without a breach of faith, or treason to the empire. However independent of Austria Hungary might have been in her local civil administration, she was not separately from the empire an independent state. She was not in herself what the au-

the noble Prince Windischgrätz, and obliged to retreat across the Danube, followed by the Austrian army. Now the sole pretext of this hostility against Austria was, that the imperial government would not aid the Magyars to reduce the non-Magyar races to subjection to the Magyar ministry, and thus aid in strengthening the Magyar kingdom resolved to become independent, by divesting the empire of Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania, and giving them to that kingdom. The baseness of the Magyar ministry has been disguised by the common mistake of confounding these non-Magyar states with the Magyar state of Hungary proper, or Hungary in its restricted political sense, and by not regarding the fact that the non-Magyar states were not struggling for independence of the empire, but for independence of an independent Magyar Hungary. They were loyal to the empire, but would not consent to make part of a Magyar kingdom independent of the empire. They were bound to the Magyar kingdom only as that kingdom was indissolubly united to the Austrian state, and consequently owed it no obedience when it ceased to be so united. The attempt on the part of the Magyar ministry to subject them was a wanton invasion of their rights, gross usurpation, and an outrage upon common justice, which would have amply justified Austria in making war on that ministry, even if it had been the ministry of an absolutely independent state. The defence of Austria and of the Croats is triumphant, and one must be wholly blinded by the revolutionary mania of the times, not to see that Kossuth and his party were wanton aggressors, and under every conceivable point of view in both law and justice deserving of condemnation and the utter reprobation of mankind. Not only the men were bad, but their cause was bad, and we have just as little sympathy with those who condemn Kossuth, and yet approve his cause, as we have with those who make Kossuth their *fetiché*.

thorities call a complete state; which is evident from the fact, that she had no ambassadors at foreign courts, and could maintain diplomatic relations with no foreign power. In all external or foreign relations she was merged in the Austrian state. She could declare herself, therefore, independent of the Austrian empire only by an act of rebellion, and justify herself in doing so only on those grounds, if such grounds there are, which justify revolution. She had, as we have seen, no such grounds to allege, for she really had no grievance to complain of against the imperial government.

Hungary at war with the empire was then simply the rebel at war with his sovereign, and every sovereign has the indefeasible right to reduce the rebel to his allegiance. It makes no difference here whether the sovereignty is lodged in an emperor or in a president, in a king or in a congress; the sovereignty and its rights and prerogatives are always the same. In the case before us the Emperor represented the sovereignty of the state, the sovereign state, and had therefore the right to reduce Hungary to her obedience, and consequently the right to invoke the aid, if he saw proper, of Russia, or any other friendly power, in doing it, and the power invoked had the right, if it saw proper, to grant the aid solicited. No man who knows any thing of the meaning of the word *state*, or of international law, or has the least glimmering of common sense, can deny this.

But, if this be so, no nation, unless in a clear case of self-defence, can have the least right to intervene to prevent the power called upon from granting the aid invoked. Here is a point to which we wish to call the attention of our readers. Those of our statesmen who have opposed Kossuth's demand for intervention against intervention, have done so on the ground that such intervention would be impolitic, and contrary to our interests as a nation. This is no doubt true, but we would oppose it on higher grounds,—on the ground that we have no *right* to intervene in the case, and could not intervene without manifest injustice,—not, indeed, without striking a direct blow at the right of independent nations to manage their own domestic affairs in their own way. We retort Kossuth's doctrine of non-intervention upon himself. He says, nations have the right to modify their institutions, and to adopt

such ameliorations and such forms of internal government as seem to them good, without the interference of foreign powers. As against one another, with the single exception of the right of neighboring nations to intervene simply in necessary self-defence, and understanding by nations independent nations, we accept and even maintain this doctrine. But in the present case this doctrine applies to Austria and Russia, not to Hungary, for Hungary was not an independent nation, was not in herself a complete state. She could introduce no reforms or alterations incompatible with her indissoluble union with and subjection to the Austrian state. She had no competency to declare herself independent of the empire; and to intervene at the request of the empire to prevent her from doing so, or to aid in reducing her to her allegiance, was not in any sense of the word to intervene in the domestic affairs of an independent state, — was and could be no violation of the law of non-intervention. But to have intervened to prevent Austria from invoking the aid of Russia, or to prevent Russia from granting it, would have been a direct intervention in the domestic affairs of independent states, and an undeniable violation of the law of non-intervention.

What Kossuth is soliciting of us is manifestly in violation of the very law of non-intervention he contends for. He wishes us to unite with England in saying to Austria and Russia, that if Hungary again rebels, — for Hungary is not now in a state of rebellion or revolt, — and declares her independence, Russia will not be permitted to take any part in the contest, and if she presumes to do so, it will be counted a *casus belli*. But this would be, not an intervention in behalf of a revolutionary government already existing *de facto*, but an intervention to encourage a province of an independent state to rebel and organize such government. If this would not be intervention in the internal affairs of independent states, we are at a loss to understand what would be. In any point of view, then, from which you choose to consider the matter, Kossuth's doctrine of non-intervention condemns him, and his insisting upon it proves that, however brilliant a rhetorician he may be, he is but an indifferent lawyer, and a sorry logician. If non-intervention is the law, we have nothing to do with the case, and have no right to protest against the conduct of either Austria or Russia. If intervention is the law, or the

right, as it must be to justify us in intervening at all, then the alleged intervention of Russia is justifiable, for she has as good a right to intervene to put down revolution as we have to intervene to sustain revolution.

But we deny that there was any intervention, in the legal or political sense of the term, in the case. To assist a friendly power, at its request, to put down a rebellion in its states is not intervention, is not to violate the law of non-intervention. The intervention prohibited by the law of nations is the intervention of a foreign power, *motu proprio*, in the internal affairs of an independent state, or without the request or permission of its sovereign. We have for this the authority of one of the greatest revolutionists of the age, the Abbate Gioberti, who belongs heart and soul to Kossuth's party, and is as innocent of all Catholic faith and tendency as the well-known pantheist, Stallo, who recently defended Kossuth at Cincinnati. Whatever Gioberti may have once been, his recent work, *Del Rinascimento Civile d' Italia*, proves that he can no longer be regarded as a Catholic, and that for years he has been a thorough-going revolutionist, prepared to carry his points with or without the Pope, with or without the Church. He is a decided liberal, and can no more than the fallen Lamennais be regarded as a Catholic priest, or as a Christian believer. He must therefore be good authority for Kossuth and his friends. Well, Gioberti, when accused in the Sardinian Chamber of having proposed, as Sardinian minister, to intervene in the affairs of Tuscany, replied, "I ask, Is to enter any foreign state whatever with an armed force always intervention, in the political sense of the word? I answer, if this entrance is by the request of the prince and people, it is not intervention: if against the will of the prince and people, it is intervention."* By *people* in this connection we must understand the people, not of a particular province, but of the state, and the people also in a political sense, speaking through its legal organs, not the mob or club. Now Russia did not take part in the contest against the will, but at the request, of the prince and political people of the Austrian state, and therefore neither intervened nor asserted the right to intervene in the internal affairs of independent nations. We

* *Del Rinascimento Civile d' Italia*, Tom. II. p. 593.

are, as our writings have sufficiently shown, no special friends of Russia, and we do not seek to conceal the fears with which we see the advances of the Russian empire; but we are bound to be just at all times, to all persons, and to all states, and we must say, that, since the peace of 1815, we have seen no disposition on the part of Russia to intervene in the internal affairs of any of the western states of Europe, in the sense in which intervention is contrary to the law of nations. It is rarely that we find on the throne an abler or a more equitable prince, aside from his schismatic character, than the Emperor Nicholas. If he were, as he should be, in communion with the Church, we should have no fears of his power or his growing influence. All things considered, it will be difficult to name the European state which for the last twenty-five years has been more wisely or advantageously governed than Russia, or a secular prince who has more scrupulously observed his engagements, and respected the rights of his neighbors, than its present sovereign.

There having been no political intervention in the case, and no assertion of the right of intervention, the request of Kossuth for our government to intervene against intervention is absurd. The fact is, all the intervention there has been, has been on the other side. In the first place, in the revolution in Vienna and in that of Hungary, the organized revolutionists of Europe openly and avowedly intervened, and many of the chief officers in the Magyar army were foreigners, such as Bem, Dembinski, and Guyon. Austria had to resist, not only her own Hungarian rebels, but armed Poles, Italians, Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, and perhaps Americans, aided by the popular demonstrations of the people of the United States, England, Germany, France, and Italy. In the second place, the English government and our own openly sympathized with the Magyars, and were on the eve of opening diplomatic relations with them. There was no lack of at least indirect intervention against Austria, amply sufficient to justify Russia, had she chosen, in volunteering her assistance to Austria, and in entering unsolicited into Hungary, in the interests of order and humanity, with an armed force adequate to suppress the rebellion.

Little does it become either the British government or our own to complain of Russian intervention. The Brit-

ish government has not ceased, for the last twenty or thirty years, to intervene in the internal affairs of Continental states. *Blackwood's Magazine* for February last, speaking of Lord Palmerston, says very truly: "He supported openly, so far as he could, — favored covertly when this was impossible, — the cause of revolution all over the world. He aided by the fleets of England the establishment of one revolution in Belgium, by the marines and volunteers another in Spain. He concluded the Quadruple Alliance to force revolutionary queens upon a reluctant people in both kingdoms of the Peninsula. He covertly aided in the spread of *liberal* ideas in Italy, — openly in supporting the insurgents in Sicily. He took Russia by the beard in the Dardanelles on account of the Hungarian insurgents; and afterwards, for a wretched private dispute at Athens, ranged France by her side, — all but brought on a war with France by the bombardment of Beyrout, and hostilities against Greece; and irritated Austria past forgiveness by the open sympathy expressed for the Hungarian insurgents." * And in the discussion in the British Parliament growing out of inquiries as to the dismissal of Lord Palmerston, it was avowed by Lord John Russell that the policy of the government had been the introduction and support of constitutional government in Continental Europe. As for our own government, no man can deny its interference in Mexico in favor of federalism, its open declaration that it would intervene to prevent the reestablishment of monarchy in that now distracted republic, or its unwarrantable interference in the affairs of European states by its expressed sympathy with the revolutionists, by resolutions of Congress, the diplomatic correspondence of the Secretary of State, and the official messages of the President. England has been constantly intriguing, and sometimes openly warring, for the establishment of British constitutionalism on the Continent, and we have become a nation of democratic propagandists, openly, and even through our government proclaiming all non-popular governments illegal, and virtually all crowned heads tyrants and usurpers, against whom it is lawful for their subjects to conspire when they will; and there is little room to doubt that Mr. Webster and Lord

* *Blackwood*, Feb. 1852, pp. 255, 256.

Palmerston contemplated an Anglo-Saxon alliance for the protection and support of the revolutionary movement of Europe, which is headed by Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin, Kosuth, and men of like character. Mr. Webster, we can believe, intended on our part no *armed* intervention, for he seems to have believed that the presence of English and American ships in the Mediterranean, and the united declaration of the two governments, would so overawe the sovereigns, and so encourage the revolutionists, that nothing more would be necessary. That something like this was in contemplation may be easily inferred from the acts and avowals of the government, and the lacrymose tone of the honorable Secretary's letter to Mr. Rives, instructing him to maintain his diplomatic relations with Louis Napoleon.

Now, if we have a right to intervene for the spread of democracy, and England for the spread of constitutionalism, and to encourage revolutions for one or the other, neither we nor England can deny the right of Russia to intervene in opposition, and by our intervention we give her at least a very plausible pretext for doing so. The silly pretence that the Allied Sovereigns propose to intervene against our democracy here at home, is unworthy the least consideration, and no man knows it better than our present Secretary of State. Mr. Webster pretends that the Allied Sovereigns, in their famous Laybach Circular, assert principles which deny the legality of our institutions; but we have, in replying to his letter to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, proved that this is not the fact. Mr. Webster is a great man. We have never denied it; we have heard him advance truly conservative doctrines, and develop views which proved him capable of being a statesman of the very first rank; but his mind is comprehensive rather than acute, stronger in grasping certain general conclusions than in the analysis of principles. He has strong sympathies and strong prejudices, and is not incapable of blunders which would be unpardonable in a smaller man. He read the Laybach Circular as a democrat, not as a statesman or as a lawyer, and entirely misapprehended its character. We have never been the advocate or the apologist of what has been called the *Holy Alliance*, but we prefer it to the unholy alliance of the revolutionists. That alliance was rendered necessary against the doctrine of the *Fraternity*, the "*Solidarity*," of peoples, proclaimed and

acted upon by the French Jacobins; but in no document we have seen has it ever proclaimed the right of one nation, of its own motion, to intervene, against the will of the sovereign authority, in the internal affairs of another. That the alliance was intended to maintain the historical rights of nations and sovereigns against modern revolutionism is conceded; but this in the mind of such a man as Mr. Webster should be an argument in its favor, not against it. So eminent a man as Mr. Webster cannot be ignorant that revolutions, even when necessary, are a terrible calamity, and that in Europe, and indeed in all countries, if we except our own, they have uniformly ended in destroying constitutional freedom, and in rendering military despotism more or less indispensable for the maintenance of society. Such were the effects of the movements of the Gracchi, and of the revolutions produced by Marius and Sylla in Rome; such were the effects of the old French revolution, and such throughout Europe are likely to be the effects of the Red Republican revolutions of 1848. Louis Napoleon is no tyrant, is no enemy of popular freedom, but he has been forced either to leave France a prey to anarchy or to rule her through the army. His constitution is not liberal, is not democratic, but we are much mistaken if it does not give to the people more power than in the present state of opinion is compatible in France with the peace and security of the state. The democratic revolutions and revolutionary ideas have rendered popular freedom impracticable in every European state, and we cannot but regard every man as really an enemy to liberty who sympathizes with them.

For ourselves, to return to Kossuth, we care not how much he is feasted, nor how much money he may induce silly dupes to give him. In himself he is nothing to us but a simple human being, whom we should be glad to see leaving off his trade of revolution, and settling himself down quietly to the work of making his peace with Heaven. All we regret is, that his progress amongst us keeps alive the sympathy of many of our people with revolutionism, and tends to foster feelings and wishes incompatible with the safety of our own institutions. No people is secure that runs mad after revolutionism, and we shall not feel that our institutions are safe till our people cease to sympathize with revolutionists. We have no solid support for

our institutions till our people know that treason is a crime against the state and a sin against God, and that every one who rebels against legal authority, and conspires by force of arms to overthrow it, is a traitor. The revolutionists have destroyed liberty on the continent of Europe, they have involved their respective countries in all but complete ruin, and here, the last stronghold of political freedom, they will do the same, if not frowned instantly down by our people. We may give them an asylum, for hospitality is a virtue that we would have our nation always practise, but we should do it only on condition of their remaining in private life, and scrupulously abstaining in word and deed from all interference in politics, foreign or domestic. It will not answer to make heroes of them, or to put them forward as our teachers and leaders. Let them live and repent, but live in retirement, without honor or notice, as they deserve. The facts detailed by our author in his account, which we have translated, of the revolution in Vienna, fully warrant this severe judgment, and admonish us to look upon all revolutionists, in the modern sense of the term, as the enemies of God and of mankind. We have been wrong and foolish in the sympathy we have extended to them; let us correct our error, and hereafter show that we are capable of honoring the cause of freedom and order.

ART. IV. — *Le Ver Rongeur des Sociétés Modernes, ou le Paganisme dans l'Education.* Par L'ABBÉ J. GAUME. Bruxelles: Goemaere. 1851. 12mo. pp. 230.

THE Abbé Gaume, Vicar-General of Nevers, is one of the more estimable of the present Catholic authors in France. He is not, indeed, remarkably brilliant, or very profound; but he is earnest, and in all his writings aims at practical results of the highest importance. We cannot but applaud the motive of the publication before us, the end sought to be gained, however far we may or may not agree with the author as to the cause of the evil he so clearly points out, or as to the specific means of removing it.

There can be no question that the worm which is devouring the very heart of modern society is paganism. The tendency to heathenism is in our fallen nature itself, and there is no age of the world in which it does not more or less manifest its strength. As long as man exists on the earth he will in greater or less degree manifest this tendency, and the Christian will have in himself and in society to continue the old war against paganism. That in modern Europe the tendency has during the last four centuries been unusually strong, and that there has been in many countries a decided reaction in favor of the pagan world against which the early Christian martyrs so heroically struggled, and did such brave battle, we have on more occasions than one attempted to prove, and it is evident to every intelligent student of history. Heathenism is everywhere rife, and modern generations grow up with heathen notions of life, accustomed to judge men and events by a heathen standard. Professed Christian countries have lapsed into carnal Judaism, another name for heathenism, and look only for a temporal prince in the Messiah, and worldly advantage or prosperity from religion. The Church is tried, not by its spiritual effects, but by its assumed bearing on the temporal civilization of nations. Even the people of Catholic countries are more or less influenced in their judgments by pagan maxims. They place, for instance, a much higher value on the active than the contemplative religious orders, and extol those who devote themselves to active beneficence and the relief of bodily wants far above those who devote themselves to prayer. The heroic devotion of the old monks and anchorites of the desert is termed by many a sublime folly. *Ascetic* is a word in bad odor, and if used will hardly be understood in a good sense. Faith in the reality of the unseen world is weak, and all thought and labor devoted to that world, or not attended by practical, visible results for this temporal life, are looked upon with suspicion, and very extensively as thrown away. So far gone is the age, especially among Protestants, where we see its real character, that its very spiritualism is material. We listened some time since to an oration before a literary society by Mr. Horace Greeley. He began by denouncing the materialism and utilitarianism of the age in good set terms, and with some truth and power, and ended by proposing a

greater attention to physical education, or the education of the body, as the only practicable remedy!

That the uneasiness, the insubordination, the revolutions, and the terrible social as well as spiritual evils which afflict modern society, grow out of the prevalence of paganism, or carnal Judaism, no well-informed Christian can doubt, and that it is the one and only enemy to our virtue and to our peace, whether individual or social, is just as certain. That it is necessary to see this, to understand well the fact of the prevalence of paganism in modern society, and the means of banishing it, or of emancipating the young generation from its thralldom, the Abbé Gaume feels deeply and sees most clearly, and so far we sympathize entirely with what he writes. The cause of this paganism in modern society he ascribes to the use of heathen works as class-books in our higher schools, and the remedy, he contends, is to abolish those works, and to substitute text-books written by Christian authors in their place.

“We have been,” he says, “much occupied of late years with freedom of education. This freedom has been energetically and perseveringly demanded, both as a necessity and as a right. All honor to those who have so nobly consecrated their talent and their courage to this important question! But there is something still more important than freedom of education, namely, that education be Christian. Freedom is the means, not the end, and if we make not education Christian, freedom of education will serve only to multiply the poisoned sources whence our youth may drink in death. To render education Christian is the work now to be done, at whatever cost. In other words, we must substitute Christian for pagan education. We must reconnect the chain of Catholic instruction, manifestly, fatally, and sacrilegiously broken throughout all Europe in the fifteenth century. We must place once more by the cradle of the infant generations the pure fountain of truth instead of the poisonous pool of error, of spirituality instead of sensuality, of order instead of disorder, of life instead of death. We must inform once more science, literature, art, and manners with the Catholic principle, if we would cure the foul diseases which now consume them, or free them from the severe bondage under which they groan. We must save society, if it can yet be saved, or at least prevent all flesh from perishing in the frightful deluge which threatens us. We must in this way second the manifest designs of Providence, whether in tempering as steel the hearts of those who are to sustain the shock of the conflict to which we are rapidly hastening, or in preserving to religion a small number of faithful, to become the seed of the kingdom of justice and peace.

"Here is the great revolution to be effected,—a gigantic revolution, before which the individual is as nothing. It will be resisted in more quarters than one ; it will stir up the fiercest opposition ; but it is possible to be effected, far more so at present than at any former period."—pp. 4, 5.

All this is very well, and shows that the author's views of the main question are sound and important. We will let him state his problem in his own way.

"In order to render the truth of my proposition palpable, I will waive all abstract reasonings, all metaphysical theories, and content myself with a few striking facts.

"1. With the exception of some acts of disobedience, inevitable even in children well born and bred, throughout all the Middle Ages, Europe was full of respect and submission for the Church. Christian in her faith, in her laws, her institutions, her sciences, her arts, her language, society tranquilly developed those beautiful and strong proportions which made her every day more like Christ, the divine type of all perfection.

"2. At the close of the fifteenth century, the sovereign power of Catholicity was enfeebled. The former union of religion and society was broken. The paternal voice of the Roman Pontiffs, hitherto so venerated, became suspected ; the majesty of their power faded into a shadow ; the filial submission of kings and people was diminished ; a fatal desire of independence sprung up in the heart of society ;—every thing announced a rupture.

"3. Hardly had the sixteenth century commenced, when from the cell of a German monk a voice was raised, the powerful organ of the evil thoughts which ferment in the soul, which exclaimed, 'O ye nations, separate from the Catholic Church, fly from Babylon ; break the bands of your long childhood ; ye are strong and enlightened enough henceforth to guide yourselves.' This voice was heard with a favor which astonishes even at this day. In a large part of Europe society accused its mother of superstition and barbarism, abjured her doctrines, despised her greatest men, burned every thing that bore the marks of her sacred hand, and overthrew or mutilated, as monuments of ignorance, slavery, and idolatry, the temples and edifices where preceding ages had sheltered their faith and immortalized their learning and genius.

"4. This incredible rupture with the Catholic world was not a passing vertigo ; it still continues. Neither sufferings, nor humiliations, nor disappointments, nor catastrophies and calamities, have been able to bring back the prodigal to the maternal bosom. So far from it, his aversion to the Church is only continually augmenting ; it has changed into hatred, hatred always living and acting ; so that after three centuries Europe seems able to do only

three things, — but to do them with the perfection of despair, — to despoil, enchain, and persecute the Church. To-day, having reached the paroxysm of passion, the old daughter of Catholicity has no other rallying-cry than those horrible words repeated by every tongue from the Adriatic to the ocean, and from the Mediterranean to the Baltic: *Christianity oppresses us; we will not that it reign over us; take it away; its very sight is intolerable.*

“5. During all the time of this aberration the Church has remained unchanged. Before as after it she is one and the same; equally good, wise, and devoted. Before the sufferings of society she has remained neither idle nor silent. Never, perhaps, has her maternal tenderness displayed more universal solicitude, more indefatigable zeal. From her ever-fruitful womb there issued in the fifteenth century thirty-five religious orders or congregations; in the sixteenth, fifty-two; in the seventeenth, ninety. All these great bodies, acting as one man, rendered her action unceasing on the family and society, from the north to the south of Europe. From St. Vincent of Ferrer to St. Vincent of Paul, innumerable saints astonished the world by their heroic virtues, and showed to the most blind that the Church of Rome had not ceased to be the incorruptible Spouse of the Saint of saints, the Mother of all men truly great; — *Alma parens, alma virum.*

“On their part, her admirable doctors, from Bellarmin to Bossuet, have proved that she is ever the source of light and of wisdom. Continued in all the majesty of its force by the Popes and Councils, Catholic instruction has long since reduced to powder both the Protestant principle and the vain reasons which served as a pretext for the rupture with the Church, as well as those they invented for continuing it. Neither demonstrations, nor admonitions, nor benefits, nor supplications, nor tears, nor efforts of any kind, have been able to touch European society, or to renew the ancient alliance of the daughter with the mother.

“From these facts, which no one will dare deny, it evidently results that, for the last four centuries, there has been a new element in Europe, an element more or an element less than in the Middle Ages, and this element forms a wall of separation between Christianity and society.

“What is this element? Where is it?” — pp. 7-9.

This is the problem. The author contends that the new element in society is paganism in education, the element less is Christianity abstracted from education. He assumes that the difference which obviously exists between modern society and society in the Middle Ages is due, and due alone, to the difference between the system of education adopted and pursued then, and that adopted and pur-

sued during the last four hundred years. Education, he contends, makes the man, determines not only his intellectual, but his moral character, and that education, too, which is accomplished in the individual during the period between infancy and youth or adolescence. "The life of man," he says, "is divided into two periods, *perfectly distinct*, that of *receiving* and that of *transmitting*. The first period includes the time of education, that is to say, of development, or of instruction; the second, the rest of life till death. Not having being in and of himself, man receives all, in the intellectual and moral order no less than in the physical order. After having received, he transmits, and he can transmit only what he has received. In transmitting what he has received, he creates family and society after his own image. The truth or falsehood, the good or evil, the order or disorder, realized in the external facts of family or society, are only the reflex and product of the truth or falsehood, the good or evil, the order or disorder, which reigns in the interior of his soul." (pp. 10, 11.) That is, the child is purely passive, and ductile as wax in the hands of the instructor, and receives the form, whatever it may be, that the instructor gives him. The original nature and disposition of the child, it seems, count for nothing, and never interpose any obstacles which defeat the intention of the instructor!

The opinions and manners of parents, the author maintains, form those of their children, and the opinions and manners of the uneducated classes are formed by the opinions and manners of the educated classes. The opinions and manners of the educated classes are formed by their literary education. This education is principally determined by the books which are placed in the hands of the young during the seven or eight years which unite childhood to adolescence or youth. It is so because these years decide the character for life, because these books are the daily food of the young, who must study them with care, learn them by heart, and thoroughly master them both as to their form and substance, and because this assiduous study is accompanied with explanations and commentaries designed to make the students comprehend the sense of these books, admire their style, their thoughts, and beauties of every sort, — to exalt the deeds, the words, and the institutions of the men and nations whose history they

relate, — in a word, to present the authors of these works as the unrivalled kings of talent and genius. Hence all comes from education. (p. 11.) Having assumed this, the author proceeds to give us at length his solution of the problem. We let him speak again for himself:—

“For a long time a founder in Florence exercised his art with wonderful success. The secret of his glory was in preparing the mould into which he melted in turn gold, silver, and bronze. One day the municipality of Florence sent him an order for the statue of one of the great men of the republic, and the Archbishop for a bass-relief for one of the chapels of the celebrated Duomo. The glory of his country and the love of his religion gave the artist new ardor; under this double inspiration his genius conceived a masterpiece. Unfortunately he had only the mould for a horse. ‘It makes little difference,’ thought he to himself, ‘I will combine the metals so well as to repair this inconvenience.’ In fact, the gold and silver, scientifically mixed, are poured together into the mould. They are expecting a hero with ancient forms: the artist breaks the mould and takes from it—a horse!

“*Quanto sbaglio!*’ said he; ‘but I perceive my mistake. I have not used my metals in proper proportions.’ He immediately sets to work again, forms a new combination, and makes another mould similar to the former. This time the artist works for the Archbishop, who was awaiting his bass-relief. The mould being opened, he found—a horse like the first. ‘This is unpardonable,’ cried the artist, striking his forehead. ‘How did I forget that gold and silver are not the proper metals for a founder? His right metal is bronze. With that, error is no longer possible. I am used to it, and it is used to me. We are old friends.’ And he prepared his bronze with jealous care, repaired his mould, which he took heed not to change, and studied deeply all the conditions of the problem. When he had resolved them, he kindled his furnace, poured the metal into the mould, which gave—a superb bronze horse. Then the unfortunate artist fell into despair; he blamed every thing except himself for his misfortune, and died without being able to understand that, to change the form, we must change the mould.

“Nations of Europe, you are the Florentine founder. Since the fifteenth century you have cast your children in a pagan mould, and you are astonished that they do not come out Christians! Listen to your history.

“During the whole of the Middle Ages education was exclusively Christian. Pagan works were never placed as *classics* in the hands of the young. They were read only at an age when the mind, the heart, the imagination, — in a word, the soul, — cast in the

mould of Christianity, had received an absolute form ; when, in consequence, paganism could no longer do any thing more than impress on the child a secondary form, without at all influencing the foundation of his moral being. Christianity was then, with regard to education, what the substantial meats which appease the hunger of the guests are in our feasts, and paganism was only as the knicknacks of our desserts.

“ What was the consequence ? That which always results from education ; that is to say, the young generations, nourished from the cradle with Christianity, penetrated with Christianity, brought up in the knowledge, in the love, in the admiration of Christianity, and rendered enthusiastic of its glories and of its works, transmitted to society what they had received. And society was Christian, Christian to the core. And this Christian society made Europe wonderful for its greatness, strength, and heroic virtue, and covered it over with monuments, whose inimitable beauties form but the least part of their glory.

“ Towards the end of the fifteenth century you broke the Christian mould and substituted the pagan, and cast in it the young generation. The consequence has been what it must necessarily be. Nourished with paganism, educated in admiration of paganism, they began to show themselves pagans and to transmit to society what they had received. If, at the first casting, they were not entirely pagan, attribute it to the action of Christianity, which, still dominant in the family and society, prevented a sudden and complete transformation.

“ Yet such was the influence of this first trial, that all the chiefs of the great revolt of the sixteenth century were among the most ardent disciples of classic paganism ; they gloried in having been cast in the pagan mould. Every day they plunged into it anew, inviting all the world to imitate them, and making of their new form a weapon against the Church, whose language, science, and arts they began to accuse of barbarism. The danger became more and more serious ; religion and society evidently lost ground. Educators again set themselves to work, and tried to form a new generation, which, being thoroughly Christian, should counterbalance the disastrous action of that which was just ceasing to be, or already had ceased to be Christianity. The great Catholic reaction of the sixteenth century commenced. Called to assist in it, doctors the most experienced, the religious orders the most learned, redoubled their activity. The ablest of these great bodies, the immortal Society of Jesus, seemed to be created expressly to come to the aid of the Church and society in the work of education. It devoted itself to it without reserve, although it adopted, like its companions in arms, the pagan mould. Public opinion rendered this necessary, as no other form of beauty was then recognized.

"In fact, as all the world knows, the sixteenth century was the golden age of the *renaissance*; it was *par excellence* the age of the worship of classic antiquity in literature and poetry,—the age when pagan artists, Hellenists, and humanists abounded throughout Europe,—whose echoes ceased not to repeat their dithyrambs in honor of the Greeks and Romans. The colleges of the Society covered all Europe. Youths without number, above all, those belonging to the higher classes, pressed around the chairs of the illustrious religious. The science, virtue, devotedness, and paternity of the masters, the orthodoxy of their doctrine, the variety and display of the religious ceremonies performed in their houses, seemed to combine to revive and perpetuate in society at large, and in the higher classes especially, the vigorous faith of the Middle Ages. The Benedictines, Oratorians, and others in great number, rivalled the Jesuits in science and zeal, whilst the universities, rich in professors distinguished no less for their virtue than learning, coöperated in the universal restoration, crowning by their learned lessons the apparently so well commenced edifice of Catholic instruction."

"But what has been the final result of this action so general and so well combined? The same with that of the Florentine founder. They cast the generations in the pagan mould, and they obtained pagan generations. According to the great law which presides over human life, these generations did not delay to transmit what they had received, and paganism inundated Europe. Alas! history, sad history says it, instead of being reanimated, the Christian spirit was more and more enfeebled, especially in the literary classes, among whom, through the zeal of so many excellent masters, it ought to have revived with new vigor. All the world knows that, at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, the men who had most largely participated in public instruction were the least Christian both in manners and in belief."

"That these bitter fruits, with the exception, perhaps, of a small number of the less poisonous, have been produced by the pagan tree replanted in the bosom of Europe, and cultivated with so much care for the nourishment of youth, an observation of another sort fully confirms. On the one hand, the women, in whose education the pagan element either does not enter at all, or only to a feeble extent, have constantly shown themselves more Christian than the men; on the other, the lower classes, preserved from the same scourge, remained loyal to the old faith, and have ended by becoming hostile to religion only under the influence of the classes brought up in the school of the Greeks and Romans."

"Founder of Florence! neither your art nor your intention can change the nature of things. As long as you cast your metals in the mould of a horse, you will have a horse. Nations of Europe! as long as you cast youth in the mould of paganism, you will have

pagan generations. Neither your laws or education, however liberal they may be, nor the talent of your professors, nor your intentions, will ever change any thing. To think the contrary is an error. This error you have committed, and every day for more than three centuries. This is the worm that gnaws your heart. This is the solution of the problem. By the fearful consequences with which it now threatens the European world, the error which we have just described has become so evident, that men the least suspected of partiality have not been able to avoid noticing it. Under pain of an inevitable, and perhaps even fatal catastrophe, they conjure society to change its system.

"Let it suffice to cite the words, so full of good sense, of a member of the National Assembly, on the occasion of the late law on instruction.

" 'Since the commencement of this debate,' says he, 'the University and Clergy have thrown back accusations on each other. You pervert them with your philosophic rationalism, say the Clergy. You brutalize them with your religious dogmatism, replies the University. Conciliators come up and say, Religion and philosophy are sisters. We have fused together free inquiry and authority. University and Clergy, you have had the monopoly each in your turn ; divide it, and let this end.

" 'We have heard the venerable Bishop of Langres thus address the University : "It was you that produced the Socialist generation of 1848 !" And M. Cremieux hastened to retort, "It was you that brought up the revolutionary generation of 1793 !" If there is any truth in these allegations, what must we conclude from them ? That the two methods of education have both been fatal, not in that which constitutes the difference between them, but in that which is common to them both. Yes, it is my conviction that there is in the two methods a common point, which is *the abuse of classical studies*, and it is thence that they have perverted the judgment and morality of the country. They differ in this, that one makes the religious element, the other the philosophical, to predominate ; but these elements, far from having caused this evil, with which they have been reproached, have, on the contrary, attenuated it. We owe it to them that we are not so barbarous as the barbarians, constantly proposed by *Latinism* for our imitation.

" 'Permit me a supposition which, though somewhat forced, will explain my thought. I will suppose, then, that there exists somewhere, among the antipodes, a nation, which, hating and despising labor, has placed all its means of existence in slavery and the successive pillage of all their neighbors. This nation has created for itself a political system, a morality, a religion, a public opinion conformable to the brutal principle it adopts, and which preserve and develop it. France having given the Clergy the monopoly of edu-

cation, they see nothing better to do than to send all the French youth to this people, to live its life, to be inspired with its sentiments, to be transported with its enthusiasms, and to breathe its ideas as air, only they take care that each scholar shall depart fortified with a little volume called the *Gospel*. These generations thus brought up return to their country, a revolution breaks out, and I leave you to imagine what part they will play.

“ ‘Seeing this, the state takes the monopoly of education from the Clergy and gives it to the University. The University, faithful to tradition, sends also the youth to the antipodes, among that pillaging and slave-holding nation, after providing them with a little book called *Philosophy*. Five or six generations thus brought up have scarcely returned to their native soil, when another revolution breaks out. Formed in the same school as their predecessors, they show themselves their worthy rivals. Then comes a war between the monopolizers. It is your book that has done all the evil, say the Clergy. It is yours, retorts the University.

“ ‘No, gentlemen, your books count for nothing in all this. That which does the evil is the strange idea, conceived and executed by you both, of sending the French youth, destined to labor, to peace, and to liberty, to impregnate and saturate themselves with the sentiments and opinions of a nation of brigands and slaves. I affirm it, — the subversive doctrines to which have been given the name of *Socialism* or *Communism* are the fruit of our classical education, whether distributed by the Clergy or the University. I add, that the *baccalaureate* will impose by force classical education, even on those schools which pretend to be free, and which, they say, ought to hold from the law.’ ” — pp. 15–20.

The question opened by the author is a grave question, and is at the present moment exciting no little controversy among Catholics in France. Respectable names are found on both sides. The Abbé Gaume appears to be sustained by Cardinal Gousset, whose name has deservedly great weight, and also by Count Montalembert, dear to every Catholic, for his chivalric defence of Catholic principles, and his steady devotion to Catholic interests, but who perhaps is a little too enthusiastic in his admiration of the Middle Ages. We are ourselves incompetent to mingle in the debate. Prior to our conversion, and during the first two or three years after, we entertained to their full extent the views defended by the Abbé Gaume. Maturer reflection, and something of that intimate acquaintance with the tendencies of our fallen nature which is obtained only by the effort to live the Catholic life, have led us to regard those views as somewhat exaggerated, and to the convic-

tion that the disuse in our schools of the Greek and Roman classics as text-books would of itself have comparatively little effect in banishing paganism from society.

We do not question the faith or the piety of our author, but we cannot bring ourselves as a Catholic to believe that a system of education has been adopted and pursued for four hundred years by the most illustrious religious orders and congregations, the most able and learned doctors, and the greatest and most heroic saints, under the supervision of the Church, and at least with her tacit approval, which is directly fitted to paganize society. It seems to us that we could hardly say so without impeaching either the vigilance or the infallibility of the Church herself. Education is a part, and an important part, of the mission of the Church, and to suppose that she has fallen into a grave mistake on the subject, or has utterly failed in her judgment of what is essentially a Christian education, or what is essentially repugnant to it, is in our judgment more than we can do compatibly with our Catholic faith. To do so would be only to follow in the track of Savonarola, who has not yet been cleared of error and proved to have been a good Catholic. Of course we do not mean that it is a matter of faith that heathen text-books should be used in our schools, or that educators are not free to disuse them, or that it is not lawful to maintain that it would be well, or indeed that it is even necessary, to discontinue their use; but we do doubt our right to contend that their use has been incompatible with Christian education, and has been the cause of the paganism in modern society. The Abbé Gaume is free to maintain that it would be well, and that under existing circumstances it is necessary, to banish the ancient Greek and Latin classics from our schools; but not, in our judgment, that the paganism of modern society has resulted from their use, and that in suffering them to be used the Church has acted as unwisely as the artist who, wishing to cast a hero, poured his molten metal into the mould of a horse.

We do not believe, moreover, with the Abbé Gaume, that education is all-powerful, and that the child is as ductile as wax in the hands of the educator. Never is the child purely passive, ready to receive any form you may choose to give it. This is the error of Robert Owen, and

of the Socialists and Communists generally. It is the doctrine of all those who are at war with society as it is, and who ascribe the depravities of individual character to the depravities of the social state in which character is formed. No child is purely passive in the formation of its character. The soul is essentially active, and it acts in receiving as well as in transmitting. Do your best, you cannot cast all children in the same mould, and turn them out good Christians. Some children, in spite of the most adverse influences, nay, it would sometimes seem, in consequence of adverse influences, grow up firm, loyal, devout Christians, whose life is most edifying to study. Others, brought up in the most careful manner, piously educated, and kept for years in ignorance of evil, wilt down before the first temptation, and end in being thorough reprobates. Education is the ordinary means under Divine Providence of forming Christian character, but it is not infallible, and often fails utterly of its end, even when no objection can be brought against the quality of the education furnished, or against those who furnish it. The same regimen will not produce the same effects in all. Even the blessed Apostles were an odor of life to some, and an odor of death to others. In the same family, in the same school, you find some turn out all you could wish, and others turning out the reverse. Always must you make allowance for innate differences of disposition, and for the free will of children.

There is in the author's doctrine on education a latent Pelagianism, and an assumption of the innate goodness or perfectibility of human nature. Education, as he treats it, is merely a human means of forming character, and he, unconsciously no doubt, reasons on the supposition that human nature has the capability by development and cultivation of being elevated to the Christian order. There is in this a forgetfulness of the corruption of our nature by the Fall, and of the necessity of grace to enable us to overcome them. Christianity in all its parts lies in the supernatural order, and neither Christian belief nor Christian character is possible by any conceivable culture which is merely human. We are not born Christians, but infidels and heathen. Nor are we born with the seeds or germs of Christianity in our soul, either as to faith or as to character, and they are implanted in us only by re-

generation. The seeds or germs with which we are born are the seeds or germs of paganism, and the more full and thorough the cultivation of our nature, the more complete and thorough pagans do we become. Hence it is that no education, no training, however wise or judicious, orthodox or pious, can infallibly insure Christian faith and character; for as long as we remain in the flesh we have within us the seeds or germs of heathenism, ready at all times to spring up, and which can be prevented from development only by the *grace* of Christ.

The author, it seems to us, mistakes the effect for the cause. The Middle Ages, he tells us, were thoroughly Christian, and were so because education was Christian. Would it not be truer to say, that education was then Christian because society itself was Christian? If education was then Christian, whence came, if the character of a generation is determined by it, the generation which in the fifteenth century broke the Christian mould and introduced the pagan? The generation which broke with the Middle Ages, and sought to revive Greece and Rome, must have been formed under a Christian system of education, and therefore, according to the author, could transmit only the Christian family and society. How, then, did it become so paganized as to substitute the pagan mould for the Christian? Certainly the generation that changed the mould had already become paganized, and paganized, if the author is to be believed, under a system of thoroughly Christian education. How, if by education you can always determine the character of the rising generation, and through it of society, did that generation become so paganized? That generation had not been cast in the pagan mould, yet it had become pagan. How, with this fact staring him in the face, can the author assert the infallibility of education? or that, if the mould was changed, the change was not the effect, but the cause, of the paganism of modern society? It strikes us, therefore, that it would be far more true to say that there is paganism in education because society itself is pagan, than that society is pagan because there is paganism in education.

Finally, so long as paganism prevails in society, the mere exclusion of pagan class-books can hardly be expected to banish paganism even from education. The education which forms character is given far less in schools

and colleges than in the family and in society, and far less by the text-books studied than by the personal character of school-mates, and of teachers and professors. The pagan books usually read in Catholic colleges have very little influence on the young, and the evil influence they are likely to produce is after the student has left college rather than before, and therefore at an age when, according to the author, the character is already decisively formed. We can see no great harm a good-conditioned boy, at the age when they are usually studied in Catholic colleges, is likely to receive from Cæsar's Commentaries, Ovid's Metamorphoses, abating a few dirty passages, Virgil's *Æneid*, Cicero's Oration, and Sallust's Histories, or from Xenophon's *Cyropædia* and *Anabasis*, Homer's *Iliad*, and, with a few exceptions, the Greek tragedies, read, as they are, not for their principles or doctrines, but for their language and the beauty of their form. If the tone of society, of the college, and of the professors be thoroughly Catholic, the pupils will imbibe very few false notions from these books. The injury that is done by classical literature, we think, is done chiefly at a later age, when read for its principles, or for the instruction and amusement of learned leisure, or at least where the tone and tendency of the family and society are pagan. It is very possible that the classics have amid prevailing heathenism some slight influence in exaggerating the evil, but in general our age is so much more heathen than ancient Greece and Rome, that the study of them not unfrequently has even a corrective tendency. Moreover, we know that some of the most pious doctors and greatest saints of the Church have been educated in Latin and Greek through the medium of these books. The author tells us that the sixteenth century was the golden age of the classics, and we would ask him what age has been more distinguished for the number and greatness of its canonized saints? The seventeenth century, again, was a century of powerful reaction against Protestantism, and it too, in France and Spain especially, was eminently distinguished by piety, zeal, and sanctity. Yet it was precisely in these two centuries that the system of education the author condemns was in its greatest vigor, and the most generally adopted. If we come down to the eighteenth century, we find society fall off in its classical studies almost as much as in its faith and piety. Experience is far from warranting the sweeping censures of the excellent Abbé Gaume.

It is true that the nations of Europe in the last century found themselves pretty generally acting on heathen maxims, and applauding the heathen spirit. You say the generation which prepared and effected the old French revolution was educated in schools exclusively under the control of the clergy. Be it so. So was the generation that prepared and effected the rupture of society with the Church in the fifteenth and early part of the sixteenth century; and the fact that the modern system did not prevent men from becoming infidels and incendiaries is no more an argument against it, than the fact that the former system did not prevent them from becoming heretics and revolutionists is an argument against that system which you approve and would revive. You are obliged to confess that the system of education adopted in the Middle Ages did not save society from the Protestant rebellion, every whit as violent and as wicked as the Jacobinical revolution at the close of the last century; but you do not regard that fact as a condemnation of it. You seek the causes of its failure in something else than its supposed defects as a system. Why not be equally liberal and just to the modern system? Why make the Jesuits more responsible for the paganism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, than the mediæval educators for the paganism of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries? The argument, *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, is not always valid, and we see no reason for counting it more valid in the eighteenth century than in the fifteenth.

Scandals must come, heresies must come, the love of many at times will wax cold, and large masses will detach themselves from the Church. It has been so from the beginning, and will be so to the end. It is bad logic to attribute such things, when they come, to the wrong system or mistaken policy pursued by the Church, and by no means wise forthwith to demand an entire change of system. No foresight, no prudence, no policy, however wise or judicious, could have prevented them. The fault is not in those who labor to prevent them, and remain faithful to the Church, but in those who break away and rush headlong into the mad career of heresy, infidelity, and immorality. The Jesuits and other religious orders in the first half of the eighteenth century labored assiduously in the education of youth, and yet many came out of their schools infidels, real gentiles. There is no denying it, but

the fault cannot be charged to the system they pursued, for they had previously pursued the same system for a hundred and fifty or two hundred years without any such results.

We are not as well pleased with the remarks of M. Bastiat, cited by the Abbé Gaume, as we should like to be. They strike us as being neither logical nor true. He represents the state as taking the control of education from the clergy and giving it to the university, because education in the hands of the clergy had prepared actors for the revolution of 1793. This is historically incorrect. It was done solely because the influence of the clergy was adverse to that revolution, and because the state wished to have its children educated for this world, and not for heaven. The parity he seeks to establish between the clergy and the university does not exist, and to maintain it is unjust to the clergy. Neither they nor their system prepared Europe for revolution, and it was evidently so prepared in spite of both. We are not edified by the Catholic priest who cites with approbation an author who places the infidel University of France on a par with the French Clergy, and represents both as equally contributing to paganize society. The world to a great extent has relapsed into paganism in spite of the clergy, who have always strenuously resisted it, and it is not in these times, when we have to struggle as for life and death to prevent paganism from entirely swallowing up Christian civilization, that we can afford to bring accusations against them, and hold them responsible for the evils which threaten to overwhelm us. It was they who, aided by the prayers of the faithful, under God first rescued the world from paganism, and it is only they, aided by the prayers of the faithful, who can a second time rescue us. Let us not be so mad, then, as to cut off the right hand on which we must lean for guidance and support.

All these theorizings as to the causes of past calamities, and all these specifics for the cure of prevailing evils, are always to be received with suspicion. They all proceed on the assumption that these calamities might have been prevented, and that these evils may be removed, by human foresight, wisdom, and strength; and hence it is that their authors soon forget the supernatural agency of Heaven, become proud in their own conceit, impatient of instruction, and, like Savonarola, like the ill-fated Lamennais, like

the brilliant Abbate Gioberti, end in losing their faith and their virtue, and in calling down the anathemas of the Church and of all good men. Providence has given us our work, he has placed instruments in our hands, and bid us use them, but to give or to withhold success he has reserved to himself. To succeed or not to succeed does not depend on his ministers. When they succeed the glory belongs to him, and when they fail it is not for us to blame them. If they are faithful in the work he gives them to do, they will receive their reward in heaven; and the ill success of their labors, if ill success attend them, must be explained by his plans, inscrutable to us, and into which we are not to pry.

What were the proximate causes of the pagan reaction of the fifteenth century, or of the new outbreak of heathenism in the eighteenth, we do not know. We have no theory to explain the presence of either at the precise time it appeared, or to tell why either might not have just as well appeared a century earlier, or a century later. All we know is, that there was in the fifteenth century a powerful pagan reaction, which gave birth to the Protestant movement and revolt, and that there is now in society a widely prevalent heathenism, affecting Catholic countries in some degree as well as Protestant countries, and to which is to be ascribed our modern Jacobinical revolutions and socialistic movements. At either epoch the real origin and cause of the heathenism are to be sought, not in this or that erroneous policy, in this or that system of social organization, or in this or that system of instruction and education, but in our fallen and corrupt nature. Every man in his fallen state is naturally a heathen, and the paganism which at any time or in any country obtains is nothing more nor less than the natural expression of what every one of us without grace is in himself. By whatever causes faith is weakened, and men are led to neglect the means of grace, heathenism is promoted. What these particular causes are, and why they operate at one time more than at another, in one country more than in another, is just as difficult for us to explain, as why, of two friends having equal opportunity, one shall be converted and the other shall remain an infidel; why, of two women grinding at the mill, one shall be taken and the other left. We know that it is so, but why it is so we do not know.

The Middle Ages were not as completely Christian as many modern romanticists dream, but their errors and defects were not in general errors and defects of faith. They transgressed the law of God through pride or passion, but they did not erect transgression into a principle, and, like modern times, invent theories to justify it. Consequently, you had in general only to touch the conscience to bring the sinner to the confessional. Education could then be Christian, for society was Christian, — as to faith in all, as to practice in many, and especially in those intrusted with the instruction of the young. This Christian education no doubt tended to preserve Christianity in the family and in society, and to check the manifestation of the heathen tendencies of our nature. But the education was Christian because society was Christian, and only in a weaker sense was society Christian because education was Christian. After the rupture, society, which in fact never was and never will be thoroughly Christian, but only relatively so, became heathen in its principles and theories, and education, though it remained Christian in school, became to some extent pagan out of school, and unable to resist the pagan tendencies of human nature itself, and the pagan influences of society. It is far less what is studied in school that makes our youth grow up pagans, than the influences of pagan society out of school. Yet these influences acting on the schools may have made them less Christian than they were in the Middle Ages, and they again may have reacted on society and augmented its heathenism. But except where the state has restricted or denied the liberty of education, and banished, as in France for the last sixty years, religion from the schools, we do not believe this has been to any great extent the case in Catholic countries, though it undoubtedly has been in Protestant countries. However, heathenism is now prevalent in society, and it is not by education alone nor chiefly that we can expel it, for the simple reason, that so long as society remains heathen, whatever your schools, you cannot withdraw your children from heathen influences.

We are undoubtedly to make constant and deadly war on the heathenism of the age. In prosecuting this war it may be found necessary to place the same interdict on the literary remains of pagan antiquity that the Church always places upon the literary productions of contemporary

heretics, because the prevalence of paganism may have made them in some sense the works of contemporaries. Whether this will be so or not, we do not know, and happily it is not for us to decide, since we are not in holy orders, and the care of all the churches does not devolve on reviewers. This is a matter for the decision of those whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us. Some whose opinions we are bound to respect, and do respect, appear to think it is necessary to exclude the classics from the studies of the young. Others, equally deserving our respect, think it is not, and till the proper authority decides, we have no opinion on the subject. All we venture to say is, that in our judgment the banishing of the Greek and Roman text-books usually studied by our youth will of itself do little towards checking the evil complained of. It will cut off only a feeble rill, while it leaves the main torrent to pour in the poisonous floods of heathenism.

We have, as we never cease to repeat, no faith in specifics, no confidence in the man who proposes to cure all ills with a "Morrison's pill." All the evils of society, however wide they may spread out their branches, spring from one and the same root, and are really destroyed only as you cut off that root itself, and deprive them of the sap by which they live. This root is our own corrupt nature, and nothing is really remedial, or any thing more than a mere palliative which instead of curing is pretty sure to aggravate the disease, that does not heal this nature itself, or enable us to keep its evil affections in subjection to the law of God. Instruction alone will not do this, for few of us do as well as we know, and a man may know perfectly well his duty, and entirely neglect it. Nothing will do it but God's grace, and our sole instruments are the means of grace. In other words, we must not rely on ourselves, or hope by human means, by any humanly devised schemes, however promising they may appear to our wisdom, to roll back the tide of heathenism, and restore society to Christian life. It is not for us to attempt to raise the dead, to rekindle the vital spark that is extinct. We must rely on God, and feel that the work is his, and his alone. By pious submission, and devout and continued prayer to him to have mercy on mankind, we may coöperate with him in its performance, and rest assured that in his own way and time it will be done.

Some of the objections we have suggested the Abbé Gaume has himself noticed and attempted to answer, though, we must say, not to our satisfaction. We beg our readers, however, not to misunderstand us. Into the real question as to the propriety, or the necessity, under existing circumstances, of banishing the pagan classics from our schools, we have not entered, because we consider that as a question for the ecclesiastical authorities to settle, not for us. We have only wished to enter our feeble protest against the assumption that their use in our schools has been the cause of modern paganism, and that the Church has erred or been culpably neglectful of her duty in suffering them to be used. Nor have we wished to depreciate education, which no man prizes higher than we do; our wish has been to guard our readers against ascribing to it a virtue it does not possess, against ascribing all the good in society to good, and all the evil to bad education. Education can do much, and should be encouraged; good education should never be neglected; but it is never able of itself to overcome nature, or to preserve society from all aberrations. The mere cultivation of nature is always an evil rather than a good, for good is not a natural product, is not developed from nature, but is the fruit of supernatural grace and discipline. Our reliance for the reformation of society is not, therefore, on education alone, but on it and all the other means of forming character which God has provided, and especially on his own gracious pleasure. In a word, we have full faith only in prayer and the sacraments as the instruments of salvation, whether for the individual or society; for there is nothing of which we are better assured than that the salvation of either is of God, not of man, and, as we often say, that God will prosper no means the glory of which does not redound to himself. We must never forget that the Church is God's Church, not man's, and that it is only through the Church, his Immaculate Spouse, whom he loves, and for whom he shed his blood, that he does or will regenerate and bless either the individual or society. Human means, the might of the powerful, and the wisdom of the wise, he brings to naught, save as inspired by his grace and subordinated to his praise.

ART. V. — *La Raison Philosophique et la Raison Catholique. Conférences prêchées à Paris dans l'Année 1851, augmentées et accompagnées de Remarques et de Notes, par le T. R. P. VENTURA DE RAULICA, etc., etc.* Paris. 1851.

THE coming generation will enter on the stage of active life under better auspices than those under which we entered. Infidelity is going out of vogue. There may be nearly as much of it in the world as ever; but if there is, at least it no longer carries so bold a front as formerly. It even assumes the mask of belief; it pretends to be Christian, in order that it may appear respectable. Now there is an immense advantage in this. A great number of persons, particularly young persons, are governed by fashion in the formation of their opinions; and there are many who, without any pains to form opinions, allow their language and their outward actions to take their form and color from those with whom they associate. Many a young man has been fool enough to say, not in his heart, but with his lips, "There is no truth in revelation," because he hoped to gain *éclat* by the bold impiety of his language. Many a one, without knowledge, without examination, without reflection, has scoffed at all belief in miracles and mysteries, in order that he might have the name of thinking for himself, and bowing to no authority but that of his own individual reason. Irreligion was fashionable, and therefore contagious. Incredulity was tempting, as the shortest road to distinction. This evil, the bad legacy of three centuries of religious disputation, doubt, and denial, is beginning to pass away. This openly Antichristian spirit, though not banished, has been rebuked. A long period must yet elapse before the world will see what has been briefly, but happily, described as an "age of faith"; — an age when all the civilized nations of the world shall form a *Christendom* once more; when all will be united in the same religious belief, and in the bonds of Christian brotherhood and charity. We may salute that blessed epoch at a distance; we may long for its return, and each one in his own way and measure strive to hasten its advent; but none of us may rationally hope to witness its arrival, — then sing his *Nunc Dimittis*, and go to rest in

peace. Still we are advancing towards it. The spirit of doubt and denial has nearly run its course. It is time for the human mind, worn and desolate with its weary flight over the ocean of uncertainty, to return to that *ark* which is its only resting-place. The idolatry of reason, of man's individual reason, must at last succumb, like the old pagan idolatries, to the divine authority of faith.

Attempting to show you the utter inadequacy of *reason*, whether as a *substitute for faith*, or as the *arbiter of faith*, we have no fear of laying ourselves open to the charge of being an *enemy to reason*. To the right use of reason we are not opposed; to reason herself we can have no hostility. We shall appeal to reason throughout our observations. It is the abuse of a good thing, the idolatry of reason, that we oppose; and it is a most criminal abuse of reason to attempt to substitute her teaching for the revelation of God, or to make her the judge of him and his infallible declarations.

There is a philosophy which, fixing itself on the firm basis of revelation, so far as religion and morals are concerned, is content with hunting arguments and illustrations from history, analogy, or experience, in favor of the truths which it reveres. It knows that the supernatural world is far above the sphere of its contracted powers, and that its true province is the wide field of nature, in which it has room enough to expatiate and employ in fruitful researches its principles of natural science, which would be only misapplied if brought to bear upon the supernatural. It is no "scrutinizer of majesty"; it does not strive, with rash and impious hand, to lift the veil of mystery. This is the right use of reason; this is true philosophy. But there is also a philosophy which, professing not only ignorance, but also disbelief, of all revealed truths, undertakes to give us the speculations of pure, unaided reason, as all-sufficient to guide us through this life and prepare us for the future;—and this is the substitute which has been kindly offered us for that religion which has civilized and reformed, enlightened and blessed, mankind. It cannot be wrong to examine what titles to our respect and confidence are possessed by this bold pretender; what certain truths requiring our belief, what lessons of wisdom to be reduced to practice, have been taught or can be taught by this philosophy of reason.

The most important and deeply interesting questions to the human mind are those respecting the nature, attributes, and providence of God ; our relations and duties towards him ; our origin, the purpose of our present existence, our future destinies, and the causes of the evils which surround us. These are the great problems which reason has tried to solve, from the very dawn of history to the present day. Now, what progress has she made towards a right decision of any one of these questions ? Can it be shown that of herself she has ever discovered a single truth regarding even one of them ? and is it not demonstrably certain, that she has fallen into the most serious errors on each and every one of them ? Every scholar will admit that the wisest and best of the philosophers of pagan antiquity have done little credit to reason by their researches into these matters. Their ignorance and blindness surprise us ; their degrading errors seem to us scarcely conceivable. Yet it must be observed, that, while the mistakes and absurdities which abound in their speculations are their own, whatever fragments of truth may be found amid their masses of error most certainly are not theirs, — are not discoveries of reason, but vestiges of revelation. It is one thing for reason to discover a truth, and quite another thing for her to recognize the form and lineaments of truth in that which is proposed to her as such. We should laugh at the silly arrogance of the man who should pretend to have discovered the propositions of Euclid or the theory of Newton because he believed in them and could repeat their demonstrations.

Reason herself, though unenlightened by revelation, cannot deny — on the contrary, must admit as a probability at least — that our Creator, at the very origin of our race, may have manifested something of his wisdom, power, and goodness to his rational and responsible creatures, — may have prescribed their duties towards him and towards each other, — and may have held out to them the hope of rewards and the fear of punishments hereafter. Now this is precisely what we know to have been done, on the testimony of the inspired writings, which give us an authentic account of the facts, and are corroborated by all the monuments and traditions of our race. The dogmas of the existence of the Creator and Ruler of the universe, of the necessity of religious worship, of the immortality of the

soul and future rewards and punishments, of man's fall and promised restoration, were not the fruits of philosophic inquiry. Revealed by the Almighty to our first parents, to be transmitted to all their descendants, found among the most rude and barbarous, as well as the most civilized and refined, nations of the ancient world, they were the inheritance of the human race, the traditionary religion of all mankind. But in the course of time that same neglect and indifference in such matters which are still exhibited by so many and to which every man is liable, the power of passion and of vice to darken the mind, and the pride of reason exercised about things entirely above the sphere of its comprehension, gradually so weakened the remembrance of these great truths of primitive revelation, blended with them so many errors and absurdities, ingrafted so many superstitions on them, that the fair image of truth was no longer to be recognized in the monstrous systems of polytheism and idolatry which prevailed in every nation but one of the ancient world, and which still prevail wherever the Christian revelation is not yet received.

The philosophers of the Grecian states and of the Roman empire were men of the greatest genius and ability. While the world lasts, the monuments they have left us will bear witness to their Herculean powers of mind. They were acute, subtile, earnest, persevering in their search for truth, and they devoted themselves with heart and soul to moral, metaphysical, and theological investigations. In their ardent inquiries they could discern absurdity and folly in the religion which they practised; and by visiting in person, or collecting the reports of travellers who had visited, the East, they occasionally caught some echoes of the faith of a chosen and separate people, who worshipped one only God in spirit and in truth. And yet they were only groping in the dark, and their own conclusions were so far from satisfying their minds, from appeasing "the mighty hunger of their souls," that we find them all confessing their doubts, uncertainty, and ignorance, and some of them expressly declaring that reason had utterly failed, that philosophy could not enlighten them, that there was no hope for man but in a revelation from above. They never dreamed of reforming the popular religion of their respective countries; they might as well have attempted to command the tempest, to chain the winds, or check the tides;

for supposing them to have had, what they unquestionably had not, the will to sacrifice themselves in such a cause, and the power to force unpalatable truths on unwilling multitudes, who were ready to stone or burn them for their pains, they had *no certain truths* to teach, *no doctrines which they firmly believed*, not even on the first and fundamental points. They had done what man left to himself in this dark world could do to arrive at truth. We know the state of their minds, the extent of their knowledge and ignorance, for their opinions are recorded in their writings; and we confidently summon them as witnesses to prove the utter insufficiency of reason to guide us through this life or prepare us for the next. Let us select one or two of those questions which are obviously most important, and would necessarily first claim attention; — for example, *the doctrine of a God, Creator of all things*. This tenet was originally revealed, and was always believed by those who retained that pristine revelation. But the attribute of *creative power* was too great for the comprehension of unaided reason; and that pure, simple, and sublime idea of omnipotence, which the Israelite and Christian acquire in childhood, never entered the mind of the wisest sages of antiquity. Reason could not conceive how any thing could be *created*, in the proper sense of that term. Matter exists; therefore it must have existed from eternity. It might be shaped or fashioned into different forms, differently combined, variously modified, as it is on a small scale by the hand of man or the machinery of man's invention; but drawn from nothing! called into being by the fiat of almighty will! — reason never reached by its own efforts this sublime, though now familiar belief. This may appear to some a purely speculative question; but there are practical consequences of the highest moment resulting from this utter failure of reason to realize the truth of a Creator-God. For according to any system of philosophy, or to any religion but that revealed to us, man was not the creature of God. He owed not to him his existence, but at most his form and mode of being. He could not therefore call God his Father. He knew not whether the Deity cared for him or not. He might fear his superior power, but he could not love him; he never had the idea of loving him. There is not one phrase in all the writings of the pagans to show that the love of God, "the first and greatest command," was

even thought of by them. And looking at the evils to which he was subject, the miseries of that condition in which the Deity had placed him, and all the moral disorder of the world, man could scarcely feel that he owed either gratitude or love to a Supreme Being whom he did not know as his Creator and Father. Another consequence of the failure of reason was an almost total ignorance of the second great command, which is like to the first. For not recognizing a common Father in heaven, man did not know as brothers his fellow-men on earth. Hence that heartless indifference to human suffering, that cruel barbarity, that bloodthirstiness, which disgraced every pagan nation,—exhibited by them in peace as well as in war; in the heroism of Horatius, in the patriotism of Brutus; in the cruel treatment of prisoners and slaves; in their inhumanity to women and children; in their human sacrifices, their bloody gladiatorial shows; in the practice which universally prevailed, as it still does in China and every nation not enlightened by Divine revelation,—a practice which both law and philosophy sanctioned among Greeks and Romans in the days of their greatest refinement,—the practice of exposing infants to death as soon as they were born, which was never declared illegal until a Christian Emperor, Constantine, ascended the throne. We have all sympathized with the Roman auditory, who rose to applaud the sentiment, "*Homo sum : humani nihil a me alienum puto*,"—"I am a man, and feel an interest in all that concerns my fellow-men." Why is it never noted, that the whole plot of this play of Terence turns on the discovery, by the father who utters this noble sentiment, of his child, supposed to be dead, because exposed to death in infancy according to custom, which was, moreover, a custom so well established and sanctioned and regulated, that, when the new-born infant was presented to its father, if he did not take it in his arms, if he turned his back on it, it was to die as a matter of course?

The idea of creative power being totally lost, all religion might have perished with it, but that the imperfect remains of traditionary truth, the feeling sense that religion is the first great want of humanity, the hunger and thirst of the soul for some object of supreme veneration and worship, the idea of Divinity originally and permanently present to the mind of the whole human race, drew men back from

the dark gulf of atheism, at least practical atheism, towards which reason was hurrying them by its restless efforts to measure with its feeble powers the infinite and incomprehensible.

Let us interrogate philosophy as to the limits of her researches on another point of immense importance and vital interest to all mankind. *Divine Providence*, a superintending care of the moral and physical universe, was merely a question, on both sides of which reason had much to say. Fate, blind, inexorable destiny, a power superior to gods as well as men, was commonly supposed to be the ruler of the universe. Then the question of a providence was complicated by the want of a clear and firm belief in the unity of God. The philosophers, who listened to the voice of tradition, and thus received an intimation of this important truth, still fell short of any just conception of the relative or moral attributes of the Supreme Being, whose existence and absolute attributes they indistinctly knew. Some regarded him as the *Soul* of the *universe*, animating the whole frame of nature; others, as an inert being, indifferent to the affairs of men or committing their government to inferior gods. Whether he could be propitiated by man, — whether prayer, sacrifice, or any other religious acts were necessary or could aught avail us, — they professed themselves utterly unable to determine. The Epicureans released all their gods from every sort of care. The Stoics thought that man was all-sufficient for himself, and accordingly they pronounced it weakness to pray for corporeal blessings, and waste of time, and folly too, to ask Heaven for the goods of the mind. The Peripatetics were doubtful and contradictory, and the Academicians ready, on this as on every other point, to maintain either side of the question. In fact, there was more of truth in the popular superstitions than in the speculations of philosophy. The people prayed to their false deities; they called on gods that could neither hear nor help them; they preferred their petitions to beings more vicious than themselves, and oftentimes for objects most unholy. But still they recognized the sacred duty of prayer. The philosopher, guided by pure reason, scoffed at this Divine instinct of our nature, this innate tendency of our being, this universal sentiment of our race. He proposed to rob poor human nature of its last defence, of prayer, — the lan-

guage of faith, the cry of weakness and of want, the voice of hope, the only refuge from despair, — prayer, the bond of union between man and his Creator, the homage which we offer him in concert with the heavenly host that minister around his throne, the one of all our acts or occupations which immediately and of itself prepares and practises and fits us for heaven! And if he who at the present day acknowledges no higher philosophy than that of reason does sometimes bend the knee to his Creator in humble supplication, it is not from any certain knowledge that his philosophy gives him of the necessity and efficacy of prayer; for how can reason assure him that the Deity wishes to be invoked, and that he who has foreseen and predetermined all things will hearken to the petitions of weak and erring mortals? When, therefore, he prays, he is obeying a higher voice than that of reason, — the voice of conscience, enlightened by some rays of revelation; he is listening to the voice of God within him.

On the question of *the immortality of the soul*, reason may be expected to speak a more confident language. It is emphatically the faith of the human race. It was clearly revealed in the beginning. The soul whose immortality is in question is our own; and we have through consciousness some natural knowledge of it, as the substance which thinks, remembers, wills, and differs in all its ascertained properties from body or matter. It might, then, without the help of revelation, be inferred that the soul is not liable to the decay or dissolution to which the body is subject, and could only be destroyed by the same Omnipotence which called it into being. Yet human philosophy has been able, by its ceaseless questionings, to overshadow even this subject with its gloomy doubts. The wisest and best men of antiquity affirmed that the mind was immaterial, and therefore indestructible; they shrunk with horror from the prospect of annihilation; they fondly hoped to live beyond the grave; they thought the universal traditional belief must be right. At all events, they would rather err on this side; they would cherish this delusion, if it were a delusion; they would cling to the belief of an hereafter, as the only adequate motive and recompense of virtue, the solace of adversity, the support of wronged and suffering innocence, the last hope of trembling humanity. Those who are versed in Greek and Roman lore will rec-

ognize the argument, while they will sympathize with the feelings, of these ancient advocates of the immortality of the soul. But what is the character of this argument? Why, it is an appeal mainly, not to reason, but to the sentiments and instincts of our race. How different, too, is this opinion or persuasion of theirs from the firm, unwavering, and immovable confidence which revelation gives! How unlike the Christian's "*Credo in resurrectionem mortuorum et vitam aeternam*," — "I believe in the resurrection of the body and life everlasting." But philosophy never did and never will produce a *Credo*. On this subject it held, not the language of certainty, but of hope and earnest desire, blended with fears and haunted with doubts, which philosophy had no power to exorcise. For there were those who, vindicating the rights of reason, claimed some firmer foundation for their faith, and would not believe what did not present to their minds the characters of evident and indisputable truth. "We want," these philosophers answered, "we want proof, conclusive arguments addressed to reason, and you offer us hopes and fears, instinctive feelings, a natural dread of annihilation, vulgar superstition, and your crude notions of the substance of the soul, which we do not feel bound to admit, which you cannot prove true, and which science may hereafter refute." Pressed by such difficulties, the nobler spirits among the old philosophers felt that reason alone was a treacherous guide, and turning reproachful looks upon her, and uttering a cry of distress, a prayer for help, took refuge (so to express it) in the temple of Hope, resolved to wait there until some messenger from above should enlighten their ignorance. In truth, the strongest testimonies of the absolute insufficiency of reason to determine this and similar questions abound in the writings of Plato and Cicero, and may be found in the declarations of other philosophers. On this very subject, after a full discussion of it, Cicero, though persuaded of the immortality of the soul, expressly says, "It would require a god to decide which of the opinions is true: as for ourselves, we cannot even determine which is the more probable."* Plato had previously put into the mouth of Socrates the following language, speaking also of the immortality of the soul: "The clear knowledge of

* *Tusculanæ.*

these things is in this life impossible, or at least very difficult. The philosopher should, therefore, hold to that which appears more probable, unless he has some surer light, or the *word of God himself*, to be his guide." * Now we ask, whether reason, which could not rise to any thing more than a probability, a cherished, though possibly a delusive persuasion, on a matter so clearly proposed to it by the belief of mankind, could have ever discovered this truth, had it not been primitively revealed to our race. It is very easy for a man at the present day to say, My reason teaches me to know and adore God, to believe in a providence, to expect an immortal life hereafter. He stands on the vantage-ground to which Christianity, not philosophy, has raised him. He lives in the light of divine revelation, though, like some African tribes that we read of, he may curse the luminary which vivifies and irradiates his mind. Had he not been reared in a Christian land, under the influence of Christian faith, he would be, with that same boastful Reason for his guide, a grovelling, superstitious idolater, or at best a doubting and bewildered inquirer after unknown truth.

Reason is not, then, that pillar of light which is to guide us safely through the desert of this life to the promised land that lies beyond it. We needed a revelation, and a revelation has been given to us. Knowing how the wisest and best portion of the human race had longed for the dawning of this celestial light, one would suppose that its appearance was hailed with universal joy. But history tells us quite a different story. And the erring reason, the proud, rebellious reason of man, was not the least potent or conspicuous among the formidable antagonists of Christianity. The cross was indeed a "stumbling-block" to the Jews, but to the Greeks, the refined, educated, philosophic Greeks and Romans, it was absolute "folly." It happened then, as it often happens now, that Reason was ready with her line and plummet, her compass and square, to sound the depths and take all the dimensions of truths which reached from the highest heaven to the lowest abyss of hell; and when her line was out, she was sure that she had fathomed the fathomless, and when her compass was stretched to the utmost, it certainly had measured infinity.

* *Phædo*.

tude itself. It is a great question, no doubt, whether the doctrines of divine revelation are to be implicitly believed, or to be subjected to the examination of reason. But to state the question is to solve it. It is the most presumptuous folly that can be conceived, for any man to undertake, by the power of reason, to determine what the Almighty must say when he speaks to his rational creatures. It is the most blasphemous inversion of order for man to attempt to give law to his Creator, to

"Seize the balance and the rod;
Rejudge his justice; be the God of God."

It is the finite measuring the infinite; — weak, puny human reason declaring itself the judge and arbiter of the Divine reason. When, therefore, any thing is proposed to me with the seal of revelation on it, if my reason cannot fathom it, if it transcend my powers of comprehension, am I to pronounce it false, to reject it as unreasonable? Would not such a rule be destructive of revelation itself? Would it not throw us back into the condition of the pagan philosophers, lost like them, but without their excuse, in the mazes of human opinion? What doctrine of revealed religion is there which could stand such a test? It has been applied to them all successively, and in consequence of its application they have all been successively rejected. If it enable you to-day to deny some article of my belief, will it not enable some one else to-morrow to overturn your peculiar creed? Descending step by step through all the grades of religious opinion, does it not inevitably lead to naked deism? And since nothing is more incomprehensible than God, nothing more incredible than creation, nothing more difficult to understand than an infinite being, self-existent, eternal, omnipresent in all space and in every minutest point of space, must it not end by denying Him? What other limit has it than downright atheism? Reason, then, is not in this sense the judge of revelation. No one is authorized to reject a doctrine because he cannot comprehend it. No Christian can consistently hold a principle, which is not only false, but subversive of all divine revelation. Reason herself, then, if truly enlightened, will direct us to believe what we cannot comprehend, when its truth is duly attested. They who do not comprehend the truths of geometry would exhibit little wisdom in pronouncing them false. The immense major-

ity of men, who understand nothing of the calculation of an eclipse or of the return of a comet, ought not therefore to refuse all evidence to the predictions of astronomical science. The tribes that live within the tropics are not admired for their extensive knowledge and profound philosophy, when they will not believe that water can become solid, so that men may walk on it or the huge elephant move securely over its stony surface, though they do not and cannot comprehend how this may be. The true position evidently is, that our inability to comprehend a fact or a doctrine does not authorize us either to affirm or deny it; but when we have satisfactory evidence of its truth, then we are bound to believe it, whether we comprehend it or not. Now the dogmas of revealed religion must surpass our comprehension, because they relate to God and to the future life, which to us are subjects essentially mysterious and incomprehensible. The believer is the first to proclaim that such is their nature. He knows that, if you strip them of their character of mystery, you take away one of the most evident marks of their divine origin. He knows, too, that mysteries are not confined to revelation. The most familiar facts in nature are often the most incomprehensible. The union of body and soul, and their action and reaction on each other; the secret of animal life; the principle of intelligence and affection in brutes; gravitation, electricity, magnetism, galvanism, — all the known laws of the physical universe, — are so many mysteries, in regard to which we believe the facts that have been ascertained, though we do not and cannot explain or account for them. There is not even a blade of grass, or flower of the field, or dew-drop sparkling on its leaves, or smallest insect nestling in its chalice, that may not suggest to the reflecting beholder a multitude of questions which reason cannot answer. And shall the mind, which, at every turn, at every glance, is so forcibly reminded of its ignorance and impotence, presume to inquire of the Almighty a full and perfect explanation of every truth which he declares, before it will vouchsafe to believe his divine attestation?

There is another point of view, in which enlightened reason must admit its perfect incompetency to deal with revelation any otherwise than by submissive assent and lowly adoration. We refer to that most extravagant of all the extravagances of the human mind, its pretended right

to improve or amend, in any manner whatsoever, the doctrines and institutions, the system of faith and practice, once declared to us on the part of the Most High. To believe in Christianity, because its author was the Son of God, and its promulgators his inspired Apostles, and then to maintain that what was divine at the origin of our faith must change and undergo revision and correction, that it may keep pace with the march of intellect, the progress of human knowledge, the improvement of our race, — to imagine, in a word, that at the present day we can make a more perfect Christianity than God has made for us, — is indeed to verify the expressions of our great poets, that

“Fools rush in where angels fear to tread”; —

that

“Man, proud man, . . .
Plays such fantastic tricks before high Heaven
As make the angels weep.”

It would be just as rational to pronounce the sun an obsolete luminary, quite good enough to give light and warmth and gladness to the world some two or three thousand years ago, but now behind the age, and totally unsuited to the enlarged philosophy, the increased knowledge, and higher wants of, the nineteenth century. Why, if one of the Apostles rising from the grave, or if an angel from heaven (we are but repeating the energetic language of him who was rapt to the third heavens), — if an angel from heaven were to offer us a new Gospel, a pretended revelation, differing but in one iota from that which the Son of God has given us, our only salutation to the innovator must be anathema.

Resting on this firm foundation, the believer is delighted with every effort to enlarge the boundaries of science, and hails with joy every new discovery of truth. He never dreams that Christianity can be endangered by the progress of science. He knows that every tenet of Christian faith is an infallible truth, based on the sure authority of Him who has revealed it. How can that which is true ever be proved false? Or how can any one truth ever be at war with any other truth? Who imagines that the demonstrations of mathematical science will ever be refuted? Who is afraid that any of the conclusions of geometry will be disturbed by the progress of discovery?

Yet no Christian philosopher will pretend that mathematical certainty is greater than the certainty of Divine revelation. If this comparison appear bold and hazardous to any one, it can only be because he does not understand the very meaning of the true revelation. He who holds a system of doctrines which he thinks may have been revealed, while he is not perfectly, that is infallibly, certain that they have been, cannot indeed venture on such a comparison. The reason is obvious. He does not believe truths divinely revealed. But he entertains opinions respecting what has been revealed, which opinions may be in part or entirely false. Such a one is or should be an inquirer, a seeker after the sure and perfect and infallible truths which God has revealed. A believer, a man of Christian faith, he is not and cannot be, so long as a shadow of doubt or uncertainty rests on his mind.

But Reason still claims to be the judge of Revelation, so far at least as to feel authorized to choose among revealed dogmas, — to give a decided preference to some, and a cold, if not contemptuous, look to others. According to this notion, some doctrines are essential and must be believed; others are unimportant, and you may believe them if you choose, or deny them, dispute about them, proclaim them false, or treat them as altogether unworthy of notice. The first class of revealed doctrines are *fundamental*; this is the favorite phrase; they must be retained because they are the foundations of the whole edifice of Christianity. Admitting the distinction, only for argument's sake, still we would ask, What are the foundations without the superstructure? Surely the foundations of any edifice will be of very little service, when the walls, roof, and all the other parts have been taken away. But we are also compelled to ask, How is reason to determine what doctrines are fundamental? That which appears so to the reason of one man may seem very unimportant to another. And experience proves this to be an insuperable difficulty; for they who have assumed the principle in question have never yet been able to designate precisely the fundamental dogmas of Christianity, or to give such a definition or description of them as may enable us to recognize and identify them. But the principle is a bad one, not only false and impious, but clearly irrational. It presumes a revelation, only to destroy what it presumes. A revelation supposes

that God has spoken, — that he has declared certain truths, given us certain laws, established certain institutions. And is it not blasphemy to say, that any truths which he has declared to us are of so little consequence that they may be disputed, denied, spurned with contempt? Is it not a bold defiance to the Omnipotent for man to disregard, to set aside as trivial and useless, to nullify, no matter on what pretext, any law that God has given him? Is it not ingratitude and insult combined in the highest degree, to make light of and reject any institution, which he, through infinite mercy, has established for our eternal welfare? There is wisdom in the homely saying, that “*beggars should not be choosers*”; only mount *the beggar man upon the steed of reason*, and it is not hard to tell in what direction he will gallop. For if it be reason’s privilege to play the master with the word of God, to canvass the merits and demerits of divine truths, to discuss their comparative value and worthlessness, to sift the wheat from the chaff, to treat them as a pile of rubbish containing some hidden gems, or as a decayed and ruinous and rotten fabric, which must be cleared away to the very foundations, — then welcome deism, atheism, or any thing else which will only be consistent with itself, — which will not give the lie to its own silly pretensions!

If, then, we are asked what is the province of reason in relation to revealed religion, we answer, to seek the light of revelation, if it has not yet been found, and to follow its guidance when it is found. If the further question is put, how shall reason distinguish and recognize revealed truth, without attempting to give a complete answer to the inquiry, we will simply say, that reason has the undoubted right to question and reject whatever comes to her in the guise of human opinion. She cannot fairly be required to admit as revealed what does not purport to be such. All the truths of revelation are *unchangeable, infallible, divine*. Doctrines which have these characters stamped upon them claim the assent and submission of human reason. But the *unchangeable, infallible, divine* truths of revelation are given us from heaven, not to be discussed, but to be believed, — not to be the themes of philosophic speculation or theological criticism and controversy, but to be the objects of implicit faith and humble adoration.

We find that we have exceeded our limits, and yet we

have said nothing of the learned, and in many respects remarkable work, the title of which we have placed at the head of our article. We may return to it hereafter; but we have fully accomplished our object for the present, if we have made clearer to any of our readers this great truth, that Reason must ever be ancillary to Faith, — that she can neither dispense with revelation nor pretend to be its judge.

ART. VI. — *A Course of Five Lectures, delivered in St. Louis, on Protestantism and Government.* By Hon. HUGH A. GARLAND, Author of "John Randolph of Roanoke." Phonographically reported by E. F. Underhill. St. Louis. 1852. 8vo. pp. 28.

DURING the last winter, the editor of this journal, at the invitation of the Catholic Institute of St. Louis, gave in that city a course of five lectures on Catholicity and Civilization, in which he endeavored to maintain that all true civilization is of Catholic origin, and that all nations in the ancient world became barbarous in proportion as they departed from the patriarchal religion, and that all modern nations tend to barbarism in proportion as they recede from the Catholic Church. He did not maintain this thesis precisely as an argument for the Church, for he contended that the Church is spiritual, instituted not for the civilization of nations, but for the glory of God in the salvation of souls; he maintained it because it is historically true, and because it is a conclusive argument against the carnal Judaism into which the world has lapsed, and which proposes simply material civilization and temporal well-being as its sole end. His lectures were nothing but a running commentary on the sacred text, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."

The conclusions of the lecturer were neither flattering nor acceptable to the carnal Jews and gentiles who listened to them. If his conclusions were sound, and nobody pretended that they did not follow irresistibly from his premises, and if what he alleged to be facts were really facts, the

boasted progress and intelligence of the modern uncatholic world could be regarded only as false intelligence, worse than no intelligence at all, and a progress towards barbarism, if not arrested, destined to end in savagism. The secular and sectarian press, with one or two honorable exceptions, kept up during the delivery of the lectures a continual fire against the lecturer and his assertions, and even sought to crush him beneath the weight of his own shameful writings prior to his conversion, and which he had long since retracted. But this was not enough. The lectures were listened to by large numbers of the most respectable and influential classes of the city, with deep interest, almost with enthusiasm. Nowhere had the lecturer ever found a more intelligent audience, or been listened to with more manifest respect and sympathy. Something was necessary to be done to counteract the influence of his decidedly anti-Jewish and anti-gentile lectures. So, at their close, a number of anti-Catholic citizens of St. Louis invited the Hon. Hugh A. Garland, a Virginian, and formerly clerk of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, to deliver a course of lectures in reply to them, and to tell the people what they were to believe as to the compatibility of Protestantism with civilization and good government. Mr. Garland accepted the invitation so far as to consent to give a course of lectures on the same subject, or at least some branches of it, and the pamphlet before us consists of a phonographical report of his course.

The author does not profess to *reply* to the course by the editor of this journal, but professes to go over the same ground, and, save in the correspondence between him and the gentlemen who invited him to lecture, he makes but a single allusion to him, and that, save as to its too complimentary character, one to which we can take no exception. We might, therefore, very well regard ourselves as under no special obligation to notice the pamphlet; but as the correspondence which occasioned it is published at its head, and as it was no doubt intended to be a vindication of Protestantism against the Catholic lecturer, without the responsibility of a direct answer to his arguments, and as our silence might be misconstrued by the enemies of our faith, we have concluded not to let it pass without making it the subject of a few brief comments.

With the author personally our relations have long been friendly and affectionate, and we remember with great pleasure the intercourse we enjoyed with him, in the bosom of his own family and elsewhere, during our late visit to St. Louis, the great city of the West. We confess we were not prepared for such a course of lectures as he appears to have given, from a gentleman of his character and intelligence. Surrounded as he is by Catholics, in daily and hourly intercourse with them, and to some extent familiar with Catholic doctrines and treatises, we did not expect from him arguments against us which would hardly have been creditable to a Dowling or a Sparry. We speak of the arguments as to their substance, not of the language in which they are clothed, which for the most part is that of a gentleman, and unexceptionable.

The precise purpose of the author in his lectures he nowhere distinctly states, and we are at a loss to determine what general thesis he means to maintain or to refute. His lectures as a course appear to lack unity of design and distinctness of aim. The author has read a good deal on various subjects, has thought intensely, and has made many just observations; but he does not seem to have digested his materials, or to have worked out his thoughts, and reduced them to a system. He does not appear to have determined his principles and doctrines, and become able to state them clearly and distinctly, so as to bring his reading and observation to bear directly on their illustration and defence. His lectures are to us, though eloquent and high-wrought in passages, confused, indeed chaotic, and successfully defy our powers of analysis. We cannot reduce them to unity, and test their soundness or unsoundness by testing them in their principle. In a word, the author is far more of a Protestant than we had taken him to be, and, like all Protestants, argues and draws conclusions in general without any major premise, or, when he has a major premise, without any middle term. The only way of thoroughly reviewing such an author is to take him up sentence by sentence, and examine each sentence by itself. This is not precisely the author's fault; no Protestant can write otherwise, without writing himself out of his Protestantism. Protestantism is essentially illogical and unintellectual, repugnant to the fundamental laws of reason, and the Protestant who should undertake in his writings

against Catholics to conform to those laws, would at every step refute himself. We have neither the space nor the time to take up these lectures at length, and point out all that we judge unsound in them, and the author must expect from us only a few brief remarks on such statements of his as appear to us the most deserving of animadversion.

The author very properly, in his first lecture, denies and refutes the doctrine, popular in our times at least, that man began in the savage state; and consequently he denies and refutes, whether he intends to do so or not, the whole modern doctrine of the progress of the species, or the perfectibility of human nature. He also asserts a spiritual order, and maintains that it is above the temporal, or in other words, he maintains the supremacy of the spiritual order. Thus far he has done well, and done much. His admission that man began in perfection, that is, in perfection as a man, not in imperfection, and his assertion of the supremacy of the spiritual order, contain in themselves the refutation of all his Protestantism, and substantially all that he alleges against the Church. But though he recognizes a spiritual order, he does not recognize, properly speaking, the supernatural order, or at least, that God has not only given us a religion supernaturally, but also a supernatural religion. "Besides the faculties of understanding, and the passions, and the appetites which belong to nature or this outward material order, man is endowed with reason, conscience, and high moral faculties, which teach him truth, what is right and what is wrong, — the great guides given him by his Creator to accomplish the ends of his creation here. These faculties are the highest qualities that man possesses, and [those] that distinguish him from the material world around him. These moral faculties, properly educated and properly instructed with the truths which God, his creator, has revealed to him *by means of these faculties*, can keep in subjection the animal appetites, and guide man to reason and justice. The spiritual quality, being supreme, should govern and control the whole man." (p. 3.) We will not press the language here employed as far as it would bear, because even the best reporters are seldom to be relied on for strict verbal accuracy; but it is clear from it, that the spiritual recognized by the lecturer is the higher faculties of the soul, which are evi-

dently in the order of nature, since they pertain to the nature of the human soul, and that these higher faculties, without supernatural revelation and without the grace which enlightens, elevates, and sanctifies, are adequate to teach us the truth, and to enable us to attain our destiny; for the only revelation assumed to be necessary, or to have been made, is the revelation which God makes to us by the means, that is, through the medium, of these faculties, which, as they are natural, must be natural as to its medium, and therefore as to its substance, for no natural faculty can attain to truth that lies in the supernatural order.

The author, whatever he may believe himself, is therefore in his principles really a Rationalist or a Transcendentalist. Here is his fundamental error, and the source of all his other errors. Revelation with him means only the man arriving through his higher faculties at a higher order of truth than is perceptible by his senses; that is, God has made man capable of attaining to supersensible truth, and as man does attain to it by means of a higher order of faculties than those of the senses, God is said to reveal it, simply because it is not revealed or presented to our apprehension by the external world, to which the author improperly restricts the word *nature*. But this is no proper revelation at all, and gives apprehension of nothing that transcends the natural order. Hence religion according to the author is natural, and is only the educator or the education of our higher faculties. It develops the moral faculties, draws out what is in them, and directs them to their proper objects; but it neither gives to them, or presupposes in them, as supernaturally communicated to or infused into them, any thing above nature, fitting them to perform what surpasses the natural light and strength of man. "Religion," he says, "*taken in its broad and comprehensive sense, as teaching man to live, and bringing forward and making predominant in all his acts that moral and spiritual faculty which belongs to him, is the most essential and important principle in the training and education of society.*" (p. 4.) Religion in its broad and comprehensive sense must comprehend all that is essential to religion. But as the author here defines the term, it is only the cultivation of human nature, and implies no grace, — nothing that lifts nature above itself. This is evident from what he immediately adds in the same paragraph: — "How is this to be

done? has been the great problem of history from the beginning down to the present day, — has been the difficult question *that has never yet been solved*, and of which it has fallen upon us, in our country, to attempt a solution. I trust that during the present course I shall be able to show that there has been a revelation to man of all those great truths, and that they must be taught to the individual and the community, — must be enforced and impressed on them, *so as to bring out and make predominant in all man's acts those moral faculties the nature of which has been revealed to man by his Creator*"; that is, a revelation by means of these faculties themselves. The end of religion is, therefore, not to raise man above his nature and enable him to attain to a supernatural destiny, but to develop and render predominant in himself and society the higher faculties or quality of his nature. This clearly brings religion within the natural order, and entirely neglects at least the supernatural.

But there is another point involved in this extract, not without difficulty. The author contends and proves that man began in the perfection of his nature, a fully developed and perfect man. Of course in the beginning the higher nature predominated, the spiritual ruled the carnal. He tells us also that the moral faculties, educated and instructed by the truths which God reveals to us through them, are adequate to teach us truth, what is right and what is wrong, to enable us to keep our animal appetites in subjection, and to guide us to reason and justice. But in this extract, how the moral and spiritual faculty which belongs to man is to be made predominant in all his acts, individually and socially, he alleges, has remained unsolved from the *beginning* down to the present time, and the task of solving it has fallen upon us at this late day in this country. So up to the present, all the revelations of God and all our moral faculties have only enabled us to know that the spiritual faculty *ought* to predominate in all our acts, whether as individuals or society, without teaching us in any respect how or by what means it can be made thus to predominate! Man began with that predominance, has always been able through his faculties to know what it is, and to effect it, and nevertheless, how it is to be done has never yet been ascertained, and remains for us in this country to find out!

We mean no disrespect to the author, who is really a man of fine abilities, and, where not cramped or blinded by his Protestantism, a good reasoner and a pleasing rhetorician. We call his attention to this inconsistency into which he has been betrayed, for we believe he honestly means to be a Christian, and is one of the few Protestants who would sooner give up private judgment than the Gospel. No doubt man has the moral and spiritual faculties the author contends for, but we respectfully suggest to him that the cultivation of these does not place a man in the Christian order, nor advance him a single step towards the kingdom of heaven. Christianity is a new creation, above the primitive creation, and holds from God as supernatural creator, as the latter does from God as the creator of nature. It differs as to order from nature. It is the kingdom of grace, and demands of its subjects that they act from God to and for God in a sense unintelligible or superintelligible to any of our natural faculties. Man considered in his natural powers and capacities can no more grow or develop, no matter what the instruction or cultivation he receives, into a Christian, into a citizen or subject of the kingdom of grace, than an alder-shrub into an oak, or a dunghill fowl into the eagle that gazes with undazzled eye on the noonday sun. The most upright and perfectly developed man in the natural order can no more enter into the Christian order without being born again, regenerated, made a new creature, than the foulest sinner, the most revolting criminal. As to live a natural life it is necessary that the child should be born, so to live the Christian life is it necessary that he be born again, supernaturally regenerated. No acts are in the Christian order, or meritorious in relation to heaven, except those that proceed from grace as their principle, and are done for God as the end of grace in the supernatural order, either as the Supreme Good itself, or as our supreme good. This is what Christianity teaches us, and it discloses the grand mistake of all who make Christianity nothing but a means, natural or supernatural, of cultivating our spiritual faculties.

There was one great fact to which the lecturer to whom the author was requested to reply called the attention of his audience, and on which he insisted at great length; namely, that our nature has been so corrupted by the Fall, the understanding so obscured, and the will so attenuated,

that left to itself the inferior nature, the appetites and passions, uniformly predominates, and thus man falls in his natural life even below, so to speak, the plane of his nature. Hence, left to the light and strength of his nature alone, he not only cannot gain heaven, but cannot institute and maintain true civilization. Civilization he defined to be the supremacy of reason, or the freedom of man's higher faculties; and barbarism, to be the predominance of appetite and passion, or of man's lower nature. The former he contended could not be secured except by Catholicity, or true religion, not only as a revelation, not only as a teacher, but as a repairer, as infusing into man a supernatural power to subject the lower, and maintain the freedom and supremacy of the higher, faculties of his nature. Here was the whole doctrine of his five lectures, and all else that he said was brought forward solely to elucidate and defend it. The author, considering that he was, if not expressly, yet in some sense, replying to the Catholic lecturer, and endeavoring to set aside his conclusions, should not have passed over this in silence, or quietly, almost surreptitiously, assumed the contrary, and reasoned from it as an admitted truth. The great fact is, that men under the law of nature alone, without the aid of supernatural religion, of Catholicity, cannot in their present fallen state fulfil the law of nature, and have a perpetual tendency to run into barbarism; for barbarism is in society only the dominion of the flesh in the individual. No training, no cultivation in the order of nature alone, can save a people from barbarism, for it is only by grace that men can in their present state keep the law of nature even, and maintain the freedom and predominance of what the author calls the moral faculties. This is not speculation or theory; it is fact, proved to be such by all experience.

This being undeniable, the conclusion that all true civilization, and therefore all true liberty, are the products of Catholicity, and that all nations lapse into barbarism as they recede from it, follows inevitably, unless there be included under the name of Catholicity other than the true religion. If the alleged Catholicity be the true religion, the conclusion is certain, and the Catholic lecturer proved it *a posteriori* to be true of what he called Catholicity; that is, the one religion which has been transmitted to us from the beginning, through the patriarchs, the synagogue,

and the Catholic Church, or Church in communion with the See of Rome. He proved, or at least attempted to prove, this historically, and the author had no right to assume the contrary, without at least some attempt to answer the arguments of the Catholic lecturer, or some attempt at independent proofs. He was not, in a *quasi* answer to the Catholic lecturer, at liberty to assume as a conceded truth, that religion in any other sense than that of mere education of man's natural faculties is not needed, and that man is abundantly able without supernatural grace to keep the law of nature, and institute and maintain true civilization. Till he had refuted his Catholic opponent, and established the fact that civilization is practicable without Catholicity, as the lecturer defined it, he was not free to attack the Catholic Church; for that was virtually to deny civilization itself. The Catholic proofs that civilization is impossible without Catholicity were conclusive so long as unanswered, and to attempt, without answering them, to disprove Catholicity, was not to prove that there can be civilization without Catholicity, but, if any thing, that there never has been and never can be any true civilization at all, assuredly not the thesis the author wished to defend. The author has thus signally failed. The corruption of our nature is a fact that cannot be denied, and equally undeniable is it that nature left to itself tends inevitably to barbarism, for we receive the seeds or germs of true civilization only as supernaturally deposited in our hearts. We bear the seeds or germs of barbarism in our very natures, and we have only to act out our corrupt nature to be genuine barbarians.

The author makes no account of this fact, and proceeds on the assumption of the natural origin of civilization, and of the capacity of nature, without supernatural light and strength, to sustain the most perfect civilization. Overlooking the necessity of grace to enable us to keep even the natural law, he attempts to prove historically that the Catholic Church is false, and that Protestantism and society well governed are compatible with each other. But he has failed in both respects, for his proofs rest on the misreading or the misinterpreting of history on the one hand, and the surreptitious change of the terms of his proposition on the other, as often as necessary to meet historical facts which he can neither misread nor misinter-

pret. He does not keep steadily to one view of civilization, and his conception of good government is very much that of no government at all, or of a government that leaves men a prey to all the barbarous elements of our nature. Man started, he concedes, with all he needed, a good government, and proper teachers and guides, but soon fell from the right way, lost his good government, lost his light and freedom, and became a degraded, ignorant, superstitious slave. Through the corruptions of human nature? O, no! But through the cupidity and grasping ambition of the priesthood. Indeed, the author seems disposed to charge all the evils of society, and nearly all the faults of individuals, upon the priesthood, the heathen priesthoods in the world before Christ, and the Catholic priesthood since. Religion has always been perverted and man corrupted by his spiritual guides. Of antiquity, only the Jewish people were preserved in a state of true civilization, and they only by the frequent and miraculous interposition of Almighty God; that is, they were protected and prevented from falling into all the barbarism of the gentiles only by the supernatural grace of God,—precisely the doctrine maintained by the Catholic lecturer. In the world before Christ the author finds himself obliged to concede, and apparently without being conscious that he does concede, the practical inadequacy of nature to sustain good government and true civilization. What becomes now of his doctrine of the sufficiency of nature, of the sufficiency of our moral faculties to tell us what is right and what is wrong, and to keep our animal appetites in subjection? If this were so, how came your ancient priesthoods so corrupt, and how could they so corrupt the people and degrade them to the lowest barbarism?

If the author may be credited, prior to the coming of Christ true civilization was maintained only by the continued supernatural intervention of Almighty God, and all nations tended to barbarism in proportion as they receded from the patriarchal religion and polity. This is precisely the doctrine the Catholic lecturer himself asserted and defended in his lectures at St. Louis, and thus far the author, consciously or unconsciously, agrees with him.

But since the coming of Christ it has not been the same. By the Christian revelation "man found that which had been lost and forgotten, and was once more restored to

himself." (p. 8.) Nevertheless, only a short time elapsed before he, in part at least, lost himself again, and fell anew into ignorance, superstition, and slavery. His spiritual guides proved unfaithful, his faith was corrupted, and his manners and morals were debased. Whence and by what means? Whence and in the same way in which the gentiles lost the patriarchal religion and polity. Menes, king of Egypt, "brought all the priesthood into subjection to him, and associated them with him for the purpose of enslaving and degrading the people." (p. 5.) In the same way Christianity was corrupted. Under paganism the Emperor was not only supreme civil lord, but also *pontifex maximus*, or supreme head of the pagan church. When the Emperor became converted, he "placed himself at the head of the Church, in the same position which he had previously occupied with respect to the pagan church, and was now as before *pontifex maximus*." (Ibid.) This is inferred from the conduct of Constantine and Theodosius, who are alleged to have imitated Menes of Egypt, especially Theodosius, who as *pontifex maximus* took upon himself to decree what is orthodoxy. (p. 9.) In this way the clergy were subjected to the prince, made civil functionaries, and employed to pervert religion, and to corrupt and enslave the people.

An ingenious theory, only it does not happen to be supported by a single fact. But suppose it to be true, what does it make in favor of the author's thesis, if thesis he has? Suppose it, it only proves that the subjection of the Church to the state, and the usurpation of ecclesiastical functions by the civil power, are fatal to religion and civilization, — precisely what the Catholic lecturer at St. Louis alleged. What does this say in favor of Protestantism, or against the position assumed, that modern nations in proportion as they recede from the Catholic Church tend towards barbarism? Surely there can be no greater departure from the Church than to subject her to the civil authority, and to convert her clergy into civil functionaries. Then, again, this very absorption of the Church into the state, of which the author complains, is the characteristic of Protestantism. Protestantism was sought as the emancipation of sovereigns from subjection in spirituals even to the spiritual authority, and of giving them supreme authority in both spirituals and temporals. Every

Protestant sovereign claimed to be *pontifex maximus* in his own dominions. Henry the Eighth of England assumed for himself all the powers that had previously been attributed to the Pope, and caused himself to be declared supreme head of the Church in his realm. The present Queen of England is the sovereign pontiff or papeess of the Church of England, and all the bishops hold from the crown. The same is true of the Protestant sovereigns of the Continent, and here, where democracy prevails, the great boast of Protestantism is that it emancipates the people from all subjection to spiritual authority, and gives them the control of their pastors, and the power to determine their religion for themselves. On the author's own principles, then, Protestantism is a departure from primitive Christianity, and tends necessarily to destroy true civilization, and barbarize the nations that submit to it, by absorbing the spiritual power in the temporal. Why, when really reasoning from the principles of the Catholic lecturer, did the author put on the air of reasoning against them?

But the author has misread history. It is not true that Constantine or any other Christian Emperor ever claimed to be in relation to the Christian Church *pontifex maximus*, or supreme head of the Church. Constantine expressly disclaimed the character, and recognized in its fullest extent the independence and exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical authorities in all things spiritual. When he entered the Holy Council of Nice, he remained standing till invited to be seated by the Bishops, and even then took his seat on a low stool at their feet, acknowledging that there they were sovereign, not he. Theodosius never pretended to any ecclesiastical powers, and in the decree referred to he only promulgated as the law of the land the decisions and canons of the Church, made by the proper ecclesiastical authorities. That some usurping Emperors, both in the East and the West, sought to encroach on the liberties of the Church, and in doing so caused incalculable evil, is no doubt true; but they were resisted by the Church, and never succeeded in subjecting the spiritual authority to themselves, save in heretical or schismatic countries. The Catholic Church always asserted her independence in face of the temporal power, and she is the only church that has uniformly maintained the freedom of the spiritual order. Schismatics and heretics have always been ready

to surrender spiritual liberty to the prince, on condition that he would protect them in their heresy, or their schism, against the Church. One of the reasons alleged by the Catholic lecturer why she and she alone could preserve civilization was because she and she alone asserted and was able to maintain freedom of religion, the liberty of conscience, in face of the temporal power.

But the author tells us that subsequently the Popes themselves destroyed the purity and efficacy of the Christian religion, by absorbing the state, and making themselves supreme in both orders. "The second or third successor of Hildebrand completely triumphed over the Emperor, and established himself as supreme head of both temporal and spiritual affairs, and was now *pontifex maximus*." The Pope "now placed himself on the throne of the Cæsars, and was supreme in all things, both spiritual and temporal, — was emperor and *pontifex maximus*, as Constantine and Theodosius before him had been, and was like them the supreme object of adoration to his subjects." (p. 11.) Unhappily for the author, this is all pure theory, or pure imagination. It is false as a whole, and in all its parts. The second successor of Hildebrand, or St. Gregory the Seventh, was Urban the Second. He proclaimed the Crusades indeed, and excommunicated Philip the First of France, for a scandalous adultery, but did not completely triumph over the Emperor, or exercise supreme authority as emperor any more than his predecessors. The third successor was Pascal the Second, whom Henry the Fifth of Germany caused to be imprisoned, with many cardinals, bishops, and nobles who adhered to the Holy See, and forced to concede to the Emperor the faculty of investiture. This was no triumph over the Emperor, but for the moment a triumph of the Emperor over the Pope. The fact is, none of the Popes, in their struggles with the Emperor, ever completely triumphed; they saved the principle at stake, but were often obliged to concede to the temporal authority in practice the faculties it claimed. There is no instance on record of a Pope who was in himself both emperor and pope, as there is on record no instance of a Christian Emperor who was both pope and emperor. The two powers have always been, under the Church, distinct, and, saving in the ecclesiastical states, not only distinct, but separate; and the struggle of the Popes with the civil power has

never been to place themselves on the throne of the Cæsars, to absorb the imperial authority and dignity in the pontifical, but simply to maintain the freedom and independence of the spiritual order, and prevent that very union of the two powers which the author regards as the source of all spiritual and temporal evils. All the power the sovereign pontiffs have ever exercised, or pretended to exercise, over temporal sovereigns, is that of declaring the law according to which they are bound in the sight of God to govern; of subjecting them, as Catholics, to the discipline of the Church for their sins, crimes, and moral offences, in like manner as if they were private individuals; and, as the highest recognized court of Christendom, to judge the causes between sovereign and sovereign, and a sovereign and his subjects, submitted to them for adjudication. The Pope's right to decide judicially causes thus submitted is unquestionable, though whether he holds it *jure humano*, or *jure divino*, may not be defined; and whether he has or has not the right to execute by physical force the sentence he pronounces, is a question of no practical importance, because as Pope he has never the physical force for the purpose at his command, and cannot have it without the consent of secular sovereigns. He has in the secular order for enforcing his commands, or for executing his sentences, whether upon private individuals or upon public persons or authorities, practically at least, only moral means, and can have no other.

That the Pope ever was "*the supreme object of adoration to his subjects*" is a charge which the author should never have suffered himself to bring. The supreme object of adoration to all Catholics was always, and is, and always will be, God, and God alone, and the author disparages his own understanding rather than ours, when he supposes that any of us are incapable of distinguishing between God and the Pope. The author is wholly unwarranted in his assertion that Constantine and Theodosius were the supreme object of adoration to their subjects, especially if he means their Christian subjects. The pagan Emperors were adored by their pagan subjects, but no Christian Emperor has ever received divine honors from his Christian subjects. Charges so foul, made without the shadow of authority, by men so respectable in their station and general character as our author, are in the last degree unpar-

donable, for such men cannot be ignorant that they are unfounded, and utterly false. In Mr. Garland's particular case, the charge, we doubt not, was made without deliberation, and from a habit acquired when he was a Transcendentalist of substituting theory for fact, and his own gloss for the text.

The author has much to say of the doctrine which he ascribes to St. Gregory the Seventh. We have no space to follow him through his commentaries; but the whole amount of what he alleges, taking it in its fullest sense, is, in principle, that the spiritual authority is supreme, and that kings are no more exempt from the power of the keys given to St. Peter than are their subjects, — in their public than in their private conduct. Supposing the power of the keys, this is nothing to which the author can object, for he himself says the spiritual is supreme and ought to rule in the individual and the community; and it would be ridiculous to pretend that sovereigns are not as much bound to obey the law of God in their official as in their private conduct. If you concede to the Church the power of binding and loosing at all, that is, any power of spiritual discipline, you cannot without gross inconsistency and absurdity subtract all public persons in their public capacity from its operation. Hildebrand, even according to the most the author makes out, asserted only the principle that the spiritual is supreme and ought to rule in the individual and the community; that is, that princes and states as well as individuals are bound to conform to the law of God, and are subject to spiritual discipline when they violate it, — a principle no Christian, and no well-conditioned pagan even, can have the folly to deny.

The author has conjured up a phantom, and is frightened at it. He seems to suppose that in the Catholic world the two powers, spiritual and temporal, have been identified, first by the Emperor making himself Pope, and secondly by the Pope making himself Emperor. All this is fancy. The Church, and therefore the Pope, or the Pope, and therefore the Church, teaches that the two powers are distinct, and she neither claims the imperial purple for herself, nor accords the tiara to the Emperor. But in admitting the two as distinctly subsisting powers, she does not therefore admit them as equal in rank or authority, as two coördinate and in all respects mutually independent

powers, for she asserts the supremacy of the spiritual order, and the obligation of the temporal power to rule in secular affairs in obedience to the law of God as defined by the spiritual authority instituted by Almighty God, and supernaturally assisted and protected for that purpose. Here is no identification of the two orders, no absorbing of the one by the other, but here are two distinctly subsisting powers, each with its own constitution, only the one is inferior and subordinate to the other, as the body is inferior and subordinate to the soul. This is only the doctrine the author himself asserts in principle, and therefore is a doctrine to which he has no right to object, and to which none but a political atheist can object. The only thing here to be objected is, that the Catholic Church is not the divinely constituted representative of the spiritual order on earth. If she is, the author must concede St. Gregory's doctrine; if not, he is where he was when he began, and obliged to end, not with the conclusion that Protestantism and good government are compatible, but with the conclusion that how true civilization and good government are to be secured is, as he says in the outset, an unsolved problem, and reserved for the future to solve. This in fact is the author's conclusion. His church is in the future, and so is his civilized order. He takes refuge in hope, and sings,

"There is a good time coming, boys,"

but when or how he confesses himself ignorant, as must every Protestant.

ART. VII. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *Histoire des Souverains Pontifes Romains.* Par le CHEVALIER ARTAUD DE MONTOR. Paris: Didot Frères. 1847. 8 tomes. 8vo.

THIS is a popular history of the Popes, from St. Peter to Pius the Sixth inclusive, written in a truly Catholic spirit, with learning, good sense, and good taste, and admirably adapted to general reading. A translation of it into English, accompanied by a few judicious notes, correcting a few slight mistakes and modifying the views of the author on one or two questions, would be a valua-

ble accession to our literature, and tend not a little to correct many of the errors with regard to papal history still very widely entertained by the people, sometimes Catholic as well as Protestant.

We notice this work at this time both for its own merits and because it bears us out in one or two statements in the article on *Christianity and Heathenism* in our last Review, to which some exceptions have been taken. And since we have referred to that article, we wish to correct the blunder we committed, of calling the Emperor Charles the Fifth the *son* of Maximilian the First. He was the *grandson*, not son, of Maximilian. Several correspondents, some of them highly esteemed friends and most worthy clergymen, and some of them Protestants or *Liberal* Catholics, have taken exceptions to our statement, that "we have yet to see full evidence that any Pope, after he became Pope, was a very bad man," and have referred us to the concessions to the contrary of certain Catholic historians. The concessions we are referred to we were well aware of, and we protested against them as unwarranted by the facts in the case. We expressly asserted that they were uncalled for, and that they constitute the only real embarrassment of the Catholic in his controversies with the enemies of the Church. We therefore refused to accept them as authority, and consequently there was no use in citing them against us. Their justice was the point our correspondents should have proved.

Our readers are requested to bear in mind that we did not say that we had seen *no* evidence, but that we had yet to see *full*, that is, conclusive evidence, &c. Nor did we pretend that every Pope had been a *good* man; we simply said, that we had yet "to see full evidence that any Pope, after he became Pope, was a *very bad* man." Here is a point which our correspondents appear to have overlooked, and yet it is a point of some importance. A man may not be very good, may not be a saint, and yet not be very bad, that is, very wicked. The Chevalier Artaud de Montor has given us in the work before us the history of every Pope down to Pius the Sixth, and proves, not indeed that every one was a saint, but very clearly that not one of them is proved to have been a very bad man. Instances of weakness he enumerates, but never of great crimes. He shows us many Popes, according to human modes of judging, who committed mistakes, and through weakness or love of peace yielded too much to the tyranny and rapacity of temporal sovereigns, but none who were governed by an unjust ambition, or who were grasping and oppressive. He refutes the calumnies circulated against some of them, and especially those alleged against those particular Popes mentioned by our correspondents. He is a respectable authority, and far more reliable than Reeves. We have read him for the first time since we

wrote the article to which exceptions have been taken, and are well pleased to find him sustaining us.

We have found in our historical reading that Catholics have not always been just to the Sovereign Pontiffs, and that popular Catholic historians have been too ready to concede charges preferred by the enemies of the Church. They seem always to have written on the principle, that, where there is a doubt, the benefit of that doubt belongs to the enemies of the Popes. But as the Popes are the party accused, this is to reverse the well-settled rule of both law and justice. The accused is always entitled to the benefit of every doubt, on the principle that every one is to be presumed innocent till proved guilty. These authors throw upon us a burden that we are not bound to bear, and, instead of compelling the accuser to prove his charges, they require us to disprove them. This is being generous to a fault, and carrying candor to an excess. No doubt the concessions we refer to may be made without impeaching the sanctity or the infallibility of the Church; yet they embarrass the Catholic controversialist, for the enemies of the Church will recognize no distinction between the concession of an unimportant fact and the concession of an essential dogma. Moreover, these concessions, being made by Catholic historians, pass into history, form the popular judgments of history even among Catholics, and thus lead the faithful themselves to regard the facts of history as less creditable to them than they really are, which operates in many to weaken their faith, to diminish their charity, and to damp their zeal. Our rule is to dismiss every charge against either the official or private conduct of a Pope, that is not fully proved, and we ask other proof than the fact that some writer, who professes to be, or really is, a Catholic, concedes it. We find concessions even in Baronius that we are far from accepting.

In the same article we said in substance that the popular histories circulating among Catholics, especially in England and this country, have been written by unbelievers, heretics, Gallicans, or lukewarm Catholics. This charge our correspondents deny, though in most respectful and courteous tones. They refer us to Rohrbacher's popular history of the Church, recently published in French, as a refutation of our statement. Our statement, if taken literally, may be too sweeping. But we had reference, as was obvious enough, not to the works which have been written, and which are known only to scholars, but to the works which circulate among the people, and form the popular judgment of historical persons and events. In this sense we have no reason, when asserted specially of England and the United States, to doubt its accuracy. We have not indeed read Rohrbacher's history, but we were aware of its existence and of its general character. It vindicates the Sovereign Pontiffs, we are told, and is Ultramontane in doctrine,

spirit, and tendency. As much, too, may be said of the Ecclesiastical History by Baron Henrion. But excellent as these works are, they are far from leaving nothing to be desired, and, moreover, they are not in general circulation in England and this country, and have as yet done comparatively little in forming the popular judgments of ecclesiastical and papal history in any country.

It was far enough from our intention to ignore or to underrate these and many other recent publications of a similar character. These works we regard as among the first fruits of the reaction which has commenced in our times against the heathenism which has prevailed more or less for the last four centuries, and which we conceded had commenced. We did not suppose it had commenced with us ; we did not suppose that we had made a new discovery, that we were telling the Catholic public something no one else had told it, and were to be the father of a new movement. We regarded ourselves merely as engaged in a work with others, and as laboring to help on a Catholic reaction which had been commenced, under the providence of God, by choice spirits in all Catholic countries, and commenced, too, long before we had left the ranks of heresy. We lay no claim to originality, even where a Catholic may be original, and our highest ambition is to be a feeble echo of what we hear from others, at whose feet it is our pleasure and our glory to sit and learn. We are but an humble laborer in a great work in which all good Catholics are engaged, and whoever, from the earnest and positive tones in which we sometimes speak, imagines that we claim to be any thing more, or that we look upon ourselves as destined to start or to effect something new, does us no ordinary injustice. Our article was written to help on the Catholic reaction against paganism in modern society, and, if we failed to give full credit to the labors already accomplished by others, it was because our mind dwelt on the tendencies still predominant among the mass of the people, and because we are accustomed to count nothing done as long as any thing remains to do.

We have departed from our usual policy in making these remarks, because we have felt that something was due to the correspondents who had in a kind and courteous manner called our attention to certain statements which they regarded as unsound. The sneers and denunciations, the cavillings and misrepresentations of the newspaper press, we sometimes glance at, but we make it a rule to let them pass for what they are worth. But hints and suggestions from friends, or even from those who are not Catholics, made in a courteous manner and with serious aims, are always welcome, and will never be suffered to pass from us unheeded, whether we formally acknowledge them or not.

For ourselves, in looking around us and striving to form a just

estimate of society in its relations to the Church, we see much to afflict us, much that needs amendment, even in the tone and manners of Catholics; but we are far from believing that we of this generation have fallen upon peculiarly evil times. We know no epoch in the world's history in which, had the choice been left to us, we should sooner have chosen to have our lot cast, than the present. The Church in this world is always the Church Militant, and the Christian's life here below is always a warfare. Not till we die can we put off our harness or lay down our arms. But we verily believe that the reaction of heathenism, which broke out in the fifteenth century, has been arrested, and that a decided Catholic reaction against it has commenced, and is proceeding with no little rapidity and force. There is no country where this reaction is more needed, where it has a freer field, or may be encouraged with fairer prospects of success, than our own. It is needed here, as elsewhere, for the salvation of souls; it is also needed to mould our people into a uniform national character, to preserve good government, to secure freedom, and even to save society itself.

A noble field opens here to our young Catholics. Here is a spiritual work to be done worthy of their noblest ambition. Hundreds and thousands of them are now wasting their genius and talent, their enthusiasm and strength, in idleness and sensuality, or in the ignoble pursuit of mere worldly wealth or honors. Let them aim higher, and open their eyes and their hearts to the great, the noble, and the enduring. Let them, each according to his own gifts and callings, give themselves up heart and soul to the work of banishing heathenism from our society, and of rendering this country, if the youngest, the most beautiful and the best beloved of the children of the Church. Never was there a nobler work, never did a more honorable or glorious career open to ingenuous youth. This country must be won to the Church. To win it, we must labor constantly to cultivate a high and uncompromising, but sweet and gentle, Catholic tone among ourselves, and by our prayers and our examples, our words and our deeds, to bring all with whom we have any relation under the pure and hallowing influences of our holy religion. Would that we could speak a word that would reach the heart of every Catholic young man in the country, and make him feel that to this noble work is he called, and that in it he may find an object equal to the largest ambition, and a good that will fill his soul with sweet joy and peace. We are growing old now, and our hair is turning white, and, young men, we look to you to enlist in the grand army of the living God, and to march forth with brave hearts to the battle against ignorance, superstition, heresy, infidelity, irreligion, the implacable enemies of the Church, and always in arms against the Lord and his Christ.

2. *College Conversations.* By MARY MONICA. Vol. II. London : Burns. 1849.

THESE Conversations are written by a lady, a convert from Anglicanism to the Church, and the volume before us has been placed in our hands by a reverend and very dear friend, late engaged in giving missions in England, with a request that we would examine it and give our opinion as to its suitableness for republication in this country. The book is pleasantly written, in a gentle spirit, and our young folks have found it very interesting. It is a good book of its class, and the class cannot be too much multiplied. We never praise a book written by a lady, if we can help it, for we think the writing of books is not woman's vocation, and a female literature is pretty sure to be a sentimental literature, wanting always in robust health and masculine energy; and we generally look upon every work by a recent convert as *suspect*; but in the present case we very cheerfully commend the little work before us, and trust that some of our enterprising publishers will not hesitate to give us an American edition of it.

3. *The Glories of Mary. From the Italian of* ST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI. First American Edition. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1852. 12mo. pp. 802.

THIS is a very beautiful edition of one of the sweetest and most admired of the devotional works of that great saint, Alphonsus Liguori. We have not compared the translation with the original, but it has been made by one that is abundantly able to do it faithfully, tastefully, and affectionately. We say no more of this work now, for we mean to seize the earliest opportunity to make it the text for an article on devotion to Our Lady.

4. *The Ursuline Manual. Catholic Piety. The Child's Catholic Piety.* New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1851.

THESE are well-known and approved manuals, and need no commendation from a reviewer. We notice them now as an act of justice to Messrs. Dunigan of New York, who are among our most deserving Catholic publishers, and distinguished for their enterprise and liberality as business men. They spare no pains to send out their publications in the best style of art, and the editions of these manuals now before us, especially of *The Ursuline Manual*, deserve high commendation for the beauty of the letter-press and the richness of the binding. The illustrations are numerous, and

several of them are of great merit. They are mostly from Overbeck or from disciples of his school, — a school which is highly admired by those who are better judges of art than we are, but which after all does not entirely satisfy us. It has too much mannerism, and appears to be confined to a single type. Upon the whole, however, these excellent manuals will compare favorably for letterpress, illustrations, and binding, with the best specimens of publications issued in this country, and we trust the publishers will find themselves liberally patronized.

-
5. *Rivers's Manual; or Pastoral Instructions upon the Creed, Commandments, Sacraments, Lord's Prayer, &c. Collected from the Holy Scriptures, Fathers, and Approved Writers in God's Church, with Prayers conformable thereunto, for the Use of those who wish to be instructed in the Christian Religion.* Boston: Thomas Sweeney. 1852. 12mo. pp. 432.

THIS would appear to be a well-known and standard work, although we ourselves never heard of it before seeing the present edition. We have partially examined it, and with two exceptions, where the author gives as the doctrine of the Church what is only opinion in the Church, namely, that man was created in a state of grace, &c., — the Council of Trent uses the word *constitutus*, instead of *conditus*, — and that a man may be saved with simple faith *in voto*, without faith *in re*, we like it very much, and regard it as a most excellent work. We would, however, suggest to the publisher to employ an editor and a proof-reader when a second edition of it is called for, and also to do the same in the case of several other publications which he has sent out. His publications are distinguished for the errors of the press, and the lack of editorial supervision.

-
6. *Reflections on Spiritual Subjects, and on the Passion of Jesus, Christ. From the Italian of ST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI.* Boston: Donahoe. 1851. 12mo. pp. 331.

IT is enough to say that this is one of the spiritual works of St. Alphonsus Liguori. It cannot be too often read and meditated, with a prayer to the great saint to pray for us.